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INTRODUCTION
Waging a war against the Northern people from 1861 to 
1865 involved a great deal more for Mississippians than 
raising and equipping volunteer regiments. As a result of 
the war situation, the destitute became a tremendous burden 
on state officials as the death of providers, scarcity of 
necessities, and Federal invasion daily added families to 
this category. Subsisting the military forces, combined 
with feeding and clothing the needy, presented Mississippi 
officials with problems which alone taxed state resources 
heavily.
Yet, these problems, great as they were, proved only a 
part of the very difficult situation facing Mississippi dur­
ing the Civil War. The state’s people were by no means 
united in their views concerning secession and the efficacy 
of war as a panacea for existing sectional problems. A 
significant portion of the population firmly believed the 
Union should be preserved at all costs, and when secession 
precluded that, remained obstinately aloof from either Con­
federate or Mississippi officials. Then as Confederate and 
state policies— particularly those regarding impressment 
and conscription— unfolded, thousands more in Mississippi
iv
disavowed any further support for "the cause." Thus, state 
officials never could depend on anything approaching a uni­
fied population during the mammoth struggle which ensued.
Mississippians traditionally declined to invest excess 
capital in industry, choosing instead to return any surplus 
profits gained through agricultural pursuits back into ex­
panding that system through the acquisition of more land 
and slaves. Therefore, when war cut off the Western sources 
of supplies, and the blockade prevented the exportation of 
cotton, Mississippi officials found themselves forced to 
create a self-sufficient system. Since no domestic supply 
of such necessities as salt, grain, and medicines existed 
in 1861, state authorities were faced with the vast problem 
of either creating such supplies at home, or finding some 
way to break through the circle of Northern military forces 
to tap some source outside the state.
To obtain necessary articles, to maintain an army, and 
to provide for a multitude of destitute within the state, 
required vast expenditures of money— and in 1861 the state 
possessed none. Since Mississippi had formerly repudiated 
its "faith and credit," little remained of either when the 
war forced the immediate creation of a comprehensive financial 
structure. Mississippi's record of fiscal irresponsibility 
precluded any foreign help in absorbing bond or money issues, 
thus leaving the state's citizens as the only source from 
which wealth could be obtained to act as a foundation for a 
workable financial structure. How this was accomplished,
V
amid a seriously divided people beset by inflation and 
scarcity, invaded and largely occupied by an enemy force, 
and dependent upon a distrusted and often despised National 
Government forms the basis of this study.
VI
CHAPTER I
MISSISSIPPI ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR
For four decades prior to 1860 constant irritation ex­
isted between the people residing in the Southern states 
and those living in the North. Commencing before the South­
ern political stranglehold on the Federal government ever 
came under serious challenge with the debate over nullifi­
cation in 1833, a series of events occurred which taken to­
gether indicated to both the North and South that geograph­
ical divisions were also becoming political boundaries. 
Slavery, by 1820 an almost exclusively Southern institution, 
had since its gradual evolution in the last half of the Sev­
enteenth Century, evoked both support and opposition from 
people residing in all sections of the United States. How­
ever, beginning with the Missouri controversy in 1820, the 
debate over slavery assumed a far more menacing dimension. 
Most of those who attacked slavery after that fateful year 
haled from the North; while the practitioners and defenders 
of the institution lived, almost invariably, in the South. 
Thus, after 1820, the slavery issue became a distinctly 
geographical one which this issue, combined as it inevitably 
was with other sectional grievances, produced what appeared
1
2by 1860 as two manifestly dichotomous societies; one in 
the North and one in the South.1
Peaceful coexistence between the increasingly divergent 
social ideologies developing in the North and South would 
have proven extremely difficult had disparities concerning 
slavery represented the only major issues. But this was 
not the case. Adding immense complications was a great re­
ligious revival in some areas of the northeast, which touched 
off a whole series of reform movements. While these reform 
impulses were directed toward correcting a number of soci­
etal shortcomingsWhat disturbed the South most was that 
by far the greater part of reformist energy appeared directed 
toward what became the "sin" of slaveholding.
The motivation behind this shifting of the grounds upon 
which Northern reformers attacked the institution of slavery 
originated in what was termed perfectionism, which demanded 
the personal involvement of its adherents in the business of 
the Lord. Because perfectionism held out the possibility of 
ultimate salvation to those willing to sacrifice for the 
cause of humanity, the scattered opposition to slavery was
^Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy (New York, 1966); Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free 
Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before
the Civil War (New York, 1970); Kenneth M. Stampp, And the 
War Came (New York, 1950); David B. Davis, The Slave Power 
Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style (Baton Rouge, 1969); Stan­
ley Elkins, Slavery : A Problem in American Institutional
and Intellectual Life (Chicago, 1959). Moore says that there 
were two societies in America, a Northern and a Southern so­
ciety. Foner and Stampp describe the Northern mind, and 
Davis and Elkins demonstrate how these two societies came 
into conflict.
3forged into a white-hot, uncompromising crusade. The goal
of the resulting campaign could contenance no compromise;
it must end only with the demise of the hated practice of
one human being holding another in bondage. The natural
outcome of taking this view toward slavery, that is that it
represented a sin, was of course to view the slaveholder as
a sinner. Under perfectionist urgings, sin must be rooted
out, while at the same time the sinner— in this case the
Southern slaveholder— must be convicted of his sin, and per-
2
suaded to forego its indulgence.
The ensuing crusade of the abilitionists by no means 
drew immediate and full support from the Northern populace. 
On the contrary, for several years the Northern press and 
public constantly derided the vigorous campaigners, and con­
demned them for further stirring up hurricanes to endanger 
the safe voyage of the ship of state which during this period, 
for many reasons other than differing sectional views on 
slavery, frequently sailed on treacherous seas.
Another major factor in furthering the creation of di­
vergent societies in the North and South had its roots in 
the War of 1812, America’s faltering and almost fatal ex­
perience in this conflict led to a stress on developing in­
dustry and manufacturing. Ill-suited to agriculture, the
^Gilbert H. Barnes, The Anti-Slavery Impulse, 1830-1844 
(New York, 1933). Barnes describes the impact of revivalism 
and perfectionism in the abolitionist movement.
4North rapidly built around its existing commercial nucleus 
a society based largely on industrial, banking, and trans­
portation pursuits. Obviously, the requirements for a social 
order founded on such activities differed sharply from those 
necessary to an agrarian-based economy. With the boost pro­
vided by experience in the War of 1812, the North began to 
demand more and more favorable legislation designed to en­
courage and protect its infant industrial society. Internal 
improvements at government expense, a national banking system, 
and a protective tariff were basic needs to Northern indus­
trialists, while in most Southern regions, these services
3
were considered superfluous, if not downright harmful.
Ultimately, all these vexatious problems were reduced 
to an intractable question of power politics. Whereas the 
agrarian South enjoyed practically unchallenged national gov­
ernmental superiority from the founding of the republic; in 
the years following the War of 1812 the commercial northeast 
mounted a serious threat to this Southern domination. Both 
the North and South fully recognized that the section which 
controlled the Federal legislative machinery could thereby 
dominate the other.4 The Missouri controversy of 1820 cen-
^The most complete early articulation of this scheme, 
which came to be the basis of the Whig program, is Henry 
Clay’s "American System," which he enunciated in 1824. For 
a study of the life of Clay, see Glydon G. Van Deusen, The 
Life of Henry Clay (Boston, 1937).
^This fight between the South and the North over con­
trol of the Federal governmental machinery, with a stress on 
the slave issue as a main causal factor is a main theme in
5tered on the question of legislative power, as did the nul­
lification crisis in 1833, Undoubtedly the question of 
sectional domination of the Federal governmental machinery 
precipitated the debate in Congress over the Wilmot Proviso 
in 1848. Certainly geographical as well as social consid­
erations added heat to the bitter struggle temporarily 
halted by the great Compromise of 1850. Then came the de­
cade of the fifties, with its series of explosive contro­
versies: notably those over Kansas-Nebraska, Uncle Tom's
Cabin, John Brown’s raid, the Dred Scott Decision and 
slavery. But just as surely there invariably existed the 
strong overtones of control and raw power.
Beginning in 1820, and increasingly thereafter until 
1860, the North consistently strengthened its ability to 
exercise greater influence on the course of national legi­
slation. Meanwhile, the South appeared far from willing to 
sit idly by while the national power base shifted northward. 
Initially relying on free discussion and the tactics of 
rhetorical persuasion which had proved sufficient in the 
past, the South ultimately concluded that another tack 
must be taken if its cherished institution of slavery was 
to be maintained. After the debates over nullification 
finally made the slavery question a permanent national 
issue. Southerners devised a completely new argument to
William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification
Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York, 1965) 
and in Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
6justify its continuing to hold slaves. Whereas prior to 
the early 1830's most Southerners apologetically defended 
slavery on the grounds that such a labor system represented 
a necessary evil, following the attack by the North after 
the nullification crisis Southerners demonstrated a mili­
tant defense of the institution on the declaration that it 
was a positive good. It provided the only possible labor 
force capable of working rich Southern soil under the 
broiling sun and in the malaria-infested low lands, so the 
argument ran, and at the same time provided a means of civ­
ilizing a great number of black Africans. Given the rather 
strict class structure in the South, such an argument was 
possible to present and universally maintain in that region, 
but this in no way bound Northern opinion. Abolitionist 
newspapers, speakers, and missionaries abounded in the North, 
preaching and writing in an effort to convince more North­
erners that slavery must be killed if freedom itself was to 
survive.
As a result of its change in approach to the slavery 
question, the South became extremely conservative, oppres­
sively intolerant, and not a little paranoid on the subject 
of slavery.® But it is important to realize that while most
5The changing Southern attitude toward slavery, with em­
phasis on the South's militant defense of the institution as 
a positive good, is found in Ibid.
^Southern paranoia concerning the subject of slavery re­
ceives full treatment in David B. Davis, The Slave Power Con­
spiracy and the Paranoid Style.
7discussion centered around the slavery issue, it undoubtedly 
served in part as a scapegoat for other social differences 
which in the period from 1820 to 1860 literally rent the , 
national fabric asunder.? Southerners were by no means 
blind to their loss of power on the Federal level, and when 
it became obvious, as more and more free states were added 
to the Union, that this loss was going to prove a permanent 
one, the South turned increasingly to defending a political 
philosophy of state rights and state sovereignty. In the 
view of many Southern political leaders, this offered a way 
by which a minority could be protected against the tyrannical 
majority fast gathering behind the leadership of the north­
east.®
And so by 1860, America had indeed become twr ideolog­
ically separate nations, with different views of the proper 
function of government, and with seemingly incompatible 
economic and social objectives. So much bitterness existed 
between these sections that they no longer talked to each
?The use of slaves and slavery as substitutes cloaking 
other social and racial prejudices receives an excellent ex­
amination in Winthrop D, Jordan, White Over Black: The De­
velopment of American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 
(Chapel Hill, 1968).
^Constitutional aspects of the Civil War are discussed 
in two articles by Arthur E. Bestor: "The American Civil
War as a Constitutional Crisis," American Historical Review, 
LXIX (January, 1964), pp. 327-52; and "State Sovereignty and 
Slavery," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society,
LIV (Summerl l96l), pp. 117-70. For a discussion of Calhoun’s 
political theory of minority rights, see Clement Eaton, The 
Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South (Durham> rev. ed., 
1964), pp. 145-62 ; and J . T . Carpenter, The South as a Con­
scious Minority, 1789-1861 (New York, 1930) , Chap. TV~.
8other, but rather at one another. Southerners talked to 
other Southerners, whipping each other into passionate hatred 
of the "Black Republican abolitionist devils" of the North; 
while Northerners discussed among themselves the evil, cor­
rupt, sinful institutions of the people to the south. No 
one listened anymore. Everyone seemed preoccupied with 
condemning anyone who disagreed with him. The conservative 
leadership, which had arranged such responsible compromises 
as that relating to the admission of Missouri in 1820 and 
another in 1850, found their voices drowned in a sea of vitu­
peration.®
Reason and logic gave way to unbridled passion, un­
reasonable rhetoric, and uncompromising declarations that 
everyone else's views were mistaken. Debates among intelli­
gent men no longer rang in the halls of Congress in Washing­
ton; instead many members carried weapons in their coat 
pockets, and decried most opportunities to engage in reason­
able discussion. Instead of retaliating rhetorically to a 
speech made in the Senate which he considered disrespectful 
to a relative, one legislator resorted instead to violence, 
beating the speaker senseless, while other members of Con­
gress sat idly by, making no effort to intervene. Perhaps 
more than any other covert event, this beating administered 
to Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts by Representative
®For a discussion of the defeat of the moderates, see 
Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Com-
promise of 1850 (Lexington, 1964).
9Preston Brooks of South Carolina demonstrated the point at 
which America had arrived by 1856. It took Sumner three 
years to recover, during which time he was re-elected to 
his seat, which remained vacant during his convalescence 
as a tribute. Brooks, on the other hand, appeared something 
of a hero to many Southerners. Citizens of the small town 
of Eastport, Mississippi, even sent him a silver medal in­
scribed "Hit Him Again," to demonstrate their approval.
This single event set the North on fire, and rendered a 
fearful advantage to Northern abolitionist leaders, who point­
ed triumphantly to it as a typical act of barbarism, so basic 
to the Southern character.10 Even more significantly, the 
entire incident lays bare the great extent of the inflamed 
tempers of North and South, and thereby goes a long way to­
ward demonstrating the hatred and distrust of each other 
which was to bring on war.
Mississippi, because of its heavy dependence on slavery, 
felt the shifting national attitude toward its cherished in­
stitutions perhaps more fully than some of the other Southern 
states. Settled but recently, the rich loam along the Mis­
sissippi River delta provided the best soil in America for 
cotton culture— a fact taken advantage of to the fullest 
extent possible by people whose sole aim was to plant more 
cotton acreage than anyone else. As a consequence, Missis­
sippi’s social, economic, and political institutions had
James G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1961), p. 102.
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been for several decades prior to 1860 under the domination 
of a planter aristocracy. This is not to imply that the 
planter leadership was absolutely unchallenged, for indeed 
it found maintenance of its tight control increasingly 
difficult. Still, in 1860 the planter unquestionably oc­
cupied the economic and social apex of Mississippi society, 
even if his political grip had been somewhat loosened by 
the election to the governorship in 1859 of a backwoods law­
yer, John J. Pettus.ll Yet, most Mississippians understood 
full well that the threat to their way of life in 1860 was 
a common threat, and they set out with the intention of 
meeting it united. The failure of this effort accounts in 
large part for the incredibly tragic and complicated drama 
played out in the state house at Jackson and on the fields 
of the Magnolia state during the brief life of Confederate 
Mississippi.
The course pursued by Mississippians during the war 
years, like the motivation for Mississippi’s secession from 
the Union, had roots deeply imbedded in pre-war traditions. 
Consequently, to understand what Mississippians attempted 
during the war, it is first necessary to gain some under­
standing of the state’s ante-bellum history, particularly 
developments in the decade of the fifties.
llpor a discussion of Pettus' career as wartime Governor 
of Mississippi see Robert W. Dubay, ’’John Jones Pettus, Mis­
sissippi Fire-Eater: His Life and Times, 1813-1867” (Unpub­
lished dissertation. University of Southern Mississippi, 1971)
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During the course of this ten year period, hatreds and 
sectional mistrust seethed continually, and agitation for 
secession in the South and in Mississippi increased at an 
accelerated rate. In the early years of that decade, it 
appeared mostly the politically ambitious in Mississippi 
who maintained that secession represented the only avenue of 
escape from the domineering society of the North. The law- 
yer-politician, the small-town editor and the planter who 
held only a few slaves comprised this restless, violently- 
oriented group, who decried compromise and propounded se­
paration. For a time, conservative men of property and 
standing, believing that the only hope for the protection 
of slavery lay in remaining in the Union and thus under the 
shield of the Constitution, successfully held the more vitu­
perative fireaters in check. But with as much help from 
fanatical minority groups of abolitionists in the North and 
West as from the fireaters in the South, these conservative 
moderates found their position continually eroded until by 
1860, their voices appeared weak indeed. Venomous rhetoric, 
spewed forth by irresponsible Northern abolitionists, pic­
turing Southern slaveholders as sinners and threatening to 
forcefully overthrow their social order, persuaded many a 
Mississippi Unionist to regretfully acknowledge that he no 
longer remained safe in that Union. This obviously played 
directly into the hands of Southern fireaters whose preach­
ments were equally as irresponsible as anything published or
12
spoken by the abolitionists.1^
This blistering cross-fire enfiladed moderate Missis­
sippians, who ultimately came to the conclusion that the 
fireaters had been right all along— their interests were 
indeed now threatened by that very Union which had hereto­
fore protected them. The only honorable course left lay in 
negotiating the thorny road through secession to political 
independence.13
Despite decades of real and imagined provocation, there 
existed in Mississippi in 1860, remarkably few thoroughgoing 
state rights leaders of the most rabid sort. Rather, two 
more moderate positions encompassed most political viewpoints 
in Mississippi. The group which wanted to resort to seces­
sion to break up the Union insisted that by so doing, they 
were protecting and preserving a social system which no 
longer found safe refuge in the Union. The other position—  
fast declining in popularity as insult followed injury in 
the decade of the fifties— opposed secession as the only 
remedy to correct existing ills, not because they desired 
compromise with the abolitionist position, but rather because 
they still hoped slavery could be protected under the Union, 
provided there existed sufficient non-abolitionist moderates 
in the North willing to act responsibly.
13Percy Lee Rainwater, Mississippi : Storm Center of
Secession, 1856-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1938), p. 218.
ISlbid., pp. 218-19. 
l^lbid., pp. 202-03.
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Significantly, however, both these groups in Missis­
sippi regarded any benefits which might accrue by remaining 
in the Union as strictly secondary to the maintenance of 
the institution of slavery. This certainly formed the major 
consideration, and because of its dominant character, poli­
ticians of all shades of opinion could find a home in the 
Democratic party in Mississippi in 1860. Regardless of 
whether a man was struggling to rise to the top of the social 
ladder, or whether he had "arrived” at that esteemed position, 
he fully recognized that the only consideration remaining was 
the basic one of survival of his traditional social system—  
and this system rested firmly on the maintenance of slavery.
The view one held on slavery, then, constituted the only 
criteria by which a Mississippian’s loyalty was tried. Mis­
sissippi's social system unquestionably rested on slavery, 
and because this system appeared to the Southerner far super­
ior to that of the North based on free labor, it must be 
maintained at all costs. Upon Lincoln's election forced 
emancipation, previously only a rhetorical throat, now seemed 
a distinct p o s s i b i l i t y L i n c o l n ' s  real view toward slavery 
in states where it already existed was one thing; how most
For a discussion of the domination of the planter 
class in the South prior to the war, and an assertion that 
the planter interests recognized that in the war they were 
fighting for their very survival as a class, see Eugene D. 
Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New York, 1965).
^®Reuben Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and Missis­
sippians , Rev. ed. (Hattiesburg, Miss.: University and Col­
lege Press of Mississippi, 1972), pp. 390-91.
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Southerners conceived his position constituted quite an­
other question. Because they firmly believed Lincoln aimed 
toward absolute eradication of the institution of slavery, 
Mississippi slaveholders and non-slaveholders alike arose 
with an uncharacteristic singleness of purpose upon his 
election. According to an outstanding Democratic leader in 
the state, O, R. Singleton, the educated and the illiterate, 
the wealthy and the destitute, the slaveholder and the man 
who desired to own slaves were now "so indissolubly united 
in feeling and interest that if you but touched a chord con­
nected with either, it vibrates through our whole social 
system, and unites in more rapid motion the blood of every 
heart."17
It is interesting to imagine the difference it might 
have made to subsequent history if Mississippi's people had 
sustained the pervasive spirit of cooperation with one an­
other engendered by the election of Abraham Lincoln. Al­
though welded firmly by their loyalty to a social system 
whose benefits most believed considerably outweighed any 
which might accrue by continuing in the Union, generations 
of cultural and social dichotomies were not to be forgotten 
overnight.
The relatively united front achieved in the fall of 
1860, therefore, represented the zenith of cooperation be­
tween divergent social and political elements in Mississippi.
^^Congressional Globe,37th Cong., 35 Sess., pt. 2, p.
1274.
15
Even in their hour of greatest cohesion— celebrated by the 
signing of the Secession ordinance in January, 1861— seeds 
of discord planted prior to the crisis of 1860 grew apace. 
From the highwater mark represented by the secession lon- 
vention, the mood of cooperation and oneness of purpose 
commenced a précipitions plunge which ultimately dragged 
most Mississippians into the quagmire of despair some three 
years later.
Decades of social distinction could not be so easily 
glossed over, regardless of the threatening gestures of a 
common enemy. Class differences were important in Missis­
sippi, with each group striving for goals which were ana­
thema to the other. In these traditional class distinctions 
lay the roots of deadly discord. For despite their momentary 
cooperation in 1861, the exigencies of war brought out pre­
viously existing disparities to such an extent as to serious­
ly hamper every wartime program inaugurated by the harrassed 
leadership.
Pre-eminent among the causes which led to internal dis­
sent ion during the war years was the rather strict class 
structure existing since the earliest period of settlement 
in the state. Forming the apex of this social system stood 
the powerful, if small, planter aristocracy. Probably the 
most heterogeneous of all the social classes, this proud 
group had always exercised an influence far out of propor­
tion to its numbers. Many in this class proudly traced
16
their origins to European social distinctions, but in Mis­
sissippi, even more arose from the professional classes, 
who in turn had risen from the lower classes by force of 
merit. For the most part, entrance to this charmed circle 
of lordly barons depended exclusively on wealth— as repre­
sented by land and slave holdings. Some few, of course, 
were products of generations of upper class gentry, but in 
the raw states of the old Southwest, many more represented 
the nouveau riche, but recently raised from the ranks of 
lower social levels. Characteristically, these men exhibit­
ed more interest in horse-racing, extravagant living, cards, 
dancing, and speculating in land and slaves than in reading 
or the fine arts.^® Still, by 1860 they did have a consid­
erable stake in existing social structures and represented 
in Mississippi that group which opposed secession as long as 
possible, then accepted it with extreme reluctance as the 
only alternative to dishonorable submission to Northern 
domination.19
Falling just below this wealthy aristocratic group in 
Mississippi came the smaller planters. The majority of 
these men had only recently risen from the professional 
classes, and a great number of them in fact kept a foot in 
two worlds— they invested in land and slaves, but maintained
l^Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern 
United States to 1860,~~ï (New York, 1941), pp. 492, 496-497.
l^Rainwater, Mississippi: Storm Center of Secession,
pp. 218-219.
17
connections with their other profession as well, usually
20law, medicine, or merchandising.
These men, realizing their stake lay in the future, 
and aspiring to join the large planter class, formed the 
group most vociferous in demanding political independence 
through secession, regardless of whether or not it could be 
achieved peacefully. These small planters demanded direct 
trade with Europe and, because their scale of operation was 
smaller than that of the large planters, they experienced 
little need for the services of the large factorage houses 
of the commercial northeast. Local finance, uncertain as 
it sometimes was, proved sufficient for the small planter 
who usually, it should be reiterated, relied in part upon 
the continuing income derived from his participation in an­
other profession. Often times, planters of the smaller 
type even provided a large part of their ''wn financial back­
ing, thereby creating in this group a distinctly independent 
21spirit. Their limited crops of cotton could be hauled by 
wagon to the Mississippi River, and upon arrival at New
number of the delegates to the secession convention 
in January, 1861 represented this type of Mississippian.
Each delegate was asked to list various statistical informa­
tion about himself for inclusion in the convention Journal. 
For this descriptive list, see Journal of the State Conven­
tion and Ordinances and Resolutions Adopted in January, 1861 
(Jackson: E. Barksdale, 1861), Appendix. (Hereafter refer-
red to as : Journal of the State Convention, January).
^^Herbert Weaver, Mississippi Farmers, 1850-1860 (Nash­
ville, 1945), p. 36; Gray, History of Agriculture, I, pp. 
498-499.
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Orleans, small brokerage firms handled its disposal, usually
to European industrialists. These same routes in reverse
furnished the small scale planter with all the necessary
supplies for carrying on his operations. As a consequence
of this arrangement, Mississippians of this social class
exhibited a strong spirit of independence throughout the
decades just prior to the Civil War. It was they who formed
the backbone of the secession movement in Mississippi; and
it was their sons who demonstrated the greatest willingness
to shed their blood in the vain effort to win Southern po­
ng
litical independence.
By far the most numerous free social class in Missis­
sippi on the eve of the Civil War was the yeoman, or self- 
sufficient farmer. Not confined to the richly-productive 
delta regions of the state as were the planter classes, this 
collection of men ranged over the entire state, from the 
sandy soil of the Gulf Coast district to the red clay hills 
bordering the Tennessee River in northeast Mississippi. Own­
ing very few if any slaves, this class of people represented 
the most independent and self-sustaining of any in Missis­
sippi. They grew food and livestock sufficient to meet 
their personal needs, and enough extra to purchase what they 
could not themselves p r o d u c e . ^3 Their stake in the mainten-
22john K. Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi: The
People and Policies of a Cotton State in Wartime (Baton 
Rouge, 19437.
23por the place of the self-sufficient farmer in ante­
bellum Mississippi, see Weaver, Mississippi Farmers, p. 39;
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ance of the institution of slavery was minimal to say the 
least; their way of life would continue on about the same 
economic level regardless of the outcome of a war over 
slavery. Still, fireating rhetoric struck responsive chords 
among this group for reasons which are not always clear. 
Some, of course, supported the secessionist movement in the 
hope that it would bring political independence, thereby 
protecting slavery— and they hoped to join the ranks of 
the holders of a socially significant number of slaves in 
the future. Others asserted their willingness to fight the 
abolitionists simply because the latter group appeared to 
attack all Southerners irrespective of their individual re­
lationship to slavery. Thus resentment at being classed 
categorically as sinners goaded some to accept violent revo­
lution as a sort of national pergative— a trial by combat.^ 
Perhaps the major motivation behind the support the 
yeoman farmer lent to secession was the catch-all phrase 
"state rights." Their dedication to a doctrine which most 
doubtless would have been at a loss to explicate appeared 
clearly evident to anyone who spent much time in the South 
either prior to or during the war. William H. Russell, a
Joseph H. Ingraham, The Southwest, By a Yankee (New York, 
1835), II, p. 26; Frederick L. Olrastead, The Cotton Kingdom: 
A Traveller's Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the Amer­
ican Slave States, Rev~! ëdL (New York, 1970), pp. 347-360.
^^The achievement of a Southern consensus regarding 
slavery in the ante-bellum period is dealt with in detail 
throughout Elkins, Slavery.
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British journalist on a visit to a camp hospital in north 
Mississippi, recorded an incident which vividly points this 
out. On approaching a wounded Confederate soldier, Russell 
heard him cry, "Stranger, remember, if I die . . . That I 
am Robert Talion, of Tishomingo County, and that I died for 
States' rights; see, now, they put that in the papers, won't 
you? Robert Talion died for States' r i g h t s . Despite 
his probable inability to explain the logic of the doctrine 
of state rights, the fact remains that the yeoman farmer in 
Mississippi felt very strongly that Northerners were bent on 
destroying these rights. Consequently, regardless of what 
the individual imagined the term "state rights" to include, 
he certainly based a substantial proportion of his hatred 
for the North upon what he considered the latter's infringe­
ment upon these sacred tenets.
Falling socially somewhere between the small planter 
and the yeoman farmer, although far less numerous than either, 
were the professional and merchant classed. Although usually 
not physically engaged in the business of agriculture, these 
classes in rural, agricultural Mississippi were in fact 
closely tied to the farming interests. For the small plan­
ter, and even some of the larger ones, merchants served as 
factors, handling the shipment of the cotton crop, as well 
as the importation of necessary supplies. Thus, the pros-
BSwilliam Howard Russell, My Diary North and South 
(Boston, 1863), p. 317.
21
perity of the farming community had a direct bearing on the 
solvency of the merchant class. Often, in order to become 
established in business, the mercantile houses loaned credit 
in the form of supplies to farmers, taking in turn the pledge 
of payment when the crops were marketed in the fall. Conse­
quently, the merchant's fortunes necessarily rose and fell 
with financial fluctuations experienced by the agricultural 
interests.26
The professional class in Mississippi, if one excludes 
planters and merchants, was fairly small in 1860. Chiefly 
consisting of lawyers, doctors, editors and teachers, this 
group exhibited little cohesive interest as a separate social 
class. This resulted both from its relatively minute numer­
ical standing, and the fact that most members of this group 
held at least some interests in other class activities—  
mainly farming. Both Stephen.Duncan and his son, for ex­
ample, were medical doctors, yet together they operated one 
of the largest plantation systems in the entire South, joint­
ly controlling thousands of acres of rich cotton land, and 
owning several hundred slaves.2? Obviously their interest 
in activities affecting planters far outweighed any concern 
they might have for the best interests of the medical pro-
26por comments on how this system operated in Mississippi, 
see Peter F. Walker, Vicksburg: A People at War, 1860-1865
(Chapel Hill, 1960), pp. 20-22.
27Stephen Duncan and Stephen Duncan Jr. Papers, "Corre­
spondence and Accounts, 1860-1869," Louisiana State Univer­
sity, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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fession. As a further indication of the multi-occupational 
nature of nominal members of the professional class in Mis­
sissippi, of the one hundred delegates to the secession con­
vention in 1861, only six identified themselves as exclusively 
planters, while another nine described themselves as lawyers
go
and physicians, with farming interests. Not surprisingly 
then, professional men as a group with identifiable, common 
interests did not exist in Confederate Mississippi.
Insofar as their participation in or influence on the 
course of political, economic, or social activities of Mis­
sissippi during the Civil War is concerned, the two remain­
ing groups, poor whites and slaves, are of insignificant 
consequence. Although most of the actions taken by the 
state government during the war directly reflected that 
state’s interest in the institution of slavery, the slaves 
themselves played no part in developing policy decisions. 
Neither did the poor whites, except to serve as elusive prey 
for search parties of conscript officers who spent consider­
able time searching through tangled underbrush in an attempt 
to flush them out and force them into Confederate or state 
service. Some whites of the poorest class, realizing that 
the maintenance of the slave system offered the only ob­
stacle to their being placed at the very bottom of the social 
scale, fought alongside their more prosperous neighbors, but 
the effort expended in the frequently futile attempt to 
coerce them as a class into military duty probably offset
28journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), Ap­
pendix.
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any benefit those willing to fight afforded the Confederate 
cause.29
The rhetorical battle which raged for forty years prior 
to the outbreak of the actual resort to arms, undoubtedly 
served to articulate what the war would be about. Tradi­
tional class structures, especially strong in the planter- 
dominated society of Mississippi, largely determined the 
overall effectiveness of the war prosecuted by that state.
But behind all this lay the most important factors: those
which inexorably decided the winner in the struggle for South­
ern independence. For underpinning political and social 
structures lay a unique economic and financial foundation, 
weak in times of prosperity; perhaps fatal in case of war. 
Caught up in a fantasically naive belief in their ability to 
whip the cowardly Northern abolitionists, and ever relying on 
the almighty power of "King Cotton," Mississippians and most 
other Southerners rushed headlong into war, never for a mo­
ment doubting the outcome. Like an over-indulgent father 
finally grown weary of his son's belligerent habits, Missis­
sippi and the South reluctantly left their home in the Union 
when the usurper grew too strong to be thrown Out instead. 
Confident that the fight, should it come to that, would be 
brief, decisive, and triumphant for them. Southerners de­
voted precious little consideration to the weakest link in
29j. L. Power to B. G. Humphreys, October 29, 2865, Ser. 
E., Vol. 77, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 
Jackson, Mississippi. (Hereafter referred to as MDAH.)
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their social chain— the incredibly lopsided, dependent, ill- 
conceived economic system. Here was the link that failed—  
not lack of willingness, or raw courage, or determination—  
but far more importantly, the utter failure of an impossibly 
inept economic scheme.
Because of the pervasive effect the economic and fin­
ancial system exercised on all other phases of the Missis­
sippi war effort, it is important to determine just where 
Mississippi stood in those areas in 1860. A brief review of 
the various aspects of manufacturing, transportation, agri­
culture, and finance, as those activities fit into the over­
all picture presented by Mississippi on the eve of secession 
points up the development of conditions which led to the 
breakdown of morale which early gripped Confederate Missis­
sippi. This situation in turn greatly effected the ultimate 
success of the military efforts attempted during the war 
years.
Although of relatively small proportions when compared 
to the capital invested in planting pursuits, an infant in­
dustry not only existed but thrived in ante-bellum Missis­
sippi. Near the end of the 1830's, textile manufacturing 
interests began to gain converts in the state. In part a 
result of the economic depression which settled so severely 
over Mississippi and the nation in 1837, and partly in re­
action to declining cotton prices, textile mills first made 
their appearance in Mississippi. Although the initial en-
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deavor failed,30 founded as it was on a barter basis, rather 
than a sound cash marketing system, others soon followed, 
and by 1860 four important textile mills operated in Mis­
sissippi. The largest of these was the Edward McGehee plant 
at Woodville, capitalized at $110,000 which produced in 1860 
alone cotton products almost equal to its total capital in­
v e s t m e n t .  31 Following closely behind McGehee*s plant were 
two more large concerns, the Mississippi Manufacturing 
Company at Wesson, and the Pearl River Mills near Jackson. 
With a capitalization of $100,000 J. M. Wesson's Mississippi 
Manufacturing Company turned out some $87,000 worth of cot­
ton products, in addition to corn and flour to the amount of 
$4,000.32 In 1860, the Pearl River Mills, also capitalized 
at $100,000 produced cotton and woolen cloth which it sold 
for approximately $62,000. In addition to these and several 
other smaller privately owned textile mills, the publicly- 
owned enterprise manned by convicts at the state penitenti­
ary, operating from a modern plant at Jackson, produced in 
1860 about 300,000 yards of linsey cloth valued at $80,000.33 
The largest manufacturing interest in Mississippi in 
1860 was lumbering. Although this type of industry would
30john H. Moore, "Mississippi's Ante-Bellum Textile In­
dustry," The Journal of Mississippi History, XVI (April, 1954), 
p. 85.
3lManuscript returns, Eighth Census of the United States, 
"Industrial Statistics for Mississippi," MDAH.
3 2 j b i d .
3 3 j b i d .
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be of less value to the war effort than, for example, the 
small foundries, its importance in furnishing timber for 
the construction of small armed vessels is apparent. By 
1860, the lumbering industry employed some 1,425 persons, 
working in 228 plants and produced annually about $2,000,000 
worth of timber products.
Next in importance to the lumbering industries were 
those concerned with grain milling. In 1860, these types 
of operations, usually operated on a small individual scale, 
collectively produced about $1,327,064 worth of flour and 
meal. These types of mills proved especially important dur­
ing the war in preparing the grain for use in baking.35
Following these larger industrial efforts came a host 
of smaller establishments, concerned with blacksmithing, 
carriage and wagon making, tanning, manufacture of farm im­
plements and other types of machinery, and boot and shoe 
making, to name only a few. The census of 1860 innumerated 
approximately thirty-six distinct commercial occupations, 
but for the most part they represented very small, usually 
individual operations.^® Obviously these "manufacturers,” 
engaged as they were in such occupations as cigar making.
34Eighth Census of the United States,III (Washington, 
1865), p. 294.
35lbid.
36Manuscript returns, Eighth Census, MDAH. Some of the 
Mississippi manufacturing concerns employed slave labor in 
their operations. For a discussion of the use of slaves in 
ante-bellum Southern industry see Robert S. Starobin, In­
dustrial Slavery in the Old South (New York, 1970).
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stone cutting, book selling, lime burning, and the like 
would have little effect on the total war effort.
In 1860, despite these beginnings in industrially- 
oriented occupations, Mississippi still ranked lowest in 
the Union, except for Florida, in the total value of its 
annual industrial p r o d u c e . B u t  the trend was definitely 
toward more capital investment in manufacturing pursuits, 
for between 1850 and 1860, the number of industrial estab­
lishments in Mississippi rose from 877 to 976, with an in­
crease in capital investment from $1,833,420 to $4,381,492.38 
As a further indication of this steady if slow growth, the 
number of people in Mississippi employed in manufacturing 
pursuits rose from 3,173 in 1850 to 4,775 in 1860, while 
the value of raw material used in manufacturing processes 
increased from $1,290,271 to $3,146,636.39 Perhaps the 
rise in the value of products manufactured is most instruc­
tive, for it indicates that not only was the volume of in­
dustrial output j i'creasing, but at the same time it evi­
dently became more sophisticated, for the value of this 
output increased from $2,972,038 in 1850 to $6,590,687 in 
1860.40
By themselves, these figures might appear to reflect
3?U. S. Eighth Census, III, p. 729. 




only a normal rate of growth for a decade, but another fac­
tor must be considered which demonstrates that Mississippians 
were increasingly turning to industry deliberately, and not 
because the profits to be made in agriculture were declin­
ing. In f^ct, in the decade from 1850 to 1860, the exact 
opposite happened. Cotton prices rose continually, with 
only temporary setbacks due to quickly-overcome d e p r e s s i o n s .  
Since, therefore, returns on money invested in agriculture 
had never been more consistently rewarding, and since Mis­
sissippi's social structure rested so pervasively upon slav­
ery, the natural inclination of men with money to invest 
would appear to dictate that this surplus capital be invest­
ed in land and slaves, instead of industry and manufacturing. 
Obviously, since this was not the case, Mississippians made 
a conscious effort in the decade preceeding the Civil War 
to achieve a more balanced economy. Still, the coming of 
armed conflict pvt a sudden stop to further industrial ex­
pansion. As the Federal armies overran the state, they car­
ried out a policy of systematic destruction which almost 
completely destroyed the industrial nucleus founded by pre­
war Mississippians. All the large textile mills fell victim 
to this Federal policy. The mill at the state penitentiary, 
the Pearl River establishment, and the Edward McGehee plant
^^John H. Moore, "Economic Conditions in Mississippi on 
the Eve of the Civil War," The Journal of Mississippi History, 
XXII (July, 1960), pp. 167-169.
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were all destroyed in 1863, and the Mississippi Manufactur­
ing Company the following year.42
As industry slowly developed in Mississippi, and more 
lands not contiguous to the Mississippi River were cleared 
and planted, the need for permanent, reliable transportation 
facilities increased. Responding to this need, and goaded 
by an increasingly "fanatical" North, men of wealth in Mis­
sissippi turned to the investment of considerable capital in 
railroads, both as a way to tap the expanding interior mar­
kets and at the same time to prevent Northern capital from 
coming South to finance— and control— the transportation 
services.43
The successful efforts to construct a railroad system 
become evident upon comparing statistics at the beginning 
of the decade of the 1850's, and the situation ten years 
later. Miles of operable railroad in 1850 totaled 75; in 
1860 it had increased to 862|. The cost of railroad prop­
erty value exceeded $24,458,000 in 1860. When the war com­
menced, eight railroads operated in Mississippi, five of them 
owned by Mississippi-based companies. The railroad companies 
controlled by Mississippians were the Grand Gulf and Port 
Gibson; the West Feliciana; the Alabama and Mississippi,
43Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi, I 
(Chicago, 1891), p. 1193; Ibid., II, pp. 202-20S; Moore,"Mis- 
sissippi's Ante-Bellum Textile Industry," pp. 93, 96-99.
43Moore, "Economic Conditions in Mississippi on the 
Eve of the Civil War," pp. 174-176.
30
sometimes referred to as the Southern; the New Orleans, 
Jackson, and Great Northern; and the Mississippi Central. 
Adding significantly to these local railroad companies 
were the Mobile and Ohio, which traversed the length of the 
eastern part of the state; the Memphis and Charleston, which 
ran across the northern part of the state in an east-west 
direction; and the Memphis and Tennessee, which connected 
Holly Springs and Canton in M i s s i s s i p p i . 44
Although still in the developmental stage in 1860, the 
new railroads proved a boon to Mississippi's farmers, who 
formerly depended either on plodding wagon or river trans­
portation to move their cotton to market. The railroads 
greatly aided those few towns, notably Vicksburg, which ac­
cepted and utilized them in combination with the river to 
build a strong commercial business with major Southern port 
cities, like Memphis and New Orleans. During the war these 
railroads, which could have facilitated the transportation 
of goods and people, thereby relieving much of the starvation 
which plagued the state, instead became political pawns, 
utilized more for the movement of troops and speculator's 
plunder than for alleviating civilian distress. Still, their 
presence did contribute significantly to the overall war ef­
fort in Mississippi, and in many instances, operated to the
44james C. Ballagh, (ed.). Southern Economic History, 
Vol. V of Thé South in the Building of the Nation (Richmond, 
1909), pp. 362-363. "
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relief of civilian d i s t r e s s . 45
Despite encouraging advances in manufacturing and in­
ternal improvements in ante-bellum Mississippi, the average 
farmer in 1860 evidenced at most a passing concern in these 
programs. Politically, socially, and economically Missis­
sippi still depended predominantly on agricultural pursuits, 
Because of the constantly increasing demand for more cotton 
at higher prices, slavery was more firmly entrenched than 
ever, as indicated by the increase in their number from 
309,878 in 1850 to 436,631 ten years later.4® Correspond­
ingly, more Mississippians joined the ranks of that most 
esteemed class, composed of those who held human chattels.
In 1850, 23,116 Mississippians held slaves, while ten years 
later the number had risen to 30,943.4? The trend in agri­
culture appeared definitely moving toward larger, consoli­
dated farm holdings, for there existed only a nominal in­
crease in the total number of farmers in this ten year 
period— from 44,833 to 46,308— while an actual decrease oc­
curred in the number of "planters," or large farmers. This 
latter group experienced a loss in its ranks from a high
45voluminous correspondence directed to both Governors 
Pettus and Clark attest to the frequency of disputes which 
arose between railroad, military, and civilian factions through­
out the war. See Governor’s Correspondence, Ser. E, Vols. 51- 
68, MDAH.
4®Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Negro 
Population, 1790-1915 (Washington, 1918), p. 57.
4?Seventh Census of the United States (Washington, 1853), 
p. 447; Eighth Census, II, pp. 232, 247-248.
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water mark of 5,343 in 1850, to 3,098 in 1860.48 it would 
be erroneous, however, to view this as indicating a decline 
in the desire of smaller farmers to achieve the elite station 
occupied by the largest plantation owners; rather, this de­
crease resulted from such factors as improved farm equipment 
and cotton ginning processes, which made larger holdings 
more profitable. Also, financial reverses following the 
panic of 1837 caused many planters to lose their holdings, 
thereby eliminating them from the large planter class. As 
successful competition with these huge operations became more 
difficult, a number of smaller operations consolidated, 
thereby increasing their combined output, while at the same 
time reducing operational expenses.
Nothing short of a pervasive commitment to King Cotton 
could have allowed Mississippi to rank first among the states, 
in the production of cotton in 1860. In that year, 1, 202,507 
bales produced on Mississippi's soil found their way into the 
world market.49 Despite the dominance of cotton, some people 
had the foresight to realize that a one-crop economy, while 
it might hold out the possibility of tremendous profits, 
could by the same token, given adverse conditions, throw the 
state’s economic and financial structure into the depths of 
serious depression. Many newspaper and magazine editors, 
possessing the means of disseminating information among a
48geventh Census, LXXV; Eighth Census, I, p. 273. 
49Eighth Census, II, p. 85.
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large number of people, frequently took the opportunity to 
play the "devil’s advocate" and argued for a more balanced 
and diversified approach to the existing lopsided economy.
A writer in the influential Vicksburg Whig recognized the 
potentially dangerous situation which had developed in Mis­
sissippi and the South when he asserted in 1860 that "the 
people of the South have permitted the Yankees to monopolize 
the carrying trade," as well as "yielded to them the manu­
facturing business, in all its departments without an effort, 
until recently, to become manufacturers ourselves." Hoping 
to demonstrate the completeness with which the Northerners 
had captured all commercial interests, the disgruntled Mis- 
sissippian continued, "We have acquiesced in the claims of 
the North to do all the importing, and most of the exporting 
business, for the whole nation." Recognizing the implica­
tions this failure to diversify held for the South, and 
Mississippi particularly, he concluded, "Thus the North has 
been aggrandised, in a most astonishing degree, at the ex­
pense of the South."^3 James D. B. DeBow, editor of De Bow’s 
Review, the mostly widely-read commercial and economic organ 
in the ante-bellum South, fought a continuing battle to per­
suade Southern farmers that not only must they expand their 
commercial interests to take in activities other than agri­
cultural, but he warned specifically against the continuance 
of almost complete dependence upon a single crop. DeBow
SOyicksburg (Mississippi) Whig, January 18, 1860.
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urged the farmers to continue to raise cotton, but to also 
begin to plant corn and other cereal crops. He recognized 
that it would be foolish to abandon the growing of cotton 
altogether, but neither he asserted, "will it pay very well 
to raise cotton at ten cents per pound, and buy corn at a 
dollar and a quarter a bushel, and bacon at 10 to 12 cents 
per pound."51
But in Mississippi, blessed with the most favorable 
climate and the best soils in America for the production of 
cotton, that staple in 1860 remained king, and so long as 
huge profits could be derived from its cultivation, its reign 
appeared secure. This monolithic concentration on cultivat­
ing cotton provided a tremendous boost to the economy of 
Mississippi in the ante-bellum period, but when this fluffy 
club was looked to to win the war as well, it proved tragic­
ally ineffective.
Mississippi in 1860 possessed the beginnings of an in­
dustrial and manufacturing system. Transportation, long a 
major problem, showed promising signs of growth, especially 
in the decade of the fifties. Cotton retained its throne in 
1860, but diversification showed promise of becoming a real­
ity. Thus, lopsided as it surely was, Mississippi’s economy 
in the years just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War had 
never been so prosperous, with every sign pointing to con­
tinued flush times. But incredibly, behind all this econ-
53-pe Bow’s Review, XXVIII (1860), p. 473.
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omic complexity lay— nothing. Banking and finance, with 
its attendent circulating medium simply, for all practical 
purposes, did not exist in Mississippi in 1860. On the con­
trary, Mississippi's expeditions into the jungle of finance 
had invariably terminated in disaster. Since all efforts to 
construct some sort of feasible financial system resulted 
in dismal failure, Mississippi by 1860 had simply decided to 
get along without one. If this appears impossible in modern 
times, the answer of course is that it would be. But condi­
tions in ante-bellum Mississippi do not even vaguely parallel 
current financial complexities, and in the period just pre­
vious to the war, Mississippi could and did suffice reason­
ably well with little attempt to again create its own fi­
nancial and banking system. Instead, agrarian Mississippi 
managed simply by relying on a time-honored system of barter 
and loans obtained in the spring using the expected fall 
harvest as collateral. Merchants, if they wished to remain 
in business, catered to this system, freely loaning planters 
and farmers alike necessary items with which to survive un­
til gathering time in the fall. At that'^ime, the crop 
would be given to the merchant or factor, who, having de­
ducted the amount owed him for supplies advanced, disposed 
of the remainder to the best advantage, returning the excess 
to the producer.5%
This simple procedure served the needs of the large and
S^Walker, Vicksburg, pp. 20-21.
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small planters, as well as the yeoman farmers. The mer­
chant received good prices for his supplies, and by loan­
ing necessary items to the agriculturalists, assured him­
self of their considerable trade. The slaves’ modest 
requirements were of course supplied by the planter. A 
self-sufficient farmer had little need for goods other than 
those he could produce, and the poor whites could not have 
afforded most items offered in the mercantile houses, even 
if they had experienced sufficient motivation to walk or 
ride their mules to town to see the goods.
On the surface this system, based on barter and credit, 
appeared adequate to the needs of all classes of Mississippians. 
As a matter of fact, it was adequate— as long as other states 
furnished Mississippi with a circulating medium to fill what 
little need the latter had for that sort of thing. The ex­
isting system served admirably with cotton prices climbing 
steadily, and the depressions which regularly gripped the 
remainder of the nation mostly overlooking the cotton-pro­
ducing South. To sit smugly by while sister-states grappled 
with the problems of inflation and contraction of their cur­
rencies, worried with counterfeiters, and prosecuted abscond­
ing bank presidents:— this was truly reaping the benefits 
while leaving others to suffer the problems. But let that 
peace be broken, and woe to the state which operated on the 
premise that the best policy consisted of no policy at all.
To create out of nothing a reasonably satisfactory financial
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policy in the crisis conditions produced by the outbreak 
of the war would have taxed the skill of experts ; unfor­
tunately none resided in Mississippi in 1860.
Mississippians unquestionably enjoyed a much more fav­
orable and balanced economic position in 1860 than had been 
the case ten years earlier. With their agricultural experi­
mentation paying off in increased yields, a reasonably ade­
quate railroad system in operation, and a sound beginning 
accomplished in introducing industry to Mississippi, the 
state appeared to one of its leading citizens, Reuben Davis, 
to be "basking in God’s benediction."^3 Still all was not 
well in the South and in Mississippi for people in those 
sections believed they saw in the threats of Northern aboli­
tionists to not only exclude slavery from the territories 
but eradicate it in the Southern states as well a potential 
issue which could lead to serious consequences for national 
unity.
Mississippi on the eve of the Civil War represented a 
prosperous, if deeply troubled society. The South’s loss 
of national power, threatened since 1830 and realized in 1860, 
created intense uncertainty over the immediate future of the 
American republican experiment. The unwillingness to com­
promise sectional needs in relation to such basic economic 
issues as the tariff, a national banking system, and internal 
improvements moved the nation closer to conflict. Abolition-
S^Davis, Recollections, p. 374,
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1st rhetoric, countered by equally irresponsible diatribes 
of the Southern fireaters left little ground for reconcili­
ation. Finally, the moderate conservative leaders, whose 
calm leadership in times of crisis had formerly proven suf­
ficient to smooth the troubled waters, had either died or 
been rejected in favor of men given more to violent reaction 
than to reasonable policy planning.
And so the war came to Mississippi and the South. Mis­
sissippians, driven to desperation by decades of abolition­
ist goading, generally welcomed the relief that actual battle 
would bring. What most martial-minded Southerners did not 
realize, however, was that sound economic policies, coupled 
with shrewd diplomatic maneuvering would prove far more im­
portant than military encounters in deciding the ultimate 
victor. Violent rhetoric, as effective as it proved in 
stirring the hot blood of young Southerners, contained nothing 
which would contribute to that section’s building a sound 
financial system sufficient to meet the exigencies of sus­
tained warfare. And in this area especially, Mississippi 
faced an extremely difficult situation, both as a result of 
its financially irresponsible past actions, and its total 
lack of any domestic financial system as war broke over the 
land in 1861.
CHAPTER II
A FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND TO MISSISSIPPI
WARTIME FINANCE
From the time white settlers first occupied lands along 
the Mississippi River in the latter decades of the eighteenth 
century, Mississippi’s wealth consisted largely of cotton. 
Since baled cotton presented difficulties if used directly 
in commercial transactions, some substitute had to be found 
to serve as an acceptable exchange medium. Out of this 
need, the practice of using gin receipts, which showed how 
many bales of a certain grade of cotton an individual pos­
sessed, became common in the old Southwest. Still, for the 
comprehensive transactions required by society as a whole, 
this type of medium proved unsatisfactory, and as a result, 
the Bank of Mississippi was chartered in 1809. When Missis­
sippi became the seventeenth state to enter the Union in 
1817, still more sophisticated financial arrangements were 
made with the old bank being converted into an official organ 
of the state. To encourage this young financial institution, 
as well as to protect its own investment, the state of Mis­
sissippi granted to the bank exclusive banking privileges,
y
which were to continue until 1840.
^Mississippi Senate Journal (1817), pp. 1-29, lop-101;
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The reorganized bank, headquartered in Natchez and 
authorized to operate several branches in other commercial 
centers within the state, increased its stock to $3,000,000 
twenty-five per cent of which was subscribed by the state.
The state treasury was in such a destitute condition, how­
ever, that it had to borrow the money to purchase a portion 
of the stock allowed it by law, and it was not until 1821 
that sufficient funds accumulated to increase its stock 
holdings in the bank to $39,200.^
Almost from the beginning, a continuing battle raged 
in Mississippi over whether or not the state should official­
ly involve its faith and credit with private banking enter­
prises. This very problem, and the subsequent activities 
surrounding shifting attitudes toward this relationship, 
created a situation in Mississippi which plagued its every 
attempt to establish a feasible financial system. In 1820, 
Governor George Poindexter came to the conclusion that 
granting the bank exclusive privilege to operate in the state 
was not only unwise, but unconstitutional. Although his 
reasons for attacking the Bank of the State of Mississippi, 
as it was now described, seemed personal in nature, he did 
receive extensive support from rural districts. These out­
lying areas, jealous of the domination of the river towns in
Robert C. Weemes, Jr., "Mississippi's First Banking System," 
the Journal of Mississippi History, XXIX (November, 1967), p. 
397.
^Mississippi Code (1824), pp. 469-470; John K. Betters­
worth, Mississippi : A History (Austin, 1959), p. 201.
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general, and Natchez in particular, demanded greater flexi­
bility in obtaining loans— a requirement the conservative 
directors of the bank appeared unwilling to grant.^
Failure to establish branches in the backwoods sections 
of the state as it had promised, coupled with increasing 
pressures for more credit to buy up the recently-acquired 
Indian lands, led to the downfall of the Bank of the State 
of Mississippi. In 1830, some forty per cent of the state's 
population lived in the rural districts away from the river, 
and these people, combined with others from the western 
counties who for one reason or another disliked the con­
servative stance the bank maintained, cooperated in the 
state legislature to charter a new bank. Thus, despite the 
state's guarantee of exclusive banking privileges granted 
to the original bank, the Planter's Bank was established as 
a rival institution.^
Even more than had been the case with the Bank of the 
State of Mississippi, the Planter's Bank constituted prac­
tically an arm of the state government, as two-thirds of its 
capital would be subscribed by the state. To avoid problems 
which arose due to the conservative and arbitrary policies 
of the old bank, this new institution was required to divide
^Weemes, "Mississippi's First Banking System," pp. 396- 
399, 408; J. T. Brown, A Story of Banking in Mississippi 
(New York, 1961), p. 11.
^Bettersworth, Mississippi : A History, pp. 201-203;
Brcwn, A Story of Banking in Mississippi, p. 11.
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the quantity of its mortgage loans equally among the sena­
torial districts.5 As its name implied, a chief motivation 
behind the establishment of this bank lay in the desire to 
provide relatively easy credit to the rapidly-expanding 
agricultural community.
Thus in 1830, Mississippi possessed one conservative 
bank and one unconstitutional bank, for which the faith and 
credit of the state remained pledged to a considerable extent. 
Meanwhile, the treasury being practically empty, the state 
had to cast about for a means of financing its stock pledges. 
Finally, after two unsuccessful years, Mississippi negoti­
ated a high-interest loan in New York, allowing the Planter's 
Bank to actually open its doors.®
At that point, the complex financial structure erected 
by Mississippi desperately needed a respite to strengthen 
its foundation, but instead outside factors intruded to 
further complicate matters. In 1831, the Bank of the United 
States established a branch at Natchez, thereby opening yet 
another source of credit to land-hungry speculators who de­
scended on the hapless state in hoards as the Chickasaw and 
Choctaw Indians left the state for the Indian Territory
7
west of the Mississippi River.
^Charles H. Brough, "The History of Banking in Missis­
sippi," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society,
III (1900), pp. 317-340.
®Ibid.; J. A. P. Campbell, "Planter's and Union Bank 
Bonds," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society,
IV (1901), pp. 109-157.
^Brown, A Story of Banking in Mississippi, pp. 11-12.
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In the meantime, the conservative policies which the 
directors of the Bank of the State of Mississippi stubborn­
ly continued, combined with the competition of the Planter's 
and United States Banks, led to the cessation of operations 
of Mississippi’s original banking institution in 1831.®
With the collapse of this one conservative restraint on 
credit practices in the state, Mississippi entered upon a 
period of wild speculation and speculation which ceased 
only after irreparable damage placed the state’s financial 
credibility under grave doubt.
What occurred then has been described in inimitable 
vividness by a young lawyer from Virginia, James G. Baldwin, 
one of dozens of such men who flocked to Mississippi, drawn 
by the lure of an unprecedented number of court suits growing 
out of land disputes :
Credit was a thing of course. To refuse 
it— if the thing was ever done— were an insult 
for which a bowie-knife were not too summary or 
exemplary a means of redress. The State banks 
were issuing their bills by the sheet, like a 
patent steam printing-press its issues; and no 
other showing was asked of the applicant for the 
loan than an authentication of his great dis­
tress for money. . . .
’’Commerce was king"— and Rags, Tag and Bob- 
tail his cabinet council. . . . Banks, charter­
ed on a specie basis, did a very flourishing 
business on the promissory notes of the indi­
vidual stockholders ingeniously substituted in 
lieu of cash. They issued ten for one, the 
one being Fictitious. They generously loaned 
all the directors could not use themselves, and
o
William L. Coker, Repudiation and Reaction: Tilghman
M. Tucker and the Mississippi Bond Question (New York, 1969), 
p. 19.
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were not choice whether Bardolph was the en­
dorser for Falstaff, or Falstaff borrowed on 
his own credit, or the funds advanced him by 
Shallow. The stampede towards the golden 
temple became general: the delusion prevailed
far and wide that this thing was not a burles­
que on commerce and finance. Even the directors 
of the banks began to have their doubts whether 
the intended swindle was not a failure. Like 
Lord Clive, when reproached for extortion to the 
extent of some millions in Bengal, they exclaim­
ed, after the bubble burst, "When they thought 
of what they had got, and what they might have 
got, they were astounded at their own modera­
tion."®
Despite Mississippi's inability to subscribe to the 
full amount its authorized stock in the Planter's Bank, that 
institution managed to plot a fairly stable financial course, 
even under such conditions as those described by Baldwin, 
competition from the United States Bank, and the Agricultural 
Bank, chartered in 1833. The Planter's and Agricultural 
Banks each received a tremendous boost when in 1833, as a 
result of President Andrew Jackson's attack on the Bank of 
the United States, each received in excess of $1,000,000 in 
Federal funds, transferred by Jackson to his "pet" banks.
Chaotic as it had previously been, banking in Missis­
sippi became even more irresponsible when the branch of the 
United States Bank ceased operation in Natchez in 1835. This 
action precipitated an immediate crisis, as its demise seri­
ously curtailed credit availability in Mississippi just as
9James G. Baldwin, The Flush Times of Alabama and Mis- 
sissippi: A Series of Sketches (San Francisco, lS05), pp.
83, 87.
^^rough, The History of Banking in Mississippi, p. 232,
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that frontier state was experiencing its biggest boom as a 
result of the opening of former Indian lands for white set­
tlement. Reacting to this situation, Governor Hiram G. 
Runnels advised the legislature in 1835 that creation of 
a "land" bank would alleviate the shortage of immediate 
credit, as such a bank could loan money to planters and 
farmers, who would secure their loans with their land.^^
This proved tremendously appealing, because people could 
now borrow money to buy land, using the land in turn as col­
lateral. Consequently, if for some reason the purchaser 
was unable to meet the payments on the land he simply lost 
it to the bank, and since he had nothing to hegin with, he 
lost nothing.
A bill creating a bank organized along the lines sug­
gested by Runnels passed the house, but failed in the sen­
ate. This plan did not lie abandoned for long, but quickly 
revived when the Planter's Bank exhibited definite signs of 
financial responsibility, which it did in 1835 when it de­
clared a dividend of 10 per cent.^^
But the speculative wave rose higher, drowning conser­
vative opposition, and in 1837 the legislature chartered 
the Union Bank, based on Runnel's principles proposed some 
two years earlier.13 As with the Planter's Bank, the state
llMississippi Senate Journal (1835), p. 21.
• 12
Brough, The History of Banking in Mississippi, pp. 
323-324.
l^Mississippi Laws (1824-1838), pp. 766-784.
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of Mississippi pledged its faith and credit to secure a 
great portion of the stock of the Union Bank, but unlike 
its earlier experience, found little difficulty in market­
ing its bonds to secure these stock pledges. In 1838, no 
less a personage than Nicholas Biddle, former President of 
the Second Bank of the United States, consented to purchase 
the entire $5,000,000 in bonds offered for sale by Missis­
sippi.^- Biddle even shipped large amounts of gold bullion 
to Mississippi to pay for his bond purchases, and for a time 
it seemed that nothing could hamper continued prosperity.
But the flush of affluence faded quickly from Mississippi's 
financial structure, when the seeds of fiscal irresponsi­
bility, sown as early as 1818, began to achieve fruition in 
the fertile soil of utterly false speculative prices in land, 
Even had America continued prosperous economically, it 
is doubtful whether Mississippi's muddled, conflicting, un­
constitutional financial structure could have remained sol­
vent. But that chance for survival by revision never came, 
for in 1837 the most devastating panic ever to grip the 
United States cast a gloom over the land which continued, 
except for brief periods, for several years. Mississippi's 
bloated economy, based upon unrealistic land values and car­
ried on a high tide of practically worthless currency, began 
to topple and then collapsed altogether. Society, as one
l^Reginald C. McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American 
State Debts (New York, 1935), pp. 196-197.
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observer pointed out, "cannot always stand on its head 
with its heels in the air," and when the crash finally 
came, it seemed as it the "ribs of nature broke."15 Men 
formerly worth a million dollars were insolvent for two 
millions. Since everyone in a community had endorsed his 
neighbor's note, in return for his own being secured in 
like manner, Mississippi went broke by neighborhoods. For­
ced land sales kept the sheriffs busy condemning and sell­
ing property by the thousands of acres. Faced by utter 
financial ruin, many families took the easy way out and 
gathering what possessions could be quickly and quietly 
collected, set out for Texas and a new life, leaving the 
hapless state government to salvage what it could from the 
financial disaster.^®
Gathering enough courage to attempt a minimum of con­
trol over fiscal policy of the banks still operating in the 
state, the Mississippi legislature provided in 1837 for 
state commissioners to visit the various banks, checking 
on their financial arrangements. Some of these banks, not­
ably the Planter's Bank and the Agricultural Bank, refused 
to allow the commissioners to inspect their books, but them­
selves fully revealed their true condition by suspending
17specie payments in May, 1837.
15Baldwin, Flush Times, p. 89.
IGj, A. Orr, "A Trip from Houston to Jackson, Mississip­
pi, in 1845," Publications of the Mississippi Historical So- 
ciety, IX (1906), pp. 174-180.
^^Bettersworth, Mississippi : A History, p. 210.
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Just as panic conditions descended on the country, 
Mississippi’s interest payments on the loans obtained to 
pay for the state's portion of stock in the Planter's and 
Union Banks began to fall due. Having no means to meet 
these payments, Mississippi's leaders searched for ways to 
avoid their promise by pointing to technical flaws in the 
laws chartering the banks, or laws passed subsequently 
which in any way altered the original charter. As a stop­
gap measure. Governor Alexander G. McNutt in 1840 accused 
several Mississippi banks of having amassed huge profits in 
the midst of panic conditions, and as a consequence, demanded 
the surrender of thuir charters. The Union Bank, sponsored 
in large part it must be remembered by the faith and credit 
of the state of Mississippi, was among McNutt's v i c t i m s .
At this critical juncture, a general election in Mis­
sissippi resulted in bringing the entire banking question 
before the voters. Many people favored urging the state to 
utilize existing technical violations in the charters of 
some banks, notably the Union Bank, and thereby squirm out 
of meeting their sworn obligations. Tilghman M. Tucker, a 
lawyer and stickler for constitutional integrity, ran for 
the office of governor on the pledge that if elected, he 
would repudiate the state's promise to support the Union 
Bank's stock. David 0. Shattuck, a Methodist minister, vi­
gorously opposed Tucker, believing that the future credit
^^Mississippi Senate Journal (1841), pp. 16-22.
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of the young state depended upon the immediate funding of 
its obligations, regardless of the financial hardship in 
doing so.19
The ensuing campaign was fought over the single issue 
of repudiation, and when Tucker won handily, the will of 
a majority of Mississippians clearly favored disavowing the 
state's obligation in the matter of paying the indebtedness 
due on account of the Union Bank. True to his campaign pro­
mise, Tucker sponsored legislation designed to eliminate 
completely the state's obligation to honor its pledge. Af­
ter a minimum of debate the legislature passed such a bill, 
based upon the assertion that a supplementary law which 
substantially altered the Union Bank's original charter had 
not been affirmed by two consecutive legislatures, as re­
quired by law. This failure, it was asserted, negated any 
responsibility the state might otherwise have in fulfilling 
its plighted "faith and credit" on behalf of the Union Bank.^®
As simply as that Mississippi relieved itself of any 
burdensome duty to uphold the state's credit— and as simply 
as that Mississippi's credit suffered irreparable damage. 
Repeated appeals to Mississippi's honor and pride, if not 
constitutional obligation to meet payments on capital bor­
rowed to purchase stock in the Union Bank fell on deaf ears.
l^coker. Repudiation and Reaction, pp. 17-39.
BOReport of the Select Committee on the Union Bank 
Bonds, to the Mississippi Legislature (Jackson, 1842), pp. 
1-19:
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In time, the Planter's Bank became linked in the public 
mind with the debacle of the Union Bank, and not to miss 
such a golden opportunity, the state for good measure re­
pudiated its responsibility in the case of the bonds issued 
on behalf of the former as well.
Despite these decisive state actions, the issue of ul­
timate payment of the repudiated bonds cropped up with in­
creasing regularity, eventually reaching the state supreme 
court which in 1853 ruled in favor of p a y m e n t . A t  that 
juncture, a referendum was called, and the state's elector­
ate again upheld repudiation. For all practical purposes 
insofar as the state of Mississippi was concerned, the mat­
ter ceased to be debatable. Ultimately, when Mississippi's 
constitution underwent extensive revision in 1890, a clause 
was inserted which precluded forever the collection of monies 
due the holders of the Planter's and Union Bank bonds.
Based upon its disastrous excursions into the world of 
high finance, leaders in Mississippi, from the 1840's until 
the Civil War, determined to forego the benefits of operat­
ing a home-grown financial structure, in order to thereby 
avoid the responsibilities which attended such a system.
Since neighboring states, notably Louisiana and Tennessee,
21john F. Cushman, (comp.). Reports of Cases Argued and 
Determined in the High Court of Errors and Appeals for the 
State of Mississippi, XXX (Boston, 1890), p. 681.
BBjournal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Con- 
vention of the State of Mississippi (Jackson, 1890), p. 681.
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furnished Mississippians with a sufficient paper money medium 
for ordinary transactions, the decision to revert to a credit 
method of finance following the calamity of the 1840's was 
deliberate. Such a total shirking of economic responsibil­
ity portended grave consequences when in 1861 Mississippi, 
building upon a far more burdensome foundation than none at 
all, was forced to attempt the instant creation of a workable 
financial system. Meanwhile, politics, not finance, occu­
pied the thoughts of most Southerners. Further thought about 
fiscal matters would follow the high political drama about 
to be played out in a series of secession conventions.
The autumn of 1860 was a time of great decision for 
Mississippians as they anxiously awaited the outcome of the 
presidential election. Southerners, believing that most 
abolitionists supported Abraham Lincoln and that the latter 
would be certain to do their diabolical bidding if elected,
determined to leave the Union if the new Republican party
23proved victorious. When the results of the election con­
firmed their worst fears, Mississippians demanded that Gov­
ernor John J. Pettus call a special meeting of the state 
legislature to discuss a plan of action. Pettus, "a disunion
man of the most unmitigated order," hastily summoned the
24legislature to convene in Jackson.
Fired up by the sure knowledge that most Mississippians
^^Reuben Davis, Recollections, pp. 384-386 
24lbid., p. 378.
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were willing at last to follow the course he had advocated 
for years, Pettus presented a succinct, closely-argued mes­
sage, in which he called upon the people of his state to 
consider "the most solemn question that ever engaged the 
attention of any Legislative body on this Continent." Pet­
tus, speaking of slavery, referred to it as a problem "in­
volving more human happiness or human misery than any poli­
tical question of the age in which we live." Carried away 
by the opportunity to at last address a group who in large 
part agreed with his dis-unionist sentiments, Pettus assured 
his eager listeners that"upon the solution of the slavery 
problem hangs the destiny, for weal or woe, not only of this 
generation and this age, but of all generations which come 
after us, for an indefinite term of centuries, the end of 
which no prophet can foretell." Pettus affirmed his belief 
that the "existence or abolition of African slavery in the 
Southern States is now up for final settlement," and "that 
all the power the Southern States now have . . .  is to choose 
whether it shall be a peaceable and gradual abolition, or 
speedy and violent."^5
Believing it his duty to place the state in a position 
of readiness should the North determine to make a fight of 
it, Pettus urged all Mississippians to "go down into Egypt 
while Herod rules in Judea," as that appeared the "only 
means of saving the life of this Emanuel of American poli-
^^Mississippi Senate Journal (November, 1860), pp. 5-6
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t i c s . "26 Having thus enunciated his own feelings, Pettus 
presented his plan for meeting the exigencies he fully anti­
cipated. He recommended that the legislature appoint com­
missioners to visit the other Southern states, appraising 
them of Mississippi's action, and urging joint cooperative 
effort. Pettus also requested the legislature to appropri­
ate money to pay the expenses of volunteer companies which 
he intended to call, and urged the drawing up of a coat of 
arms. In view of "the probable great derangement of monetary 
and commercial relations of the country, and to prevent 
ruinous sacrifices of property of the people," he entreated 
the special session of the legislature to pass a law "staying 
the bringing of suits and the collection of debts by execu­
tion sales." Finally, Pettus urged the legislature to call 
an election for the purpose of selecting delegates to a 
special convention, to meet early in 1861. Avoiding the use 
of the word "secession," Pettus described the purpose of the
proposed convention as allowing the state the "right to de­
cide for itself the mode and measures of redress, for all 
violations of the rights of her citizens, or the rights of
the State, either by the Northern States, the people of the
27Northern States, or the Federal Government." There re­
mained no doubt concerning what "means of redress" Pettus 
favored, and it appeared in November, 1860, that a majority
26 Ibid., p. 11.
27lbid., pp. 7, 11.
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of Mississippians agreed with his proposed course of action.
Judging from his recommendations, Pettus devoted pre­
cious little thought to re-creating a financial system for 
Mississippi— an essential prerequisite for effective opera­
tion of the independent status which Pettus and a majority 
of the legislature clearly contemplated in late November, 
1860. The Governor proposed the raising of revenue to pay 
for volunteer companies, but stopped short of suggesting 
from what source the money should come. He fully understood 
that Mississippi's wealth lay chiefly in land and slaves.
He already claimed the loyalty of most middle-class Missis­
sippians so his main concern appeared to lie in convincing 
the conservative planters that their best hope for main­
taining their slaveocracy rested in supporting him and the 
secessionist cause. Pettus' one concession to the small 
land owners was the recommendation of the passage of a 
"stay law," which although the lower economic classes were 
loudest in demanding, would benefit the planters equally if 
a war should cut off their sources of Northern credit. This 
"program" proposed by Pettus in 1860 foreshadowed the course 
he continued to take when secession became a reality in 
January, 1861. Until his retirement as Governor in 1863, 
Pettus stubbornly refused to base his financial program upon 
the needs and abilities of those classes upon whom the great 
burden of war fell— the small planters, yeoman farmers, and 
to a lesser extent, the poor whites. This failure led di-
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rectly to widespread demoralization of a large portion of 
Mississippians early in the war, which in turn effectively 
prevented the success of any of the state's military, econ­
omic, and social programs.
But problems of taxation, starvation, and deprivation 
had not loomed on the horizon to darken the scene when the 
so-called secession convention met in January, 1861 in re­
sponse to an election the previous December. This drama 
marked the disunionists' finest hour; the yoke of tyranny 
would be thrown off with a gradiose flourish, and the state 
would assume an independent status. To a significant number 
of others, however, secession portended an ominous and un­
certain future. Even in this final drama of secession so 
long worked for by Mississippi fireaters, a portion of the 
populace stubbornly favored a more conservative, cautious 
course. The road chosen now depended on the action of a 
distinguished group of one hundred delegates who assembled 
in Jackson, the state capital, on January 7, 1861.
Even though it might appear that hotheaded secession­
ists ruled the day in Mississippi in 1861, an examination 
of the membership of the convention discloses this to be by 
no means the case. Instead, the members to that convention 
represented rather accurately the deeply divided feelings of 
Mississippians over the proper course of action to pursue. 
Whatever the outcome, it could not be said that the dele­
gates totally lacked deliberative experience. Thirty-one
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of the hundred men had previously served in the Mississippi 
legislature, while five were former members of the United 
States Congress.28
The members of the convention responded to a request 
to record some information about themselves, which yielded 
an interesting profile of the makeup of the delegation. 
Politically, twenty of the one hundred men listed themselves 
as ’’Democrats," and twelve identified themselves as "Whigs." 
Beyond this, members chose either to list no political af­
filiation at all, or make up a name both indicative of their 
dissatisfaction with being identified with political parties 
including Northern membership, and showed their intense 
identification with "Southernism." For example, four mem­
bers called themselves "States Rights Democrats," eight 
"Southern Rights Democrats," and seven simply "Secession 
Democrats." Those who wished to maintain some identification 
with the old line Whig party used a variety of labels. Be­
sides the twelve who claimed to be simply "Whigs," three 
said they were "Old Line Whigs," three "Secession Whigs," 
two "Secession Old Line Whigs," one "States Rights Whig," 
one "Clay Whig," and one "Old Whig."29
A number of others ignored the traditional "Democrat" 
and "Whig" appellations altogether and adopted instead a
^Ralph A. Wooster, "The Membership of the Mississippi 
Secession Convention of 1861," the Journal of Mississippi 
History, XVI (October, 1954), p. 2431
29journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), Ap­
pendix.
57
variety of manes which above all dramatized their "Southern­
ness." Ten simply listed themselves as "Southern," five as 
"Secessionist," five as "Southern Rights," four as "A Mis- 
sissippian," three as "State Rights," and one each as "In­
dependent Southern," "Disunionist per se," "Inflexible 
State Rights," "Independent," and "Extremely and Intensely 
Southern." In addition to these vividly descriptive shades 
of political opinion, five listed no such affiliation at 
all, while one said his creed was "Opposed to Universal 
Suffrage." Without a doubt, members to the secession con­
vention represented a wide spectrum of political opinions.^®
Occupationally, agriculture claimed the greatest num­
ber of delegates, with forty-two listing their vocation as 
either farmer or planter. The next most numerous group con­
sisted of lawyers, of whom there were thirty-three present, 
and six said they were physicians. A variety of other occu­
pations rounded out the membership, including clerks, law 
officers, and saddlers.
Economically most of the members definitely fell into 
the middle to upper income group. Again, however, the ex­
tremes were present, represented by J. W. Wood of Attala 
who claimed to possess only $100 in real property, while 
W. L. Keirn of Holmes County set his real property holdings 




erty holdings were found in the 1860 census returns, the 
average for each delegate was $38,139.76. In personal prop­
erty, the average came to $50,801.66.
Since the main question to be decided, as outlined by 
Pettus in November, 1860, revolved around the "protection" 
to be given the institution of slavery, it is instructive 
to determine where the delegates stood in their personal re­
lation to that institution. Ninety-seven of the delegate's 
census records for 1860 can be located in the returns, and 
that record shows that of these men, eighty-five held slaves. 
Of these eighty-five, slave holdings ranged from the two of 
S. H. Terrell, to the two hundred ninety-three held by Henry 
Vaughn. By far the largest group of delegates, twenty-four, 
held from one to two slaves, while seventeen others held at 
least ten, but less than twenty. Consequently, fifty-three 
to fifty-six delegates held less that twenty slaves in 1860, 
placing them, according to one historian of Southern slavery, 
in the category of "small p l a n t e r s . T h e  total delegation 
to the secession convention, excluding the three for whom no 
returns can be located in the 1860 census, held an aggregate 
of 3,356 slaves, or an average of slightly over 34 slaves
e a c h . 3 4
S^Ralph A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the 
South (Princeton, 1962), pp. 31-32.
33u. B. Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South (Bos­
ton, 1929), p. 339; Wooster, "Membership of the Mississippi 
Secession Convention of 1861," p. 248.
34\vooster, The Secession Conventions of the South, pp. 
34-35.
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Insofar as their agricultural interests were concerned, 
fifty-one of the delegates grew some cotton in 1859, with
individual amounts ranging from five to two thousand bales.
In the production of corn, the total amount produced by the
delegates totaled 181,435 bushels, demonstrating that agri­
cultural diversification had begun to make some headway in 
Mississippi. The largest producer of both corn and cotton 
among the delegates was Miles H. McGehee, who produced in 
1859 some 25,000 bushels of corn. Apparently McGehee did 
not import all his grain from Northern and Western sources, 
as many of the largest cotton planters in the ante-bellum 
South did.35
From this brief analysis, certain generalizations re­
garding the membership of the Mississippi secession conven­
tion emerge. Perhaps most important to note is that the 
group was composed mostly of young, small planters and law- 
yer-planters, with a marked proclivity toward secession. 
Further, a typical delegate held slaves, but not more than 
twenty, and was relatively successful economically, having 
in excess of $47,000 in real and personal property. The 
political stake of the average delegate to the Mississippi 
secession convention lay, consequently, in the future; for 
while he was already established in the middle to upper 
social class, he had not yet arrived at the apex of social 
status achieved by the largest planters. Thus, protection
^'^Manuscript returns. Schedule No. 4, "Productions of 
Agriculture," Eighth Census of the United States, MDAH.
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of the social order, based on slavery, represented the major 
concern of most delegates to the convention. As events 
demonstrated, the average delegate believed political se­
paration held out the most promise as the surest means of 
guaranteeing the continuance of the prevailing social order.
The heated debates which marked the secret sessions of 
the convention did not revolve around whether slavery should 
be protected— all agreed on that as the prime consideration—  
but rather on the most effective method of achieving this 
objective. Every other question was directly related to the 
central one of the protection of slavery. The debates over 
the means to use in achieving the common goal, however, pro­
duced heated passions which clearly demonstrated the deep 
divisions among Mississippians over the question of seces­
sion. With reference to this problem, four major positions 
emerged at the convention which, because they represented 
serious splits existing prior to the convention and through­
out the Civil War period, deserve some consideration here.
Certainly, most conspicuous at the convention were un­
compromising disunionists, led mainly by C. D. Fontain of 
Pontotoc. Next, there were those known to be moderate se­
cessionists, so classified because of their desire to make 
final action on secession dependent upon the action of other 
Southern states. Outstanding in the leadership of this 
class stood Wiley P. Harris, L. Q. C. Lamar, D. C. Glen, 
and in fact a majority of the delegates. Third were the
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co-operationists, who coalesced around the idea that the 
Lincoln administration should be given a fair chance to 
prove its desire to protect slavery in the states where it 
already existed. This group favored remaining in the Union, 
at least until conditions became noticeably worse, and fight­
ing for state rights and slavery from behind the shield of 
the Constitution. Most of the large planters, such as Miles 
and Edward McGehee and A. K. Farrar, as well as such emin­
ent lawyers as T. A. Marshall and Walker Brooke formed the 
vanguard for the co-operatioaists at the convention. Fin­
ally, a significant number of the delegates simply favored 
remaining in the Union, regardless of the action of the other 
Southern states. Committed to the idea that secession would 
only create additional grievances, while doing nothing posi­
tive to alleviate sectional differences, this group gathered
behind the able leadership of James L. Alcorn and Josiah 
0(2
Winchester. The delegations from the northeastern counties,
especially Tishomingo and Ittawamba, gave strength to the
37Unionist position.
The dichotomous views as to the most effective method 
to be utilized in the protection of slavery created consid­
erable dissension in the convention which assembled in Jack-
36percy Lee Rainwater, "An Analysis of the Secession 
Controversy in Mississippi, 1854-1861," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XXIV (June, 1937), pp. 35-42.
37papers of Andrew Johnson, 1859-1860, Vol. Ill, Li­




son on the morning of January 7, 1861. The strength of the 
secessionist factions became quickly apparent upon the elec­
tion of W. S, Barry, an able but rather extreme secessionist, 
as President of the convention.^® Having prepared a series 
of arguments justifying the resort to secession as a reason­
able redress for decades of abolitionist attacks on slavery, 
the convention moved to preparation of the ordinance itself. 
To prepare this important document, which would serve as a 
sort of declaration of independence, a committee was appoint­
ed, chaired by L. Q. C. Lamar.®® Serious debate ensued, but 
inasmuch as committee debates were carried out in secret 
session, no accurate record of them exists. The objections 
of the co-operationists and Unionists on the committee draw­
ing up the ordinance being easily overridden by the majority, 
the ordinance was submitted to the convention itself. Action 
at that point again demonstrates the depth of divisions 
which persisted with such obstinance throughout the life of 
Confederate Mississippi.
The first of three amendments offered to the ordinance 
as submitted by the Lamar committee was drawn up by J. S. 
Yerger, and consisted actually of a substitute ordinance.
The title of Yerger's alternate ordinance revealed its pur­
pose: "An Ordinance providing for the final settlement and




adjustment of all difficulties between the free and the 
slave States of the United States, by securing further 
gurantees within the present Union." Despite lengthy sup­
porting speeches, Yerger's amendment went down to defeat, 
by a vote of seventy-eight to twenty-one.40 Actually, this 
does not indicate the full strength of those opposed to se­
cession, for as James L. Alcorn later recalled, he and 
others refrained from voting for the Yerger amendment, be­
cause they fully realized that secession would not be stem­
med at the convention, and they still hoped to force the 
inevitable secession ordinance to a vote of the people, where 
they planned a vigorous campaign against it. To have voted 
for the Yerger amendment, Alcorn believed, would have placed 
him and other anti-secessionists in such a position with the 
mass of Mississippi voters as to have made them totally in­
effective.41
The second amendment offered to the Lamar ordinance was 
proposed by Alcorn, and reflected the co-operationist senti­
ment. Alcorn's proposal provided that the ordinance not 
become effective until at least the states of Alabama, Flor­
ida, Georgia, and Louisiana seceded from the Union. Through 
this amendment, the opposition hoped to lay the foundation 
for an appeal to the people for concerted action, while at
40journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), p. 9,
4lQuoted in Mrs. Justinia Alcorn Swift, "The Life of 
James L. Alcorn," from a speech made at Friars Point, Mis­
sissippi, July 15, 1876, Alcorn Papers, MDAH.
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the same time avoiding the possibility of being branded 
"submissionists" and traitors to the Southern cause. Al­
corn's amendment, like Yerger's, failed by a vote of sev­
enty-four to twenty-five.42
The real nub of the opposition forces centered around 
the third amendment, offered by Walker Brook of Vicksburg. 
His proposal was that the ordinance of secession not become 
effective until ratified by the voters in a special elec­
tion in February, 1861. Having lost their other attempts to 
alter the Lamar ordinance, the full Unionist strength at the 
convention combined to urge the passage of this their final 
effort. One Unionist, J. F. H. Claiborne, stressed that 
this amendment was specifically designed "to give the people 
time for deliberation while we stood on the brink of the 
vast a b y s s . "43 Following more supportive speeches, this 
last resort of the co-operationists and Unionists failed 
of passage by a vote of seventy to twenty-nine. This vote, 
more than that polled on either of the other proposed amend­
ments, indicated the true strength of the opposition member­
ship of the secession convention.44
After the failure of these three amendments, the se­
cessionists appeared unbeatbale, resulting in a steady de-
42journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), p. 9,
43john F . H. Claiborne Papers, University of North Caro­
lina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
44Rainwater, Mississippi : Storm Center of Secession, p.
211; Journal of the Mississippi State Convention (January,
1861), p. 10.
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Cline of support for the Unionist position. The final vote 
on passage of the ordinance— eighty-five to fifteen— did not 
therefore reflect the true division of sentiment at the con­
vention, but instead demonstrated only the intense pressure 
to which those who equivocated were subjected. Only two 
men failed to sign the final ordinance on January 15. Dr.
J. J. Thorton flatly refused to sign, and stayed away from 
the convention on the day he knew the signing ceremony was 
to occur, while John W. Wood, ill during most of the conven­
tion, did not attend on January 15, although he later indi­
cated he would not have signed the ordinance had he been 
present.45 Alcorn, around whom all the forces opposing 
secession eventually coalesced at the convention, summed 
up the work of that body when he later wrote that reason was 
"dethroned; passion ruled the hour and Mississippi was hurled 
from its seat of prosperous repose and unquestioned power 
into the embrace of causeless, cruel, and bloody w a r . "46 
Alcorn’s assessment proved a terrifyingly accurate 
prediction of Mississippi's immediate future. With the act 
of formal secession consumated, Mississippi severed all ties 
with the Federal Union, and became independent for a brief 
time.
. In the interregnum between secession from the United
4^Rainwater, Mississippi : Storm Center of Secession,
pp. 211-212
46 Ibid., p. 214.
66
States and acceptance of the Confederate Constitution, state 
officials had the opportunity to legislate a financial pro­
gram. Upon their action rested the hopes of achieving the 
deisred goal of true political, social, and economic inde­
pendence. Whatever program they decided upon, it would 
have to take into account Mississippi's history of fiscal 




With the act of secession consumated, the delegates to 
the special convention in January, 1861 turned to providing 
basic legislation for the new republic. The main tasks fac­
ing the delegates, and for that matter state officials through­
out the war, were maintaining troops in the field, and sup­
plying the wants of the people at home, particularly the 
destitute families of absent soldiers. To meet these needs, 
the delegates constituted a committee of ways and means, whose 
responsibilities included suggesting to the full delegation 
ways of raising the additional revenue to meet the require­
ments of both the armed forces and the citizens.
On January 21, the ways and means committee reported 
an ordinance which provided for the collection of a special 
state tax of fifty per cent on the existing state tax, to be 
collected as soon as possible. In addition, the committee 
recommended the issuance of treasury notes, or "certificates 
of loan," to supply the wants of any person "desiring to 
loan money to the State." The committee further recommended 
that these notes be redeemable over a period of three years, 
with one-third falling due in 1862, a third the next year,
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and the final portion in 1864. Rounding out the note is­
suing proposal, the committee, acutely aware of Mississippi’s 
extremely poor record of redeeming its bonded indebtedness, 
recommended that the proposed notes bear interest at ten per 
cent, thereby making them immensely attractive to prospective 
purchasers.1
At that point in the deliberations, differences among 
the delegates as to the proper objects of taxation arose 
anew, again reflecting class interests. This question had 
never been a harmonious one in Mississippi, with the slave­
holders opposing any large tax on slaves or land, while the 
yeoman farmers and non-slaveholding classes insisted that 
since slaves and land represented the two foundations of the 
state's economy, it was fairer to tax them than resort to 
other types of taxation, such as assessments on personal 
property, other than slaves.
James Z. George, representing the small farmers and 
planters, rose in the convention and suggested that the ways 
and means committee be instructed to report a proposal that 
slaves be taxed one dollar each, rather than the current 
rate of half that amount. This motion was laid on the table 
immediately, indicating the strength of the large slave­
holders in the convention.^ The determination of the lat­
ter group to quell attempts to increase the tax rate on
^Journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), p. 41. 
^Ibid., p. 42.
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slaves came under even more serious challenge the next day 
when S. J. Gholson proposed that the tax on "negroes" be 
raised to one dollar and a quarter. Gholson went even fur­
ther and proposed a tax on "all money now vested or that 
may be employed or deposited out of this State belonging to 
citizens of this State," as well as "all bonds, bills of 
exchange, or securities for the payment of money due or to 
become due, in this State." This represented a direct at­
tack on the financial arrangements of many of the largest 
planters in Mississippi, as a number of them consistently 
invested in Northern manufacturing and commercial enter­
prises of all sorts.3 Gholson's proposal, defeated by the 
narrow margin of thirty-three to forty-five, demonstrated 
the determination of the non-slaveholders, and some who held 
a few slaves, to force the large planting interests to bear 
their fair share of the tax b u r d e n . ^
But those in opposition to the planter's known aim of 
shifting the major portion of the tax burden off onto the 
non-slaveholding classes were not put off so easily. George, 
nonpulsed by his earlier defeat, again rose to propose a 
drastic change in the existing tax structure. In order to 
make the state tax on slaves "equal to the State tax on 
other personality and on land," he asked that the contem­




not apply to slaves. Instead, George suggested, the legisla­
ture should asses "an additional special tax of one dollar 
and twenty-five cents" on each taxable slave. To make this 
proposed change somewhat more palatable, an amendment was of­
fered to it which would exempt from taxation slaves over sixty 
and under ten years of age, and further, that the tax on the 
remaining slaves "be the same as on taxable land." This lat­
ter amendment was quickly discarded, in favor of voting di­
rectly on tabling George's amendment to the planter’s chagrin, 
their effort to lay George's amendment aside failed by a vote 
of forty-seven to thirty-eight.5
To counter George's suggestion, the planting interests 
quickly offered a substitute amendment which provided that 
the tax on slaves be made equal to twenty cents on every 
hundred dollars assessed valuation of the slaves. This sub­
stitution, allowing a considerably lower tax rate on slaves, 
passed by the extremely close vote of forty-five to forty- 
three . The vote then occurred on the George amendment, which 
failed of passage by a vote of sixty-eight to seventeen.®
George seized one final chance to attempt a revision of 
the slave tax laws. When an amendment was offered which 
would alter the existing constitution of the state, George 
quickly interrupted with a proposal that the tax laws be 
changed to allow a special tax on slaves, this time in the 




planters mustered their forces, and defeated this final pro­
posal by a vote of forty-four to thirty-seven.? For the time 
being, the planters carried the day, although the opposition 
showed unmistakable signs of intending to continue the bat­
tle for more equitable taxation. After decades of unchal­
lenged leadership, the planter-dominated society in Missis­
sippi faced serious opposition.
Having fought over practically every issue to come be­
fore the convention, the delegates finally got around to the 
creation of what constituted Mississippi’s initial financial 
endeavor of the Confederate period. On January 26, following 
lengthy debate over practically every section of the final 
bill, the convention passed and the Governor signed ’’An Or­
dinance to raise means for the defense of the State.”® This 
piece of legislation, designed more as a stop-gap measure 
than a comprehensive program, revealed the direction the 
state intended to take for the duration of the war.
To defray the expenses of the proposals contemplated, the 
act initially provided for the collection of a ’’special State 
tax of fifty per centum on the regular State tax,” in addi­
tion to a tax "from every inhabitant of this State of three- 
tenths per centum upon all money owned or controlled . . . 
and deposited, loaned, or employed in the purchase of notes, 




without the limits of this State, or kept from use and 
circulation within the Same. . . ."9 The money thus col­
lected was to be set aside in a special fund, to be desig­
nated as a "Military Fund," for the express purpose of "de­
fense and military service of the State as may be authorized 
by law, this Convention, or the Legislature," provided that 
the money "invested in the loan to the State" be exempt 
from all taxes.
Having thus provided a fund for its redemption, the 
convention proceeded to authorize the issuance of "certifi­
cates of loan or treasury notes, to be prepared, signed and 
issued, in such sums as may be applied for by persons desir­
ing to loan money to the State," to an amount not exceeding 
one million dollars. Following the earlier suggestion of 
the ways and means committee, the convention approved the 
plan of staggering the redemption dates over a three year 
period, thereby allowing the accumulation of funds in the 
state treasury sufficient to redeem the notes with interest 
as they fell due. The notes bore interest at ten per cent 
per year from date of issuance, and were to be signed and 
placed in circulation by the governor "from time to time, as 
the public exigencies may require." As to how he should 
dispense the notes, the governor received the power to choose 
any method he 'deemed expedient to afford the people of the
9jbid., pp. 126-127. 
lOlbid.
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several counties an opportunity to participate in the 
loan. . . ."11
Under ordinary circumstances, the foregoing provisions 
would have been sufficient to set a financial system such 
as that contemplated by the convention into full operation. 
But as the convention delegates were painfully aware, Mis­
sissippi's history of fiscal irresponsibility was a far cry 
from ordinary. The state had belligerently repudiated its 
plighted faith only twenty years before, and a host of pro­
spective participants in the proposed "loan" possessed the 
worthless paper to prove it. For these reasons, the dele­
gates realized they must include some commitment, some proof 
of repentence of past sins and promise of more honorable 
intentions this time. To meet these embarrassing but ne­
cessary requirements, several additional sections were added 
to the "ordinance" measure.
In a direct reference to past repudiationist actions, 
section four provided, with no explanatory comment, that as 
for the notes, "the faith of the State is hereby pledged for 
the redemption of the same, and no law shall be passed to 
impair their validity and obligation."12 Still, the dele­
gates declined to depend entirely upon the strength of their 
"pledge" not to "repeal" the faith of the state, and there­




and shall be receivable in payment of any money due to the 
State in any fiscal year in which they may severally fall 
due." Certainly the delegates intended to leave nothing to 
chance: public acceptance of the proposed currency was
forced by law.^^
To further instill public "confidence" in the proposed 
note issue, the ordinance provided that the special tax of 
fifty per cent on the regular state tax would be paid into 
the treasury and there constitute a fund specially for the 
redemption of the notes. This fund, the ordinance promised, 
would be "faithfully applied to that purpose," and the tax 
would be "irrepealable by the Legislature, until such certifi­
cates and notes shall be fully paid and satisfied, at which 
time the collection of the said tax shall cease.
In order to close off the last possible avenue of escape 
for those skeptical enough to refrain from hastening to "loan" 
their money to the state, the act required each tax payer to 
subscribe to a sworn oath that he possessed no hoarded funds. 
Anyone caught lying about his financial status, or refusing 
to take the oath, was subject to a $5,000 fine. In the un­
likely event that any holders of the proposed treasury 
notes decided to keep them past their redemption date, in 
order to collect additional interest, the ordinance provided 




note. Also the governor could, by simple proclamation, 
call in any of the notes he chose at any time and redeem 
them, should surplus funds accumulate in the treasury.15
As the final step in placing their financial scheme in 
operation, the convention delegates set aside $2,500 to de­
fray the expense of "engraving, issuing, and negotiating" 
the treasury notes. Since neither the ordinance setting 
up the Republic of Mississippi's financial program nor any 
of their other ordinances, acts or resolutions were ever 
submitted to the voters for ratification, the delegates 
needed only to obtain Governor Pettus' signature. He did 
not disappoint them, and with a flourish of his pen a finan­
cial system was created.1® But as events shortly proved, 
to legislate such a system was one thing; to achieve general 
public acceptance quite another.
Regarding it certain that the convention meeting in 
January, 1861, "would dissolve the connection between the 
State of Mississippi and the United States," Governor Pettus 
issued a call for the state legislature to meet simultaneous­
ly with the convention, since the act of secession would re­
sult in "many important changes in the organic law of the 
State." A new constitution had to be drawn up, providing for 
the wants of the state in the "new relation" it was about
ISlbid., p. 131. 
IGibid.
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to assume, as well as ordinary legislation to "provide for 
the wants of the State."1?
In his message to the legislature, Pettus’ tone appeared 
considerably subdued from the ftreating diatribe with which 
he harangued that body just two months before. In a spirit 
noticeably sobered by the actual occurance of events he had 
so vociferously recommended for several years, Pettus re­
minded the legislature that since their meeting the previous 
November, "events of the gravest moment have followed each 
other with unprecedented rapidity." Seven companies of 
volunteers had been raised and sent to Pensacola for train­
ing, and the Governor admitted that the state appeared 
"pressed by emergencies which were neither forseen nor pro­
vided for."18 He proceeded, however, to paint a rather 
pleasing picture of the positive response of Mississippi’s 
citizens, reflecting a first flush of cooperation which was 
all too soon to vanish.
The Governor revealed to the legislature that he had 
expended only some $39,000 of the $150,000 appropriated by 
the last regular session of the legislature. Supplementing 
this sum, Pettus proudly announced, were donations of pri­
vate citizens, including a gift of one hundred bales of cot­
ton by H. C. Chambers, and a draft for the proceeds of the 
sale of one hundred bales each by Miles McGehee and Charles
1 7Mississippi House Journal (January, 1861), p. 5. 
IGlbid.
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Clark. Albert G. Brown, a member of the Confederate Con­
gress from Mississippi, sent Pettus a "bill on New York" 
for $500 while John M, Graves donated $200, Burwell Scott 
gave $1,000, and R. S. Rayburn contributed one hundred kegs 
of gunpowder. Pettus praised the patriotism of these men, 
but expressed his determination to draw money from the 
state treasury to repay them, indicating his desire that
the state appear perfectly capable of bearing its own fi-
1 Qnancial burdens.
Pettus announced another "gift" which, like most, was 
soon to evaporate. He stated that the Mobile and Ohio Rail­
road Company had tendered him "the free use of their Road 
for the Transportation of troops and munitions of war when­
ever the State may require it, placing at the disposal of
the Governor of the State extra trains, when required, free 
20of charge." Had this advantageous situation remained in 
effect throughout the war, considerable expense and trouble 
would have been spared the state, but like other such "dona­
tions" freely given early in the Confederate period, this 
too soon vanished under the pressures of actual war.
Pettus concluded his brief message with the reluctant 
admission that "hostilities already exist between the se­
ceding States and the Government at Washington," but he 
expressed the hope that "Justice and prudence on the part
IGlbid., p. 7. 
20lbid.
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of the Southern people" might yet avert actual war. "We 
have embarked upon a stormy sea, and much of the peril 
which attends our voyage is to be apprehended from the 
thoughtlessness and passions of our own crew," Pettus warn­
ed the a s s e m b l a g e . The Governor’s only other recommenda­
tion to the legislature was that "prompt and efficient mea­
sures be adopted to make known to the people of the North­
western States, that peaceful commerce on the Mississippi 
river will be neither interrupted or annoyed by the author­
ities or people of Missisiippi." This act, Pettus believed, 
would "materially aid in preserving peace between the North­
western and the Southern States, if it can be p r e s e r v e d . "22
If Governor Pettus possessed any firm ideas as to how 
to meet the expenses of his accomplished and proposed action 
in regard to placing the state in readiness for a possible 
war, he neglected to mention them to the body upon which the 
development of a financial program would fall. He may have 
depended upon the action of the secession convention to 
create such a program, or alternatively, he may simply not 
have given it much consideration at all. Regardless, the 
fact remains that he made no mention of what type of finan­
cial system, if any, he favored in early 1861.
Relying on the program established by the convention in 
the matter of issuing treasury notes to meet the currency
2 1 l b i d . , p .  8 .
22%bid., p .  9 .
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needs of the state, the legislature turned to another pres­
sing problem— that of a "stay law." Many of the volunteers 
in the state service, particularly those of the poorer class­
es, left their homes in haste, without making proper arrange­
ments in regard to meeting their financial obligations. Un­
less the legislature took action, many of these volunteers 
would return home to find their property sacrificed for un­
paid debts. To avoid this embarrassing situation, the legi­
slature passed on January 22, 1861, a limited bill to stay 
the collection of certain types of debts owed by absent 
soldiers. To discourage creditors from seeking to circumvent 
the intent of the law, the legislature provided for a fine 
"not to exceed five times the amount of the debt sued for.
The only other direct action in relation to strengthen­
ing or altering Mississippi's existing economic and financial 
structure was the appointment of a committee of five men—  
all wealthy planters— to draw up a short address calling the 
attention of the planting interests of the state to the "vast 
importance . . .  of home production . . . and to urge upon 
them especial reference to this subject in planting the crop 
of the present y e a r . " 2 4  With this mild gesture toward the 
importance of crop diversification, the secession convention 
adjourned until March, and with the passage of a partial stay 
law for soldiers, the legislature followed suit.
^^Mississippi Laws (January, 1861), p. 37.
^"^Journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), p.
36.
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After three months, it appeared evident that a great 
deal more than rhetorical platitudes were necessary if the 
Republic of Mississippi was to survive, either independently 
or as part of a Southern Confederacy. In the period from 
January to March, numerous communications to Governor Pet­
tus insisted that some people in Mississippi, particularly 
in the central and southern portions of the state, existed 
on the verge of actual starvation. Further, military af­
fairs, so carelessly adjusted earlier, by March required 
further attention. These and other serious problems demanded 
immediate attention from some legislative body in the state, 
but Pettus had already called the legislature into special 
session twice since the fall of 1860. Consequently, since 
it possessed legislative power equal to that of the regular 
legislature, the so-called secession convention was again 
called to meet in Jackson in late March, 1861.
In a brief communication to the delegation convened in 
the state house, Pettus outlined the main problems requiring 
punctual consideration. Foremost in the Governor’s mind 
was the immediate relief of the "distressing condition of 
a large portion of the people of the central counties" of 
the state. Their critical situation, Pettus pointed out, 
seemed due to the "excessive drought of last summer," which 
ruined their crops of both corn and cotton. The Governor 
pointedly referred to the fact that "a considerable number 
of the people of that district have not enough to enable
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them to live, and are without the means or credit to pur­
chase bread."25
Pettus recommended that the convention delegates con­
sider a three point plan for the immediate relief of the 
drought victims of the state. First, he suggested that 
"extraordinary powers be given to the Boards of Police of 
such counties as are destitute of corn, to use all county 
funds, school funds, &c, which may be under their control, 
for the purchase of corn, to be loaned to those who are un­
able to buy.” To provide additional funds if necessary,
Pettus asked that the counties be authorized to "issue 
script bearing such rate of interest as will enable them to 
dispose of it for the amount of funds required." Finally, 
Pettus recommended that the "State advance to said counties 
as a loan in Treasury notes, or money, a sum sufficient to 
relieve their distress and drive hunger from their door."
The Governor concluded his remarks in relation to the lack 
of food in some areas with the comment that beyond any doubt, 
"all the powers and resources of the State must be exhausted,
OR
before Mississippians are permitted to starve."
Pettus’ only other recommendation was that the delegates 
appropriate "four or five thousand dollars" additional funds
OK •
Journal of the State Convention and Ordinances and Re­
solutions Adopted in March, 1861 (Jackson, 1861), p. 31. (Here­




to provide for the necessities of Mississippi soldiers sent 
to Pensacola in January. Already it appeared evident that 
arming troops was far more expensive than either the Gov­
ernor or the legislature anticipated when they authorized 
an initial appropriation for the militia in November, 1860. 
Even in January, Pettus had boasted that he had expended 
only a small portion of the money earmarked for military 
preparedness; but in March he reported the fund depleted, 
and in fact several thousand dollars o v e r d r a w n . 2?
Even though Pettus realized the combined efforts of the 
executive department, the secession convention, and the legi­
slature had proven inadequate to meet the needs of Missis­
sippians, his proposals in March still lacked any long-range, 
corrective insights. They were hopelessly temporary, as re­
vealed by a closer examination of the chief points in his 
proposed program. To meet the immediate needs of starving 
people, he suggested the use of excess funds existing in 
the county treasuries, such as the school funds. These 
amounts, however, were very small in most cases, and would 
be used up almost immediately. Pettus may have considered 
his proposal that the county boards of police be empowered 
to issue interest-bearing script a permanent means of taking 
care of the problem of destitute families, but the "starving 
counties" were among the poorest in the state, consisting 
mostly of unproductive pine ridges and barren, sandy coastal
2?Ibid.
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soil. The counties might well issue script, but redeeming 
it would be another question altogether. The same problem 
prevented the "loan of Treasury notes" by the state fra ing
a permanent solution, for to pay the high rate of interest 
on this loan would be quite as impossible as redeeming the 
county-issued script. Later these shortcomings forced the 
state to assume the burden of relief of the destitute fami­
lies in Mississippi, but in March, it appeared to Pettus at 
least, that each county could adequately supply the needs 
of its own citizens.
Disregarding the urgency implied by the Governor's re­
marks, the secession delegates immediately fell to bickering 
over questions quite irrelevant to feeding the hungry people 
of the state. The same factions which tangled in January 
over the main propositions before that assembly, squared off 
in March to renew the battle. Having lost their earlier 
fight to force the submission of the secession ordinance to 
a vote of the people, the Coopérâtionists and Unionists 
factions at the March meeting focused their efforts on the 
most available target— the recently-adopted Confederate 
Constitution. S. J. Gholson, who had earlier tried to force 
the tax rate on slaves upward, offered an amendment to pro­
vide for the ratification of the Constitution by a vote of 
the people, but his proposal lost by a vote of fifty-three 
to t h i r t y - t w o . 28 Following this action, the convention
2 8 I b i d ., p p .  3 3 - 3 4
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delegates immediately voted to accept the proposed Consti­
tution— without consulting their constituents in the matter—
and thus made Mississippi a member of the Southern Confed- 
2Qeracy. ^ Then, in a move which revealed their own uncer­
tainties, but presumably reassured the public, the delegates 
reiterated their former assertion that the ordinance pro­
viding for a "means of defense and raising revenue" was to
on
be "irrepealable." ^ This would hopefully boost sagging 
sales of Mississippi treasury notes, which in some areas of 
the state were negotiated only with great difficulty if at 
all.
Having dismissed an attempt to strengthen the existing 
law relating to the suspension of collections of certain
o-|
classes of debts,^ the Convention turned finally to con­
sideration of Governor Pettus’ recommendations for relief 
of the destitute in Mississippi. Actually, the ordinance 
passed by the convention was merely a ratification of the 
Governor's suggestions, with no significant addition or de­
letion of their own. Apparently, the delegation's notions 
of each county's ability to take care of its own problems 
paralleled those of the Governor.32
Insofar as Pettus' request for some action in relation
29%bid., p. 77. 
30lbid., pp. 79-80. 
Sllbld., p. 37. 
S^Ibid., pp. 80-82.
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to appropriating additional monies for the militia was acted 
upon at all, the delegates simply included an allowance of 
five thousand dollars to Pettus to "supply the deficiency 
in defraying the expenses incidental to the concentration 
of Mississippi forces at Pensacola" along with an omnibus
O O
package calculated to cover the convention’s minor expenses.
No provision at all was made for a permanent revenue commit­
ment to support the militia. With these partial, spasmodic 
efforts, the secession convention adjourned, never to meet 
again in any capacity.
Upon the outbreak of the Civil War, Governor Pettus de­
termined to again convene the legislature in special session 
to deal with new problems brought on by the "war being waged 
by the United States against the Confederate States." This 
war, Pettus avowed, had "so deranged the financial affairs 
of the country, that property cannot be sold, at forced 
sales, without ruinous sacrifices" thereby making it the 
"duty of the state authorities to exert all the powers vest­
ed in them to place the people in the best possible condition 
to bear the burthen . . . imposed by a state of w a r . "34
When the Legislature convened in Jackson in late July, 
Pettus presented a program which demonstrated that he finally 
grasped the gravity of the situation. Unlike his earlier
33ibid., p. 94.
34i»proclamation, " July 12, 1861, John J. Pettus, Execu­
tive Journal, A, MDAH.
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efforts, Pettus in July put forward a more comprehensive, 
though still inadequate program. After praising the re­
sponse of the people of his state to the call for troops to 
withstand the "vandal hordes," Pettus turned to the crux of 
the problem, which in simple terms consisted of the dire 
need for a stay law to prohibit the forced sale of land.
Pettus bluntly advised the legislators that "on a 
former occasion of great pecuniary embarrassment," Missis­
sippians refused to permit forced sales, rendering the 
sheriff "powerless to enforce the law." Unless quick 
action were forthcoming, the Governor warned, the people 
appeared likely to "resort to a similar course in the next 
few months." Pettus pointed out that the closing of the sea 
ports by the Northern blockade effectively prevented the 
debtor from exporting his produce, which in turn guaranteed 
his inability to meet the demands of his creditors. In such 
a situation, the Governor pointed out, "the debtor class rri. 
hopelessly ruined, and the property of the country passes 
into the hands of the creditors and money holders at one 
fourth of its real value." To prevent this, Pettus asked, 
"ought not the Legislature which brought on this revolution 
equalize its burthens as near as possible?" Based on these 
assumptions, the Governor recommended "that a law be passed, 
postponing the sales of property under all judgments hereto­
fore obtained . . . for twelve months," and further "pro­
hibiting the issuing of executions on judgments hereafter
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rendered until twelve months from and after the adjourn­
ment of the next regular session of the Legislature."35
Pettus suffered from no delusion that the war would be 
brief and necessarily victorious for the South. He advised 
the legislature that the most important factor impelling 
him to recommend such a stringent stay law was the secur­
ity of the state itself. He assured his listeners that "the 
existence of our free institutions demand that all the 
available means of the whole people should be brought to 
the aid of the State in the fierce and protracted conflict 
on which she has now entered." If a stay law were passed, 
Pettus concluded, the people of Mississippi would not find 
it necessary to hold a large portion of their cotton crop 
to meet pressing debts, but would instead "loan it to the 
government annually until the war is triumphantly closed."3® 
Pettus’ second major recommendation revealed the ex­
tent of the paucity of money with which to meet either the 
demands of the militia, or the needs of the civilian popula­
tion of the state. The legislature needed to come up with 
some means of "raising a revenue sufficient to meet the ex­
traordinary demands on the State Treasury for the next sev­
eral years," the Governor asserted. He reported with pride 
that private donations amounting to hundreds of thousands 
of dollars had contributed significantly to raising, arming.
35Mississippi House Journal (July, 1861), p. 7.
SGibid.
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and clothing many of the state's volunteer companies, but 
this placed a needless hardship on the citizenry, which Pet­
tus regarded as the rightful responsibility of the state. 
Besides that, the Governor hinted darkly, some people had 
contributed nothing, and such an ingrate who failed to don­
ate "from patriotic impulse should be required by law to 
bear his full share."3?
To raise the required revenue, Pettus suggested some 
tax increases would be necessary. He informed the legisla­
tors that the income derived from merchandise alone "must 
fall far short of last year," and if a new assessment of 
land were made, it would result in the loss of some forty 
per cent of the income from that source, since land values 
had fallen steadily throughout the year. To prevent such 
an eventuality, Pettus suggested the retention of present 
land assessments until the end of the war, and that further, 
an additional ad valorem tax of "one-fourth of one per cent 
on lands and slaves be imposed." This latter tax increase 
alone Pettus declared would raise the total revenue some 
$279,000.38
As a further method of raising money for the state, 
Pettus suggested that a tax of three-tenths per cent upon 
all money loaned, owned, deposited, or used in the purchase 




sippi be collected. This measure formed a part of the ’’Ord­
inance to Raise Revenue" passed by the secession convention 
on January 26, 1861, but was scheduled to die along with the 
other provisions of that act as soon as the note issues 
authorized by the act were redeemed. Pettus wanted this 
tax made permanent, and in addition he asked the legislature 
to consider a confiscation bill. This appeared to Pettus 
an acceptable "means of retaliation on a people who are 
raising large armies for our subjugation." If such a law 
were passed, the Governor asserted, "Lands to a large amount 
could thus be taken from those who invade, and become the 
property of those who defend the state." As an added bene­
fit, Pettus reminded the legislators, "a much larger amount 
might be placed in the State Treasury by requiring the mer­
chants to give . . .  an accurate account of their indebted­
ness to Northern merchants." Then, by compelling each such 
Mississippi merchant to pay into the state treasury a por­
tion of the amount due Northern firms, receiving state trea­
sury notes in return, the effect would be to provide addi­
tional revenue as well as strengthen the treasury note is­
sues, making them "less liable to depreciation as a currency."^9 
An examination of the major legislative programs subse­
quently enacted by the legislature in July reveals that it 
not only acted upon most of Pettus' recommendations, but 
even exceeded his requests in some instances. Initially,
S i^bid.
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the house and senate of Mississippi began deliberate belt- 
tightening, by cutting off funds to selected state pro­
grams which they considered superfluous. The three most 
significant victims of this new legislative tact were the 
Agriculture Bureau, with its satellite Agricultural Soci­
eties; followed by the Geological Survey, and the State 
Library. None of these agencies formerly enjoying generous 
state appropriations were to receive additional funds until 
the end of the war.^O
In another vein not suggested directly by Pettus, the 
legislature moved to make the Confederate notes a sort of 
"legal tender," something which the Confederate Congress 
adamantly refused to do throughout the war period. On Au­
gust 2, the Mississippi legislature provided that in the 
future, tax collectors within the state were "authorized 
to receive the Treasury Notes of the Confederate States of 
America in payment of all taxes, and for all monies due the 
State arising from any source whatever," except for the 
state military tax, which could only be satisfied by the 
state treasury notes especially provided for in the Ordin­
ance of January 26, 1861.^^
In yet another move not anticipated by the Governor, 
the legislature passed a law making it lawful for any trustees 
"having money or effects which may be invested at interest,"
^^Mississippi Laws (July, 1861), pp. 42, 72, 73. 
41lbid., p. 38.
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to buy Confederate or state notes or bonds with such funds. 
This act was especially significant to Mississippians, for 
in addition to the usual sources of such funds, trustees in 
the state held immense tracts of land on behalf of Chickasaw 
and Choctaw Indian orphans whose tribes had long before been 
exiled to the Indian Territory.4% Certainly this act opened 
considerable potential sources of revenue to state officials.
Before finally turning to Pettus’ proposed program, the 
legislators acted on one other matter which to the planting 
interests in the assembly, demanded urgent priority. That 
related to what action to take concerning the Confederate 
Congress and the growing cotton crop. Since early spring, 
numerous Mississippi planters, as well as others throughout 
the South, repeatedly urged the government authorities in 
Richmond to devise some plan whereby the cotton crop would 
be purchased or otherwise secured by the Confederates. Such 
a plan, many planters believed, would contribute signifi­
cantly to strengthening the Confederate diplomatic effort, 
and at the same time furnish a domestic market for Southern 
cotton which the lowering of the blockade necessitated. With 
these considerations in mind, a memorial was pushed through 
the Mississippi legislature on August 2, which urged the 
Confederate Congress to adopt such a scheme. After request­
ing the Confederate currency be made a legal tender, the 
memorial represented the "expedience of affording the planters
4%Ibid., pp. 38-39,
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a market for their cotton and tobacco crops by the purchase 
of the same or liberal advances to them, by the Government, 
of Treasury notes."43 This memorial signalized a final ef­
fort by Mississippi planters to persuade the Confederate 
Government to procure part or all of the current cotton 
crop. Once such a plan appeared beyond the scope of reason­
able possibilities, intense pressure was applied to the state 
government to effect the same end. By the meeting of the 
regular legislature in November, this pressure had reached 
such a high point that it demanded top priority. But in 
July, the planting community still hoped for relief on a na­
tional level.
Having completed action on programs which originated 
with the legislature itself, that body turned to considera­
tion of Pettus' proposals. Of greatest importance was re­
lief for the state's debtors and its growing number of desti­
tute. On August 2, the legislature enacted a law authorizing 
the county boards of police to levy a special tax, not to 
exceed one hundred per cent of the state tax of 1859, to be 
called a "military relief tax." The main purpose to which 
revenues arising from this tax were to be applied were sup­
ply of volunteer companies, and aid for needy families of 
such soldiers while the latter served in the a r m y . 44
43lbid., pp. 34-39; "Original Bills Introduced at Ses­
sion of Legislature, January 15-July 25, 1861," Ser. I., 
Vol. Ill, Manuscript, MDAH; Vicksburg Evening Citizen, De­
cember 24, 1861.
^Mississippi Laws (July, 1861), p. 31.
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Then on August 5, Pettus signed into law a comprehen­
sive stay law, so long urged by a large number of Missis- 
sippians of all social ranks. Sweeping in scope, this stay 
law suspended the collection of debts and liabilities "on 
bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, open accounts, 
or contracts for the payment of money" until twelve months 
after the end of the war.^^ About the only significant class 
of debts not suspended by this law were judgments— an over­
sight corrected when the legislature met in January, 1862.
Insofar as general tax relief was concerned, the legi­
slators meeting in July appeared concerned that the burden 
might prove excessive on some classes of citizens. Actually, 
the general mood seemed to be that the tax burden lightened, 
rather than increased as Pettus suggested. Reflecting this 
feeling, the legislature passed an act exempting all money 
invested by Mississippians in "Confederate or State Bonds, 
or other Confederate or State Securities” from taxation.^6 
While this measure served to encourage investment in state 
and Confederate currency issues, as well as tax relief, an­
other enactment simply provided for the suspension until 
after the war of a levee tax, collected in most of the river
counties.47
45ibid., p. 74. 
46ibid., pp. 73-74,
47john C . Schwab, The Confederate States of America, 1861- 
1865: A Financial and Industrial History of the South during
the Civil V/ar (New York, 1901) , pp. 302-30^ (Hereafter re- 
ferred to as Schwab, A Financial and Industrial History.)
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In relation to Pettus* recommendation that the property 
of enemy aliens be confiscated, the legislature appointed a 
committee to study the feasibility of enacting such a mea­
sure. After a period of consideration, the committee re­
ported the power to confiscate property "belongs only to 
the war making power of a government,” and since Mississippi 
surrendered that particular right when it joined the Confed­
eracy, it of "necessity must give up the power to confiscate 
property."48 gy their action, the legislators effectively 
cut off yet another potential source of considerable revenue.
Despite holding three separate legislative sessions 
from January to July, 1861, Mississippi lawmakers accomplished 
very little in the way of providing comprehensive, long-range 
financial programs for the state. With the prospect of war 
increasing every day in the early part of the year, with no 
credit, no domestic circulating medium, and a tax structure 
so lenient it only produced $740,276 in revenue in 1860, Mis­
sissippi's legislators should have taken a closer look at 
financial aspects of the state government.'^® Instead, the 
combined efforts of the delegates to the secession convention 
and the concurrent legislature meeting in January produced 
no significant alteration in the tax structure, except for 
and across-the-board increase., and provided for the issuance 
of one million dollars in treasury notes. Efforts by non-
48Mississippi House Journal (July, 1861), p. 76.
49journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), 
Appendix.
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planting interests to equalize the tax burden met defeat at 
the hands of the large planters, thereby alienating a sig­
nificant part of the middle class citizens of the state at 
the very beginning. As for the treasury notes provided for 
in January, none would be of a smaller denomination than 
ten dollars, thus effectively precluding their use as a vi­
able circulating currency.
Judging from the lack of positive, long-range legisla­
tion, it is clear that the secession convention’s March 
convocation either failed to comprehend the gravity of the 
altered situation faced by both the military and civilian 
population of Mississippi, or they considered it their only 
function to flesh out the bare outlines suggested by the 
chief executive. In either case, their lack of foresight, 
combined with Pettus’ failure to call for comprehensive 
legislation, left Mississippi about where it stood prior to 
the March meeting. The planters still pinned their hopes 
on the Confederate Government to bail them out of what could 
develop into an economically disastrous situation; conse­
quently, they put little or no pressure on the state legisla­
ture pending the outcome of their appeal to ’’higher author­
ity." The smaller planters and yeoman farmers, traditionally 
the most self-sufficient of all classes, had not felt any 
particular pinch, economic or otherwise, in the early spring 
of 1861. But there were individuals in large numbers, such 
as those citizens of the drought-ridden areas of central and
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southern Mississippi, who did need state aid in early 1861, 
and who did call upon and look to state officials for help. 
For this latter group, pitifully little of a positive nature 
was done by anyone who had the power and the obligation to 
relieve their wants. This failure might very well be view­
ed as academic by those who still possessed a sufficience 
of the necessities of life in March, 1861, but to a signifi­
cant number of people this neglect meant hunger, want, and 
deprivation.
By the July meeting of the legislature, war had broken 
out, and Mississippi authorities finally appeared to grasp 
the seriousness of the situation. Consequently, the com­
bined efforts of Governor Pettus and the legislature meeting 
in July resulted in significant steps being taken to provide 
some tax relief to Mississippians, while at the same time 
alleviating some of the stress placed on the debtor classes 
by the exigencies of war. In that sense, the July session 
considerably advanced prior programs and inaugurated others 
desperately needed by a majority of the state's population.
Despite these positive accomplishments, other problems 
existed by mid-summer of the first year of the war which the 
legislature either ignored, or gave only cursory attention. 
Chief among these unattended problems were startling price 
increases in most articles of necessity, such as food and 
clothing. Scarcity already existed in some classes of goods, 
and combined with a prevailing spirit of avarice, this pro­
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duced widespread hoarding and speculation, which made the 
acquisition of necessary articles even more difficult. 
Legislative inaction in these critical areas by autumn pro­
duced considerable dissatisfaction with state officials, 
coupled with already existing dissillusionment appeared to 
be spawning a propensity toward disloyalty to the Confed­
erate cause. For a great number of other Mississippians, 
the first few months of war triggered self-sacrifice and a 
ready willingness to aid the Confederates in any way possible, 
Altogether, reaction to Mississippi's legislative equivocat­
ing represented a mixed situation, where greed and mistrust 
lived side by side with generosity.
CHAPTER IV
POPULAR REACTION TO INITIAL WARTIME MEASURES
W. S. Barry, President of the secession convention 
which met in Jackson in January, 1861, summed up the feel­
ings of the delegates when he commented that ”in obedience 
to the will of the people, you have accomplished the work 
of destruction." In what could, however, be taken as an 
admonition to the lack of positive action to establish a 
sound governmental system, Barry continued "but the courage, 
the thought, the wisdom, necessary to destroy are not always 
equal to the task of rebuilding." In what must stand as a 
record understatement, he concluded "More is required in the 
future than has been in the past. . . . What lies before us 
will test the heroism, the higher, the nobler qualities of 
our race. , . .
Barry and the other delegates might have suffered from 
the delusion that their actions indeed reflected the will 
of the people, but they could not have failed to detect the 
strength of those who opposed secession. After all, the 
delegates were not sufficiently convinced of popular support
^Journal of the State Convention (January, 1861), p. 36.
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for this position to dare submit the results of their ef­
forts to the people for a vote of ratification. In this 
relation, the Natchez Courier, a Unionist newspaper at the 
time of the January convention, disagreed sharply with 
Barry's sanguine assessment. "The truth of the business 
is," the editor wrote on January 22, "that we are in the 
midst of a revolution; and at present, are governed by an 
oligarchy of ninety-nine. What they will do, or how far they 
will go, remains to be seen. If the people have invested 
them with dictatorial power, so be it. The people will wake 
up one of these days from that sad delusion."%
If those responsible for creating an evenly-balanced 
independent government in Mississippi were unwilling to see 
the vital importance of establishing such a system at the 
very beginning, the average citizen of the state certainly 
was aware that financial difficulties had already descended 
on Mississippi's people. Even before the meeting of either 
the secession convention or the legislature, financial panic 
threatened as New Orleans banks, the financial nerve center 
of the lower Mississippi Valley, began systematically to 
restrict credit and call in their reserves.^ This financial 
unease spread rapidly up the river, resounding with measur­
able tremors among planting and commercial interests in Mis­
sissippi. On January 1, 1861, B. L. C. Wailes, a leading
^Natchez Courier, January 22, 1861.
^Schwab, A Financial and Industrial History, pp. 124-125,
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planter and geologist, recorded witnessing a Natchez man 
worth "not less than $150,000 being taken to a lunatic 
asylum, a victim of the political and financial excitment.
The unfortunate man, Wailes reported, "imagines himself 
ruined & poor."^
Businessmen, following decades of unparalleled pros­
perity, faced unprecedented difficulties. Thomas Webber, a 
merchant in Byhalia, recorded in his diary the bitter ex­
periences encountered by a portion of his contemporaries in 
Mississippi during the early part of 1861. On January 5, 
he confessed that "money matters are giving me a great deal 
of trouble," and he admitted to being "pressed almost out 
of my life for money to meet my pressing engagements." On 
January 28, Webber reported that the "last thirty days have 
been the worst on me in all my business career and life has 
lost all of its sweets to me on account of financial troubles." 
Blaming his woes on "the accursed Secession movements," Web­
ber admitted on February 28 that he was fast approaching the 
limit of his resources. "I am confounded I am ruined. My 
Country is ruined Would to God I had never been born. . . . "  
One day before he closed his business permanently, Webber 
vented his feeling of utter frustration in a caustic diary 
entry: "I will venture to swear that I am never again caught
this deep into a credit system. I am miserable. I feel 
tired of life/1 / It has no charmes or sweets for me. I am
^B. L. C. Wailes, Diary, entry for January 1, 1861, 
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
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loosing my energy and my health my mind Yes My S o u l ."5
While not all merchants and businessmen suffered as 
severely as Webber, flagrant social and financial abuses 
existed by mid-summer which certainly added to difficulties 
normally faced by these classes during periods of political 
uncertainty. Such practices as hoarding small coins, which 
rose early in 1861 and increased rapidly throughout the year, 
created distinct problems for merchants who daily dealt in 
transactions of small monetary value. Private citizens con­
tributed to this evil by refusing to part with coins of 
gold and silver, but far more offensive was the growing pro­
pensity of the merchants themselves to engage in speculation, 
not only in specie coins but in certain classes of merchan­
dise as well. This resulted in the false scarcity of several 
types of goods urgently needed by Mississippians. Soap, 
matches, and clothing were among the articles most frequently 
on the "unavailable" list.
While state legislative action could have helped pre­
vent such practices as the hoarding of small coins and mer­
chandise speculation, Mississippi officials were not alto­
gether to blame for the prevalence of conditions conducive 
to such practices. The merchants experienced difficulties 
as a result of ill-conceived Confederate Congressional pro­
grams. A. W. Stokes, an attorney of Hernado, brought one
^Thomas Webber Diary, entries for January 5, 28 and 
March 8, 1861, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.
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such type of problem to the attention of Secretary of the 
Treasury C. G. Memminger in early March. Representing a 
group of merchants, Stokes pointed out to Memminger that 
the recently-passed tariff meant that Mississippi merchants 
must travel to eastern Confederate cities to purchase goods, 
and pay a tariff on such merchandise before transporting it 
to their stores.® This forced them to pass the cost of the 
tariff on the customer. Normally, the purchaser in rural 
Mississippi would have no choice except to pay the higher 
prices, but Hernando had a direct railroad connection with 
Memphis, as well as several dirt road links. So instead of 
paying the higher prices necessitated by the Confederate 
tariff, citizens of Hernando and numerous other towns with 
rail or water connections with Memphis, simply went to that 
Tennessee city and purchased all their goods, leaving the 
local merchants with no market for their higher-priced items 
Since Tennessee did not belong to the Confederacy in March, 
1861, the merchants were forbidden to trade there, but were 
forced instead to deal exclusively with Confederate whole­
salers. Unhappy over such Confederate practices, and re­
ceiving little encouragement from state officials, the mer­
chant classes felt little compunction in turning to their 
own devices later in order to recoup earlier losses. This
®A. W. Stokes to C. G. Memminger, March 7, 1861, R. P. 
Thian (comp.), Correspondence with the Treasury Department 
of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865. Appendix, 
V (Washington, 1880), p. 7. (Hereafter referred to as 
Thian, Correspondence.)
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accounted for one reason the merchants turned to widespread 
speculation, but evidence such as the continuation of this 
practice long after any imagined or real losses were re­
gained, indicated that the profit motive was far more im­
portant .
Like the merchants and businessmen, farmers and planters 
in Mississippi experienced unprecedented difficulties as a 
result of the unsettled political situation in 1861. Since 
the prosperity of a great portion of Mississippi's popula­
tion depended directly or indirectly upon the continued high 
prices realized from the sale of cotton, anything affecting 
that staple was of major significance. Unfortunately, prices 
paid for cotton began to decline in sympathy with the general 
business slump in early 1861. A Mobile factor reported to 
Columbus Sykes on January 15 that the Mobile cotton market 
"is very dull as there is at present a difficulty about ship­
ping." He conjectured, however, that the sluggish cotton 
market was "temporary," and promised to dispose of Syke's 
cotton when the price paid for middling again rose to above
7
ten cents. The New Orleans market, far more important than 
that of Mobile to Mississippi planters, fared no better. On 
January 16, Winston, Morrison, and Company informed Governor 
Pettus, who had shipped cotton to the Crescent City in the 
hope of exchanging it for gunpowder, that there had been
?Toomer & Sykes to Columbus Sykes, January 15, 1861, 
Columbus Sykes Papers, MDAH.
104
"but little done in cotton this week, the market is flat 
middling."8
Despite optimism that the depressed cotton market was 
only temporary, it quickly became apparent that a combination 
of factors were in operation which could conceiveably keep 
the market down indefinitely. One important element was the 
difficulty encountered in shipping, which led to rapid fill­
ing of warehouse space. This in turn forced the cotton 
brokerage houses in both Mobile and New Orleans to practical­
ly suspend operations. Early in 1861, it also became appar­
ent to some planters that normal channels for the disposal 
of Southern cotton could, and probably would be shut off by 
a Northern blockade, should hostilities break out between 
the North and South. This knowledge, combined with the cog­
nition that cotton represented the only article of signifi­
cant worth— therefore power— in the South, led a number of 
the bigger planters to urge the embryonic Confederate gov­
ernment to formulate some scheme utilizing the South's cot­
ton producing potential to greatest advantage. Before the 
Confederate leaders ultimately decided, as they did by the 
autumn of 1861, to base their financial system on something 
other than the purchase of the South's entire cotton output, 
a plethora of plans were proposed by anxious planters. One 
such proposal, quite logical in theory and representative of
^Winston, Morrison, and Co., to Pettus, January 16, 
1861, Ser. E., Vol. 51, MDAH.
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numerous other such propositions propounded by leading 
Southern planters in 1861, came from a Mississippi planter, 
Richard T. Archer.
In an open letter to the Mississippi secession conven­
tion, as well as to the conventions of the other Southern 
states. Archer outlined his plan. Firmly convinced that 
"all Christendom is more or less dependent" upon cotton, he 
premised his argument on the faith that its continued ex­
portation was absolutely essential to the future economic 
and political stability of a majority of the world commun­
ity of nations. Since he was absolutely convinced that 
"cotton was king," Archer believed the only question to be 
decided was "how best to develop this great element of our 
power, how to give it greatest efficacy and controlability." 
He then suggested a very logical three-part plan which, to 
his mind, would make best use of the South's awesome poten­
tial power. First, Archer proposed that the Confederacy 
provide a system of cotton factories, controlled by a "bureau 
on factories," in which every citizen could hold stock in 
proportion to the tax he paid for the erection of the manu­
facturing establishments. Secondly, the Mississippi planter 
suggested that the Confederate President lay an embargo on 
all cotton, should exigencies warrant, and that "all this 
cotton be paid for at the fair market value before embargo, 
in treasury notes, bearing a reasonable rate of interest, 
unless the holder prefers to hold it." Finally, Archer con-
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eluded, when this cotton purchased by the Confederate Gov­
ernment should have been witheld long enough from foreign 
commerce to have "conquered an honorable peace, or shall 
have effected the great object for which this stringent mea­
sure shall have been adopted," the excess cotton not needed 
in the Southern factories should be sold on the open market. 
Once on the market, the cotton could be sold at "a moderate 
advance on cost and interest"— which had been paid on the 
treasury notes— and the profit or loss charged to the profit 
or loss of the Confederate manufacturing association of 
states.9
If this plan became operational, Archer insisted, the 
contemplated Confederate treasury notes would "have the 
character of the best and safest currency known to the com­
mercial world," and would be eagerly sought after as a fund 
to buy Southern cotton, as the latter would sell for nothing 
but gold or silver, or these treasury notes. This, Archer 
asserted, would make the Confederate currency safer than that 
of "the Bank of England, which is based on credit," while the 
Confederate money would be based on "a staple commodity in- 
dispensible to the commerce of all Christendom; and on the 
manufacturing labor of the strongest manufacturing associa­
tion ever known."10
Archer anticipated the argument some might bring against 
his plan, that to inaugurate such a scheme would banish gold
^De Bow's Review, XXX (1861), pp. 367-368. 
lOibid.
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and silver from the South, since the cotton would be pur­
chasable with treasury notes. To avoid this, he proposed 
that no notes be printed of less denomination than fifty 
dollars, thereby making gold and silver necessary for small­
er transactions. So that this scheme would benefit the yeo­
man farmer as well as the large planters. Archer proposed 
to limit the number of shares any individual could hold in 
the manufacturing enterprises, thereby giving equal oppor­
tunity to all, regardless of their economic standing. To 
further cement the South's interest in this mutual endeavor, 
Archer's plan called for each state to hold the same number 
of shares allowed to any individual. If all these suggestions 
were put into practice, Archer averred, the states would be 
bound to each other, and each citizen, having a "direct prop­
erty interest in the faithful administration of government, 
on account of his stock and his dividends," would be careful 
to elect wise and prudent officials to head his state gov­
ernment. This in turn would elevate the "character of the 
population," and public offices "would no longer be eleemos- 
nary institutions." If his suggestions were followed. Archer 
predicted that the fulfillment of the planter's dearest 
dream— a steady market with consistently profitable prices—  
would result. "If the Southern confederate States are true 
to themselves . . .  a destiny is before us unequaled in 
power and benefaction of the whole people in the annals of 
history," Archer concluded. 
lllbid.
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Although he and numerous other worried planters who 
deluged the Confederate and state officials with such 
schemes were not usually candid enough to specify them, 
several very real and grim probabilities faced the planting 
cimmunity in 1861. With secession an accomplished fact, 
Northern sources of capital dried up, leaving the planters 
at the mercy of a collection of extremely shaky Southern 
financial institutions. Added to this predicament was the 
blockade of Southern ports by the Northern navy, which meant 
the South encountered insurmountable difficulties in market­
ing a significant portion of the 1861 crop. The only al­
ternative lay in convincing the Confederate Government, or 
if that failed the state governments, to purchase most or 
all of the cotton crop. If some plan similar to Archer’s 
was not adopted, many planters made it clear that they would 
place little "faith" in the "credit" of Southern financial 
schemes based solely on those two much-abused entities.
By the fall of 1861 it became apparent to Mississippi 
planters that Confederate treasury plans did not include the 
purchase of the entire cotton crop. Then, when it seemed 
to cotton planters that marketing prospects for the cotton
12por a representative selection of such plans, see the 
following: T. J. Dobyns to Jefferson Davis, July 2, 1861,
Thian, Correspondence, Appendix V, pp. 184-185; R. M. Gunn 
to Jefferson Davis, July 17, 1861, Ibid., p. 229; "An Old 
Merchant," July 25, 1861, Ibid., pp. 246-247; Charles G. John­
son to Jefferson Davis, July 19, 1861, Ibid., p. 294; Charle­
ston (South Carolina) Courier, March 3, 1862; Gray A. Chandler, 
Letter on the Currency and Public Debt of the Confederate 
States (Columbus, Mississippi, 1863), pp. 1-8.
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crop soon to be harvested were bleakest, they took a turn 
for the worse. On July 17, a card appeared in the New Or­
leans Prices Current, the most important commercial index 
in the gulf South, which produced a shock wave among Mis­
sissippi planters. The notice, signed by some 129 cotton 
factors and factorage houses in New Orleans, stated that 
"in view of the interests of all parties, /the factors/ 
recommend to their various customers and correspondents not 
to ship any portion of their crop of cotton to this city, 
or to remove it from their plantations, until the blockade 
is fully and entirely abandoned. . . .
A greater blow could hardly have fallen on cotton plant­
ers in Mississippi who, together with Louisiana planters, 
shipped 1,324,849 bales of the 1860 cotton crop through New 
Orleans.14 This not only meant there would be no external 
market available to the planters, but it also doomed their 
ability to meet current debts. Under normal circumstances, 
the planter depended upon his factor to sell his cotton, pay 
the planter's debts out of the proceeds, then forward any 
excess profits to the cotton grower. If the factor was un­
able to dispose of the cotton, he could not meet the planter’s 
debts, which in turn obviated the advancing of future credit. 
Richard Nugent, a New Orleans factor, pointed this out to
202.
l^New Orleans Prices Current, July 17, 1861.
14pe Bow's Review (New Series), I (February, 1866), p.
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c. D. Hamilton, a Mississippi cotton planter, when he in­
formed the latter on September 12 that "being unable to sell 
any cotton," he could not pay the planter's obligations.15
Dealing a final blow to lingering hopes by planters that 
this policy might be eased, the Governor of Louisiana issued 
a formal proclamation on October 10, 1861, declaring that no 
more cotton would be allowed through the defenses of New 
Orleans.16 Following that proclamation, the Mississippi 
cotton planter's only hope for salvation from economic ruin 
lay with the state legislature. Increasingly until November, 
accordingly, Mississippi planters concentrated unprecedented 
pressure on state officials to afford some relief— any re­
lief— to bolster the sagging mainstay of Mississippi poli­
tical, economic, and social institutions.
The initial year of conflict proved quite as disturbing 
to the poorer classes of citizens as to their more economic­
ally prosperous neighbors. These people, composed of sub­
sistence farmers and people dwelling in the backwoods areas 
of Mississippi had little money early in the year, and as 
hoarding and speculation rapidly spread over the state prices 
climbed precipitously, consequently relieving these people 
of any excess cash they possessed early in 1861. Isaac 
Smith, a poor farmer exasperated at the alarming economic
l^Richard Nugent to C. D. Hamilton, September 24, 1861, 
C. D. Hamilton Papers, MDAH.
l^Natchez Courier, October 10, 1861.
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situation, poignantly portrayed the deplorable condition of 
a great number of Mississippians in a letter to Governor 
Pettus in early April, 1861;
I take my seat to wright to enform you of my 
Sad Condition I am bound to appli to you for 
help and with out your help I am bound to suffer 
fur I am plum out of any thing to eat but bread 
i have not a sent of mony nor cant get money nor 
provision I have money owing to me but I cant get 
a sent of it I have a family that is bound to 
suffer without some ones help I would come and 
see you if i could get moeny to bare my expences 
but it is impossible for to get aney moeny what 
ever. . . . i have not had a bit of meat in my 
house in 4 weeks nothing but dry bread thare fore
I want you to help me if you will doe it soon for
I am in neede and great neede Thare is plenty of 
provision heare at Crystal Springs at one of thare 
stores . . .  if you can help me to aeny thing to
go on arrang it so that I can get it there. . . .1?
The one means of relief suggested by Smith and numerous 
other Mississippians who appealed to Pettus in the spring 
and summer of 1861 was a stay law. Declaring that he hardly 
knew "how to commence the subject," Thomas Wiggin wrote to 
Pettus in May from Lowndes County in the north-central part
of the state, that "people through our Country is very much
in debt and thare are mour sewing gowing on a moungst the
people than has been for several years." Stating how "rong"
he considered the general rise of the practice of suing for 
debts, Wiggin asserted that "it out to be remembered that 
thare war a Short Crop maid last year and benear everyman 
has corn & outher nesaserys to buy that they are competed 
to have for the support of thear Family." Wiggin, as well
l^Isaac L. Smith to Pettus, April 4, 1861, Ser. E., 
Vol. 51, MDAH.
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as numerous others who complained to Pettus, placed the 
blame squarely on the merchants who seemed "all in the 
Spirit of Sewing it is got started and it seams that every 
one that has a clame a gainst is neighbor are determined to 
have his money.
A number of similar requests for relief from oppressive 
debts were received by Pettus throughout 1861. Most came 
from people representing the lower income brackets, although 
some planters and even one Confederate Treasury agent urged 
the Governor to take some action to prevent the massive 
forced sales of land and other property which appeared em­
inent unless some positive action were forthcoming from state 
officials. But despite their grumblings, a majority of the 
state's poor appeared to have supported the Confederacy with 
outspoken vigor during the first year of the Confederate 
period.
Despite economic hardships which beset all classes of 
Mississippians in 1861, the rush to arms was in most areas 
and among most people greeted with a sense of exhilaration. 
Decades of sectional strife finally culminated in a contest 
of arms which if successful for the South, demanded wide
^^Thomas Wiggin to Pettus, May 18, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 
52, Ibid.
IDpor comments on the general economic situation in the 
state, and suggestions as to how it might be stabilized, see 
W. Brooke to Pettus, April 25, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 51, Ibid. 
J. B. Ellis to Pettus, July 7, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 52, Ibid. 
Phil H. Gully to Pettus, July 15, 1861, Ibid. ; M. G. Ande'r- 
son to Pettus, July 21, 1861, Ibid.
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voluntary participation by citizens representing all econ­
omic classes. Since little planning had occurred with a 
view toward gearing the state's financial structure for the 
exigencies of war, voluntary contributions by private citi­
zens appeared essential to provide for the raising, clothing, 
and arming of military units.
Reflecting the first flush of excitement following the 
rout of Federal forces at Manassas, people of all stations, 
ages, and economic condition vied with each other in render­
ing donations to the Confederate and state authorities. On 
August 1, William T. Muller wrote to Pettus, informing the 
Governor that "John G. Fleming, a patriotic citizen of Adams" 
had donated several hundred pounds of wool, which the ladies 
of Natchez wanted to manufacture into jeans for the soldiers,
provided the wool was spun and woven into cloth at state ex-
20pense, possibly by inmates in the penitentiary. Encouraged 
by such gifts, and realizing that they were necessary if Mis­
sissippi troops were to be clothed and fed properly for the 
coming winter campaigns, Pettus published an open letter in 
late August asking for more outright donations. "Our sick 
and wounded soldiers need comforts, which neither the Con­
federate nor the State governments have the power to furnish,' 
the Governor asserted. In order to handle anticipated dona­
tions, Pettus appointed the probate clerks of the various 
counties as receivers of all such gifts, and charged them
^^Wm. T. Muller to Pettus, August 1, 1861, Ibid.
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with the responsibility of seeing that the articles were 
turned over to the quartermaster general for distribution.
Responding to the Governor's appeal, numerous citizens 
of Mississippi rushed forward with contributions. One indi­
vidual donated his entire sugar mill machinery to be cast
22into cannon shells. Others, not possessing material ob­
jects of use to soldiers, gave of their talents instead. A 
group of amateur musicians, visiting in Vicksburg, gave a 
concern and afterwards forwarded the entire proceeds of sev­
enty-five dollars to Pettus, asking that he use it for "the 
benefit of the noble Volunteers of your state, now in the 
field, or ready for active service."^3 Others gave a con­
tinuing series of concerts for the benefit of military charity, 
The Natchez Courier proudly reported in October that "Mr. 
Dempsey P. Jackson, who has been constantly contributing in 
one shape or other to the array, found 108 dozen pair of 
woolen socks in the store . . . and bought the whole lot to 
send to Jeff Thompson's brave men in M i s s o u r i .
Mississippi's women, particularly, expended great ef­
forts to obtain necessary articles for the soldiers. Most 
contributed sewing, turned out by such organized groups as
Blpettus, Executive Journal, (A), p. 298.
2%David Pemble to Pettus, September 10, 1861, Ser. E.,
Vol. 53, MDAH.
^^Charles T. Nash to Pettus, September 21, 1861, Ibid, 
^^Natchez Courier, October 1, 9, 1861.
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the Confederate Sewing Society of Natchez,^® but others pre­
ferred to provide money for the purchase of articles with 
which to fight. On October 8, a woman in Columbus wrote to 
Pettus, enclosing three hundred dollars and directing the 
Governor to purchase sabre bayonets, an "almost indespensible 
weapon" with the money. Unless such arms were provided Mis­
sissippi soldiers, the correspondent concluded, it would 
prove "impossible for them to withstand a charge from a foe, 
who is armed with all of the implements which Northern in­
genuity can suggest."26
Among the more remarkable donations were those by free 
blacks. The Natchez Courier reported in early November that 
the free blacks of Natchez had "contributed to the soldiery 
not less than $250. in cash, and about $50. worth of cloth­
i n g .  "27 Some Mississippians, having nothing to contribute 
themselves and discovering the desire of several planters to 
give food, offered to collect, pack, and distribute "any 
articles of plantation p r o d u c e . " 2 8
Judging from the number and extent of free offerings by 
Mississippians of all classes throughout most of 1861, a 
willingness existed to support the Confederacy and its pro-
26jbid., November 1, 1861.
26Miss Mat. E. Morton et a]^  to Pettus, October 8, 1861, 
Ser. E., Vol. 53, MDAH.
2?Natchez Courier, November 1, 1861.
28ibid., October 31, 1861.
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grams. Although scarcity of some types of articles existed 
early in the war period, real want and widespread depriva­
tion did not envelop the state until late in 1861. When 
this occurred, donations quickly dried up, and the state gov­
ernment was left with increased burdens both in supplying 
the volunteer soldiers and in providing food for the growing 
number of destitute families left behind by the departing 
armies.
Economic ability and stable commercial conditions also 
greatly affected the financial programs instituted by Mis­
sissippi’s wartime leadership in the first few months of 
conflict. The degree of acceptance of their financial mea­
sures was of extreme importance to state officials, as Mis­
sissippi's repudiationist history precluded the possibility 
of outside absorption of a significant portion of the state's 
notes and bonds. Consequently, Mississippians themselves 
would have to readily accept the state issues at or near par 
in order to provide the necessary stability for future pro­
grams.
Since Mississippi was practically destitute of money in 
1861, except for issues of notes by banks of neighboring 
states, the convention delegates believed that the currency 
authorized by the ordinance of January 26 would be gratefully 
accepted by most classes of citizens. However, because Mis­
sissippi had for decades depended almost entirely upon the 
issues of banks located outside the state for a circulating
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medium, when the convention treasury notes became available 
many people desired to buy them, but the only currency avail­
able was that of the non-Mississippi banks. Some gold could 
still be found in circulation for the first few months of 
1861, but the entire sum proved negligible, and by mid-summer,
OQ
almost none remained. For these reasons, the new Missis­
sippi treasury notes were no sooner offered to the "patriotic 
public" than Governor Pettus began receiving communications 
complaining that if he insisted on the treasury notes being 
paid for in specie or paper issued by specie-paying banks, 
very few of the notes would be negotiated. In this vein, a 
man living in Ripley wrote Pettus on February 3, reminding 
the Governor that "nearly all our whole money circulation is 
composed of Tennessee bank notes— all of which are now in a 
state of suspension." There existed no gold nor paper of 
specie-paying banks in all of northern Mississippi, the in­
former related to Pettus, but the considerable number of 
people who wished to invest in Mississippi treasury notes 
simply could not do so unless Pettus changed his instructions 
to allow the paper of non-specie paying banks to be taken in 
exchange. "Our people are entirely satisfied with all that 
has been done so far by the Governor, Convention, and legi­
slature," Pettus' correspondent concluded, but the matter of 
what type of notes were receivable for the treasury issue did
O Q  '
Pettus to Burt, June 4, 1861, Ser. G., Vol. 33, MDAH.
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need immediate attention.^®
Others, in the first flush of patriotic support for
the Confederate cause, indicated their willingness to invest
in the treasury notes with no reservations whatsoever. On
March 1, F. T. Leak, a farmer of Salem, informed Pettus that
he had a "few thousand dollars" which he had accumulated
"for the use of the State or Confederate States, one or 
0-1
both."^^ A week later. Leak again addressed the Governor, 
stating that he proposed "giving the State a draft for $5,000 
on the house of E. W. Apperson & Co. of Memphis." Leak as­
sured Pettus he could spare more, but he "felt it a duty to 
be in a condition to help the Confederate States to a small 
amount" if need be.^^
The sale of bonds, authorized at the same time as the 
treasury notes, at first moved quite rapidly too. F. Barks­
dale, an army agent charged with the disposition of a portion 
of the state bonds, reported to Pettus on March 12 that he 
had received from the Governor thirty bonds, worth $500 each, 
which he was to "dispose of." Optimistic that the bonds 
would soon be negotiated, Barksdale told Pettus that he need 
only call on "two gentlemen who reside 12 or 15 miles" from 
Yazoo City and the bonds would be sold.33
30q . Davis to Pettus, February 4, 1861, Ser. E ., Vol. 
51, MDAH.
^^F. T. Leak to Pettus, March 1, 1861, Ibid.
32ibid., March 9, 1861.
33e . Barksdale to Pettus, March 12, 1861, Ibid.
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As was the case with the treasury notes in north Mis­
sissippi, the bonds proved difficult to negotiate in some 
areas of the state, even though they sold readily in others. 
G. M. Fowler, another state agent, wrote to Pettus on April 
9 from Natchez, reminding him of a previous communication 
dealing with the difficulty met in trying to sell the bonds 
in that city. Fowler informed Pettus that he had since 
traveled to Woodville and its vicinity, "a place noted for 
its patriotism, wealth, and liberality, and it is with a 
feeling of much regret that I inform you that no funds are 
to be raised in that q u a r t e r . "34 ignoring the possibility 
that some people of southwest Mississippi simply did not 
want to participate in thie movement to "loan money to the 
state," Fowler assigned his failure to negotiate the bonds 
in that quarter to a simple lack of money. He told Pettus 
regretfully that "the citizens from whom we expected aid to 
carry out this movement express themselves wholly unable to
command any money at present owing to the unprecedented
•a R
pressure of the times."
As Fowler himself pointed out, the area around Natchez 
and Woodville represented one of the wealthiest in the state, 
yet the people appeared "unable to command any money at pre­
sent." Far more important, although if Fowler recognized it 
he did not allude to the fact, was that this region consisted
34q . M. Fowler to Pettus, April 9, 1861, Ibid. 
SSibid.
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of wealthy planters who, in the spring of 1861, still hoped 
the Confederate Government at Richmond would react favorably 
to their repeated demands that the government purchase their 
cotton, giving in exchange bonds and notes of the Confederate 
States, Many Mississippi planters in the early part of the 
Confederate period simply ignored the state government as 
long as they retained any hope for relief from the Confeder­
ate Congress. They appeared fully aware that their grip on 
the state house in Jackson was being pried loose by repeated 
attacks of the entrepreneural classes, so consequently con­
centrated on winning control of the central government in 
Richmond. Only when their efforts to convince the latter 
to purchase the cotton crop outright failed, as happened in 
the fall of 1861, did the planters reluctantly attempt to 
regain their power and influence in Jackson. Meanwhile, they 
remained content to pay the required lip service for the 
support of Mississippi’s initial financial endeavor of the 
Confederate period, but when the time came to actually par­
ticipate, they ruefully expressed themselves ’’wholly unable 
to command any money at present owing to the unprecedented 
pressure of the times."
Despite the planter’s hesitancy in responding to the 
proffered note and bond issues, negotiation of these secur­
ities moved along at a satisfactory rate in the poorer sec­
tions of the state. A strong supporter of this effort, the 
Paulding Eastern Clarion editorialized in mid-April that
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"Our patriotic people will raise not only the men but the 
money for our defense." Apparently unaware of the recalci­
trance of the planters, the Clarion boldly asserted that not 
a man existed but "will spend his bottom dollar, and shed 
his last drop of blood in the holy c a u s e . "36
The Clarion's assertion that some people in Mississippi 
would spend their bottom dollar for the "cause" appeared 
somewhat born out by the success with which the bonds and 
notes were being sold by summer. Having determined to take 
advantage of the pervasive martial spirit of the times, Pet­
tus and the Military Board decided to send out the brigadier 
generals of the state militia to canvass the state, speaking 
and selling the notes and bonds. This tactic proved more 
successful than the earlier plan of dispersing commissioners 
to sell the treasury issues. General Reuben Davis reported 
from Aberdeen on July 10 that he believed he would be able 
to "put in circulation in payment of purchases and exchange 
for money the whole amount of fifty thousand dollars trea­
sury notes in short time." The people in the northern part 
of the state, he advised Pettus, "receive them in all trans­
actions, and will deposit money with the Bank, in exchange 
for treasury notes, with which to pay their debts."3?
A week after Davis' report, General A. M. West informed 
the Governor that up to that time, his success had proven
36paulding (Mississippi) Eastern Clarion, April 19, 1861,
37Reuben Davis to Pettus, July .10, 1861, Ser. E., Vol.
51, MDAH.
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equal to "our most sanguine anticipations," and that "every­
where I have spoken the people have voted unanimously to 
make the Treasury / n o t e ^  . . .  a currency in the payment of 
debts and in the purchase and sale of all goods, wares, & 
merchandise." West further assured Pettus that the people 
had "with singular liberality exchanged money for said notes, 
considering that there is but a small amount of money in 
possession of the people save hoarded wealth, which nothing 
but the strong arm of the law can reach." The day previous. 
West reported, he had sold some $12,000 in Mississippi trea­
sury notes and bonds. Before that, in Grenada, the General 
proudly announced that he had dispensed over one thousand 
dollars, that being all he had with him, but "could have 
sold more."38
Not only were the Mississippi notes accepted by the more 
numerous classes of citizens, but the merchants and manufac­
turing interests, at least in the beginning, evinced little 
reluctance to receive them in payment for goods. J. M.
Wesson, President of the Mississippi Manufacturing Company, 
one of the largest textile manufacturing concerns in the 
state, informed Pettus in July that he felt "no hesitancy in 
saying that we will take treasury notes of small denomina­
tions say five and ten dollars of the state and Confederacy, 
for what goods we may have to sell."39 Actually, this limited
38j
39j. M. Wesson to Pettus, July 27, 1861, Ibid.
’A. M. West to Pettus, July 17, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 52, 
Ibid.
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the number of acceptable Mississippi treasury notes some­
what, as the smallest denomination issued was ten dollars.
One factor which limited the amount of Mississippi 
treasury notes and bonds the state could sell to its citi­
zens was the competition from Confederate issues, being 
distributed throughout the state simultaneously with the 
state currency. One tremendous advantage which the Confed­
erate bonds had over state issues was that the former could 
be exchanged for not only certain kinds of paper money and 
specie, but also cotton. Like the experience with the state 
securities, however, those of the Confederate Government got 
off to a slow start, not so much from reluctance of some 
classes of people to invest in them, but from disorganiza­
tion in their distribution. 0. R. Singleton wrote indig­
nantly to Pettus on April 15 that he read in the newspaper 
that he and two other prominent citizens of central Missis­
sippi had been appointed commissioners to receive subscrip­
tions to the Confederate loan. "Who are the Commissioners 
at Jackson who appointed us? What do they mean by giving 
us no notice, no instructions?" Singleton grumbled. Plenty 
of people desired to participate in the loan, he assured 
the Governor, but "what do they mean by this neglect of the 
means necessary to get the money?"^®
By April 25, the confusion had subsided somewhat, and
400. R. Singleton to Pettus, April 15, 1861, Ibid.
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books opened at various points throughout the state to take 
the names of subscribers to the Confederate loans. Much was 
made in the state press of the fact that the first subscriber 
to the loan in Port Gibson was a slave, who "took fifty dol­
lars of the loan." This seeming anomaly presented no diffi­
culty to the editor of the Natchez Courier, who assured his 
readers that the "negroes are ready to fight for their 
people, and they are ready to give money as well as their 
lives to the cause of their masters."^1 In Vicksburg a short 
time later, the Whig reported that Henry Lee, "the well known 
colored barber" and "Bill Newman, another free man of color, 
have each taken $250 of the Confederate loan."4%
Many of the same problems which plagued the distribution 
of the state securities operated to the detriment of the Con­
federate loan as well. Several commissioners in northern 
Mississippi reported in April to C. G. Memminger that in 
"consequence of the depreciation of Tennessee money, and, 
indeed, all other currency except New Orleans, it being now 
10 per cent, discount for coin," that they could not "effect 
much in the way of obtaining loans for the Government."43 
Like the experience of the agents attempting to negotiate 
Mississippi treasury notes and bonds in the counties near
4%atchez Courier, April 25, 1861.
4^Vicksburg (Mississippi) Whig, quoted in the Natchez 
Courier, April 30, 1861.
4^W. M. Sea, J. W. Clapp, and W. Goodman to C. G. Mem­
minger, May 27, 1861, Thian, Correspondence, Appendix V, p. 
117.
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the Tennessee border, the Confederate commissioners quickly 
discovered that Mississippians in that area accepted the 
Tennessee currency at par, and were therefore not willing 
to take a discount on it simply to subscribe to the Confed­
erate loan.44
By July, it became apparent that the Confederate loan 
agents would continue to experience difficulty in obtaining 
subscriptions in some areas of the state, due mainly to the 
simple lack of funds. No comprehensive stay law had yet 
been passed in Mississippi, and as Richard T. Archer reported 
to Memminger, "We cannot pay our debts and make loans to the 
Confederate Government with the same money."45 Not only did 
planters such as Archer realize that some rules regarding 
the negotiation of the loan needed alteration, but the agents 
charged with dispensing the Confederate issues quickly for­
mulated their own ideas as to what steps should be taken to 
affect this object. On July 2, T. J. Dobyns, who identified 
himself as "one of the agents who are trying to induce our 
planters to set aside such portion of their growing crops of 
cotton as they can spare and take the bonds of our Govern­
ment," proposed his plan to President Jefferson Davis. He 
suggested to Davis that a sort of national bank be established 
to regulate all financial affairs of the Southern states. 
Pausing to assure the President that he was "opposed to such
44ibid.
45Richard T. Archer to C. G. Memminger, July 1, 1861, 
Ibid., pp. 180-181.
126
institutions under ordinary circumstances," and that his 
proposed bank would "be very different from the United 
States banks," Dobyns suggested that the South’s entire 
cotton production become the basis of a huge banking estab­
lishment. He urged that the Confederacy raise through cot­
ton one-half to two hundred millions of dollars, to be used 
as security for the issuance of up to three times that amount 
of money. Dobyns proposed that individuals be allowed one- 
third of the stock, the states a third, and the Confederate 
Government itself the remainder, thereby at once providing 
a system of checks and balances and winning the support of 
three crucial elements in the C o n f e d e r a c y . 46 The government 
could hold the cotton until a satisfactory profit could be 
obtained abroad, and then sell for gold, making the bank’s 
currency issues that much more valuable and desirable.
Dobyn’s plan, and similar ones proposed by planters 
throughout the South in the early part of the war, never re­
ceived serious consideration by Confederate treasury offi­
cials. Instead, the latter chose to base their currency and 
bond issues on such ephemeral foundations as "pledges to 
pay," and’promises to pay the bearer two years after the 
ratification of a treaty of peace." Had a plan approximat­
ing that of Archer or Dobyns been accepted, a powerful diplo­
matic weapon would have been added to the Confederate arsenal.
4®T. j . Dobyns to Jefferson Davis, July 2, 1861, Ibid., 
pp. 184-185.
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for had the Confederacy collected and protected the entire 
cotton production of the South, instead of ordering it burned 
to make a dubious point to reluctant potential European al­
lies, these countries might have been more tempted to extend 
at least recognition, if not direct aid, to the Confederacy.
During the early period of armed conflict, all classes 
of Mississippians were caught up in the throes of a situation 
which appeared dangerous, hostile, and altogether strange to 
any past experience. Torn loose from traditional political 
moorings, Mississippians became so much flotsam, being pulled 
this way and that by forces which most of them understood 
but faintly, if at all. Actual war, rumors of impending in­
vasion, and the ever-present possibility of domestic insur­
rection added to the uncertainty which prevailed everywhere. 
Far more tangible, however, were the rapidly deteriorating 
economic conditions, which led to falling cotton prices, in­
ability of merchants to obtain new goods or to sell those on 
hand, and a general paucity of money or any reasonable sub­
stitute. Confederate agents encountered increasing diffi­
culty in passing their notes and bonds on to the people. Com­
missioners for the Mississippi treasury note and bond issues 
fared little better generally, while the issues of both Con­
federate and state treasuries were passing only at a discount 
in most areas, including the all-important New Orleans mar­
ket. Although one financial firm in the Crescent City re­
ported to W. R. Fulkerson of the Port Gibson Bank in June
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that if "we can all squeeze along two weeks longer we have 
got the bugger by the hand," it seemed later in the month 
that the "bugger" remained at large.4? On June 22, the same 
firm reluctantly informed Fulkerson that Southern money gen­
erally circulated only at a discount in New Orleans. Fulk­
erson received assurances that if he had "gone through for 
two months what the writer has, you would be as grey as a 
rat." No matter what remedy was attempted, it seemed that 
the rat just "got fatter, handsomer."^8
By the time winter arrived in the first year of the war, 
Mississippi officials had squandered several opportunities 
to create a workable, acceptable financial system in favor 
of a cautious wait-and-see attitude. Despite this, most 
Mississippians strongly supported the Confederacy during 
1861, but by the end of the year, were becoming increasingly 
restless and demanded more positive action on the part of 
both state and Confederate officers. In response to this, 
the legislature which met in November faced the difficult 
task of creating from nothing a viable financial structure 
for a state already beset by destitution, deprivation, and 
war.
47j. J. Person & Co. to Wm. R. Fulkerson, June 8, 
1861, Port Gibson Bank Papers, MDAH.
48ibid., June 22, 1861.
CHAPTER V 
LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS
While the economic programs implemented by Pettus and 
the legislature in the March and July meetings demonstrated 
their growing awareness of the complex problems facing Mis­
sissippians, it appeared obvious by November that compre­
hensive, long-range planning must be initiated if chaotic 
conditions were to be prevented. The commencing of actual 
war demanded greatly increased expenditures for military pro­
grams. By the same token, the additional demands upon Mis­
sissippi’s manpower supply meant a considerable increase in 
the number of needy families left behind to be taken care 
of by state and county revenue. Further complicating the 
domestic scene were the widespread practices of hoarding and 
speculation participated in by merchants, wholesalers, and 
planters alike.^ Specie existed almost nowhere in the state 
after mid-year, resulting in a dearth of small change with 
which to carry on minor business transactions.^ The smallest 
denomination of the state treasury notes was the ten dollar
^Natchez Courier, October 10, 1861; the Macon ^issis- 
sippjy Beacon, December 4, 1861.
^Natchez Courier, October 2, 1861; J. W. Watkins to Tho. 
T. Swann, December 6, 1861, Ser. G., Vol. 33, MDAH.
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bill, wholly unsuited to most ordinary transactions. Fur­
ther, these bills achieved only reluctant acceptance in 
some quarters of the state, while in others they were re­
fused altogether. J. D. Folsom, a regimental commander, re­
ported indignantly to Pettus in September that the leading 
merchant at Marion Station "refuses to have State Notes at 
any price," and would accept only Confederate notes in ex­
change for supplies which only he could furnish to Folsom's 
troops.3
Adding to the pecuniary embarrassment of a large portion 
of the state's population were skyrocketing prices, which by 
late 1861 reached proportions unknown in any previous period 
of extreme inflation. Flour sold for about seven dollars a 
pound in September, and bacon went for twenty-five cents—  
and this when a soldier's pay consisted of about eleven dol­
lars per month.4 The Natchez Courier reported on November 12 
that "there are parties here who are purchasing the neces­
saries of life, such as soap, candles, starch, &c. in such 
great quantities as to make the want of them felt" rather 
severely. The purpose of these unscrupulous people being, 
according to the Courier, to send the articles to New Orleans 
"on speculation."5 In the northern part of the state the
3j. D. Folsom to Pettus, September 12, 1861, Ser. E., 
Vol. 53, MDAH.
4lbid.
^Natchez Courier, November 12, 1861.
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Macon Beacon reported in early December that many classes 
of foodstuffs, particularly molasses, rice, wheat, and corn 
were being hoarded and "speculated in."®
Certainly by November additional legislation was urgent­
ly called for by Mississippians of all classes, from the 
planter who frantically pressed for some relief to enable 
him to dispose of part or all of his cotton, to the small 
farmer who had left his family and joined the volunteer com­
panies, only to find his wife and children facing winter with 
no money, and very little food. Under these conditions, com­
plicated by the increasing threat of actual invasion of the 
state from the north, south, and west, Pettus again sent his 
recommendations to the legislature meeting in November, 1861, 
fully realizing that upon subsequent actions rested the hopes 
and safety of all Mississippians.
The object of the legislature assembled in Jackson late 
in 1861 was, according to the Governor, to "place Mississippi 
in the best condition to exert her full force in rendering 
this conflict sucessful." The most obvious means to accomp­
lish this, he asserted, rested in "the adoption of means to 
render more comfortable and healthy, and consequently more 
efficient, the volunteers" who were then in the field. What 
the brave men in the tented field really needed, Pettus ad­
mitted, was food and warm clothing. He confessed that he had 
previously believed that the law passed by the legislature in
®Macon Beacon, December 4, 1861.
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July authorizing the county boards of police to provide for 
clothing for the volunteers would prove sufficient, but sub­
sequent events demonstrated otherwise. Since the law left 
it up to each county to decide how much they wanted to con­
tribute, Pettus complained, some "patriotic but poor" counties 
had furnished as many as fifteen companies, while other more 
affluent counties provided for the support of only two or 
three. To correct this obvious injustice, Pettus suggested 
that the state assume the burden of providing the basic ne­
cessities for Mississippi troops, which the Governor reported 
numbered about 30,000 in camps and in the field. All these 
soldiers, Pettus pointed out with pride, were volunteers, hav­
ing been constrained to enter the service only out of "patri- 
otic duty to stand between the State and her enemies."'
Pettus then addressed his remarks to financial conditions 
in Mississippi, which he characterized as "the most pressing 
want of the country." He assured the legislators that he had 
exhausted every effort to dispose of the entire sum of $1,000,000 
authorized by the act of January 26, but found this impossible, 
due mainly to the lack of specie or other ready money. Based 
upon what he considered the absolute necessity to equip and 
arm Mississippi's soldiers, Pettus informed the assemblage 
that he consequently "exercized a discretion which I believe 
is given me by the ordinance, and caused these notes to be 
used as money in the purchase of arms, accoutrements, equip-
?Mississippi House Journal (November, 1861-January, 1862), 
p. 10.
133
age and supplies." In other words, when it proved impossible 
to dispose of all the notes and bonds by "patriotic appeals," 
Pettus simply withdrew from the treasury a sufficient amount 
of the unsold currency and used it to purchase articles need­
ed by the army. Realizing his action lacked legal sanction, 
and if continued would likely cause sharp depreciation in the 
currency actually sold, Pettus urged the legislature to de­
vise some "well-digested financial scheme" to obviate the 
necessity of such extra-legal undertakings in the future.&
Although he left it to the legislature to evolve a "well- 
digested financial scheme," Pettus overtly suggested where 
it might be well to begin the search for such a plan. Re­
flecting pressures applied by planters whose every effort to 
persuade Confederate authorities to purchase their cotton met 
with failure, Pettus reminded the legislators that since Mis­
sissippians "depended almost entirely on the sale of cotton 
for money," it seemed only logical to look in that quarter 
for some basis for an additional currency issue. Pettus then 
rather astutely summed up the glum financial situation in 
Mississippi:
Having no large cities whose capital is accumu­
lated, and no bank, and having spent the ready 
money on hand at the commencement of hostilities, 
in fitting out their sons for the field, /Missis­
sippians/ will be pecularly embarrassed in paying 
their taxes, unless some plan can be devised by 
which cotton can be converted into the means of 
payment.
If this can be done, then all trouble on this
8lbid., pp. 12-13.
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subject vanishes, and the Confederate Government 
might double the tax, and it would be paid as 
cheerfully as the most moderate State tax was ever 
paid; but unless cotton can be thus exchanged, my 
deliberate opinion is that the present tax cannot 
be paid.9
Pettus reluctantly came to the decision that the state 
must issue additional paper money, even though he clearly 
preferred that the Confederate Government assume the response 
bility of furnishing the South with a sufficient circulating 
medium. If a paper currency must be relied upon, as he re­
gretfully assumed was the case, Pettus suggested it would be 
cheaper "for the Confederate Government to make that paper 
currency by issuing Treasury notes to the full amount of the 
wants of the Government." If this policy were followed, Pet­
tus asserted, "the Legislatures of the several States might 
materially aid in giving these notes a continued currency by 
making them receivable at the State Treasury." Later, the 
tax for their ultimate redemption might "be collected on the 
raising of the blockade; and if necessary, it might be made 
double or. treble the present rate, and it would be less bur- 
thensome and more cheerfully paid."10
Mississippians might well endure the privations of a 
few years of war, Pettus confidently assured his listeners, 
because for them "with returning peace comes renewed prosper- 
iety." As for the enemy, he said "no peace can restore their 




back to' survey the ruin brought on their country by their 
own folly.” Clearly concerned about the families of Mis­
sissippians daily dying to overcome that foe, Pettus re­
commended that the legislature take such measures for their 
relief ”as their circumstances may be found to require.”11
Governor Pettus concluded his remarks by again warning 
that he feared the "magnitude and duration of the war” had 
not been fully appreciated. The North, he asserted, would 
prove a tenacious combatant, since its stake in the war was 
nothing less that "absolute control of the hundreds of mil­
lions of the teeming annual wealth of Southern fields.” This 
being the case, he predicted northerners would "not be easily 
driven from their pretensions to the right to plunder” the 
South, and would "doubtless submit to any sacrifice so long 
as hope remains of so rich a conquest.” Reflecting the gen­
eral position most Southerners took— that their war effort 
was strictly defensive— Pettus assured Mississippians that 
their brave soldiers were "battling in defense of property, 
honor, life, and all for which freemen should wish to live.” 
Because these were the issues being decided on the field of 
battle, Pettus said, "we must triumph or p e r i s h !
While Pettus' remarks may have strengthened their re­
solve, the legislators were already aware of the pressing 
need for the development of a comprehensive financial program 




the convention treasury issue of January, 1861, several 
Confederate Government issues, some script of private banks, 
and issues of surrounding Southern states. By November, 
each of these types of currency issues had proven unsatis­
factory to one degree or another in meeting Mississippi's 
financial needs. The state's own convention treasury note 
issue had not sold well at all, despite vigorous efforts by 
numerous state officials to secure the sale of the $1,000,000 
authorized by the January 26 act.^^ Then in February, 1861, 
the Confederate Government voted to issue $15,000,000 in ten- 
year, eight per cent bonds secured by a tax on cotton ex­
ports. In March, the Richmond government supplemented this 
by authorizing the sale of $1,000,000 in one-year treasury 
notes, bearing a little over three and one half per cent in­
terest, and in August, this issue was doubled.
Neither the state nor the Confederate notes were intended 
to be used as a legal tender. Furthermore, the Confederate 
currency, issued in denominations of not less than fifty dol­
lars and the state notes, issued only in denominations exceed­
ing ten dollars, were consequently unusable as a circulating 
medium in the ordinary course of business transactions. Print-
ISjackson /Mississippi^' Mississippian, March 5, 1862; A.
M. West to Pettus, July 17, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 52, MDAH; Mis­
sissippi Senate Journal, July, 1861, pp. 39, 86.
14gchwab, A Financial and Industrial History, p. 9; The 
Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Con­
federate States of America, February 8, 1861-February 18, 1862, 
James M. Matthews, Ed. (Richmond, 1864), pp. 42-48, 54-57. 
(Hereafter referred to as Confederate Statutes.)
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ing delays and inefficiency in the distribution of both 
these types of notes further hampered initial efforts to 
distribute them among Southerners. Because of uncertainties 
regarding their acceptance in payment of taxes, both note 
types early began to pass only at a discount.15 The Confed­
erate issues were so laden with liabilities that by July 19,
only some $123,000 worth of the bonds authorized in February 
had been disposed of in Mississippi.1® As for the state notes, 
a report dated July 26 indicated only a little over $174,000 
of the entire issue had been taken up.l? In fact, people gen­
erally displayed so little confidence in the convention notes 
that in September the state treasurer felt constrained to 
issue a formal statement, guaranteeing that the legislature 
would pass no law which might impair their value and that they
would be accepted in the payment of taxes due to the state.
Although used extensively by Mississippians since re­
pudiation forced the abandonment of home-grown financial ar­
rangements, note issues of the surrounding states were by no 
means satisfactory once the war began. One problem developed 
because issues of the various banks rose and fell drastically 
in value during the disturbing early days of the war. Con-
ISgchwab, A Financial and Industrial History, p. 9; Audi­
tor's Records, Ser. G., Vol. 19, MDAH; Jackson Mississippian, 
March 5, 1862.
iGsettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 94.
^^Mississippi Senate Journal (July, 1861), pp. 39, 86;
A. M. West to Pettus, July 17, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 52, MDAH.
l^Natchez Courier, September 18, 1861.
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sequently, Mississippi merchants never really knew the rate 
of discount which the notes whould command. More importantly, 
only Mississippi convention treasury notes were acceptable 
for the military tax, and there existed widespread fear that 
out-of-state issues might not be accepted for other county, 
city, state, and Confederate taxes. For these reasons, notes 
of surrounding states proved less desirable as their useful­
ness became less assured.
Aware of these problems plaguing Mississippi’s financial 
system, the legislature which remained in session from Novem­
ber, 1861 to January, 1862, devised multi-faceted financial 
schemes which far exceeded the Governor's sketchy recommenda­
tions. By their action, the legislators virtually created 
out of "cotton and faith" a comprehensive financial program, 
designed to meet the pressing needs of all classes of Mis­
sissippians. If up to that point legislative action in re­
lation to finance and currency seemed inadequate, their ef­
forts in November, December, and January compensated somewhat 
for valuable lost time.
Before breaking new ground in devising financial mea­
sures to relieve the distress of their constituents, the 
legislators turned first to the convention treasury note is­
sue of January 26, 1861, with a view toward strengthening and 
expanding its original provisions. Since only a fraction of 
the $1,000,000 authorized by the original act had actually
l^Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, pp. 94-95; G.
W. Brame to Pettus, November 28, 1861, Ser. E., Vol. 54, MDAH.
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been sold, and since Pettus had simply withdrawn a portion 
of the remainder to use as money in securing military sup­
plies, the legislature passed an amendment which essentially 
legalized the Governor's action, and allowed his continued 
use of treasury funds if the need arose. Further, the amend­
ment provided for the issuance of more of the unsold treasury 
notes, with the proviso that they be put in circulation at 
their par value. These additional issues, like those previ­
ously sold, were redeemable in either 1862, 1863, or 1864.20 
In January, 1862, this act underwent further alteration, 
making future issues of the treasury notes acceptable for 
taxes in any year, regardless of when they were actually due. 
In the event such notes found their way to the state treasury 
prior to their ultimate redemption date, the amended act 
allowed their re-issuance by the state treasury. By this 
device, the state increased its circulating medium, without 
adding to its liability for their redemption.21
This decisive legislative action stimulated sales of the 
treasury notes considerably. Whereas state Treasurer M. D. 
Haynes reported only some $209,000 of the notes and bonds 
sold by November 13,22 A. B. Dilworth, Auditor of Public 
Accounts, notified Pettus on December 25 that total sales had
20Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
45-46.
21lbid., p. 244.
22Treasurer's Report, Mississippi House Journal (Novem­
ber, 1861-January, 1862), Appendix, p. 2.
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jumped to just over $281,000.^3 Nevertheless, this increase, 
combined with Confederate, local, private, and surrounding 
state issues fell far short of furnishing Mississippians with 
a plentiful circulating medium, adequately adapted to common 
needs. To meet the exigencies thus presented, the legislators 
turned next to the most valuable Southern staple of all— cotton.
To look to the great Southern staple for relief repre­
sented no drastic departure from past practices for Missis­
sippians in 1861. For decades the plantations of the South 
were devoted almost exclusively to the production of a single 
staple crop for sale in a distant market. The proceeds of 
this crop secured the slave laborers needed to work the land, 
as well as clothing, food, farm tools and animals, and the 
comforts and luxuries demanded by the planting aristocracy.
To exchange their crop for these items, most planters depended 
on factors, or commission merchants. Frequently, either be­
cause of a desire to increase his holdings or as a result of 
a partial crop failure or falling cotton prices, a planter 
desired credit, and to obtain it he usually looked to his 
factor. The factor in turn, anxious to secure for himself 
the lucrative commissions incident to marketing the planter’s 
crop, eagerly supplied the required capital, either out of 
his own reserves or through a loan obtained from other s o u r c e s . ^4
BSfbid., pp. 206-207,
4por a discussion of how the factorage system operated 
in one important Mississippi commercial center, see Walker, 
Vicksburg, pp. 4-12, 20-22.
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The staple crops, and cotton in particular, had for de­
cades prior to the outbreak of the Civil War furnished the 
main basis for the Southern credit system. Land and slaves, 
the other two chief bases of Southern wealth, presented dif­
ficulties which prevented their widespread use as security 
for loans. There were periods of great speculation in land, 
such as when removal of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Indians 
from Mississippi in the early 1830*s opened vast new tracts 
of arable land for white settlement, but generally the low 
value of land coupled with the exhaustive system of cultiva­
tion made this form of security peculiarly undesirable.
Slaves, while sometimes utilized as security to purchase other 
slaves, presented obvious limitations in that prices of this 
human commodity fluctuated so drastically, and they might, 
after all, die at any time.^S
When economic ruin threatened the plantation system in 
1861, Mississippi planters therefore turned quite naturally 
to cotton as they believed it offered the best hope of stav­
ing off the impending crisis. For years, mortgages on the 
growing crops represented the usual form of obtaining money 
when the latter commodity became scarce. To relieve the 
critical situation created by the lowering of the Northern 
blockade of Southern ports in 1861, Mississippi planters 
frequently appealed to the Confederate Congress to devise
^^For a thorough study of these aspects of Mississippi 
agricultural operations, see Herbert Weaver, Mississippi 
Farmers, 1850-1860 (Nashville, 1945).
142
some scheme whereby most or all of the cotton crop would be 
purchased outright by the government.^® This action would 
both relieve the planters pecuniary embarrassments by furn­
ishing an internal market for their staple, and supply the 
Confederate authorities with a powerful diplomatic and econ­
omic weapon. But unfortunately for both planter and govern­
ment, the Confederate Congress declined to purchase the cotton 
crop of the South outright, and instead passed a "produce 
loan," whereby $50,000,000 was set aside to be subscribed by 
planters who wished to pledge their produce to the Confeder­
ates for which they were to receive twenty-year, eight per 
cent bonds.27 This type of arrangement proved very attractive 
to the government, as it allowed them to obtain necessary 
supplies without having to actually advance money for them. 
However, such a plan left the planters little if any better 
off than before, for the bonds could only be used as long-term 
investments, not as a circulating medium which represented 
the planters’ prime necessity. Without treasury notes with 
which to pay current debts, the planter could neither afford 
to expand or even maintain his present level of operations.
2®Appeals emanated from all classes in Mississippi through­
out 1861, with the preponderance being from the larger cotton 
producers. Some of the more thorough plans suggested were pre­
sented in the following: De Bow’s Review, XXX (1861), pp.
367-368; Charleston Courier, March 3, 1862; ¥. C. Smedes to 
Jefferson Davis, July 10, 1861, in Thian, Correspondence, Ap­
pendix V, p. 204; Charles B. Johnson to Pettus, November 11, 
1861, Ser. E., Vol. 54, MDAH; and G. W. Brame to Pettus, No­
vember 28, 1861, Ibid.
27schwab, A Financial and Industrial History, p. 12.
i4â
nor could he subscribe liberally to additional Confederate 
or state loans.^8
By the November session of the Mississippi legislature, 
it seemed clear to both Pettus and the legislators that if 
the planters were to get any real relief it must originate 
on the state, not the national level. Disillusionment with 
Confederate Secretary of the Treasury C. G. Memminger moti­
vated one Mississippi agriculturalist to complain to the 
Governor that "the impotency of Mr. Memminger's administra­
tion has lost the country millions, and if he persists, in 
the course he has adopted, will involve us in utter ruin . . . 
for all purposes of good the secretary has been a Dummy . . . 
all of his policies have been pregnant with evil."29 Reacting 
to rumors that the impending legislature planned to create 
banks, in the hope they would lend money to the hard-pressed 
planting community, "a planter" writing in the Natchez 
Courier warned that in such a scheme where banks were created 
to loan money to planters for the latter’s cotton, the sum 
advanced would surely be so small that when the blockade was 
finally lifted, the banks could sell the cotton at enormous 
prices, pocketing the profits while leaving the hapless plan­
ters to suffer severe losses. "Let us beware of that snare,"
C. Smedes to Jefferson Davis, July 10, 1861, Thian, 
Correspondence, Appendix V, p. 204; and Thomas Dabney to C. G. 
Memminger, Fall, 1861, Ibid., p. 444.
29charles B. Johnson to Pettus, November 11, 1861, Ser.
E., Vol. 54, MDAH.
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the planter urged, "let us still hope, and labor, that the 
Government may give us a currency, and buy our cotton."30
While the author of that plea probably had the Confed­
erate Government in mind as the body most likely to purchase 
Mississippi's cotton, it became the state government upon 
which the burden ultimately fell. Early in December, the 
senate passed a bill authorizing the issuance of money based 
upon cotton to be pledged by growers of the staple, but the 
bill faced stormy debate in the house of representatives. 
Following four days of speeches, challenges, and attempts 
at amendment, the bill passed the house by a vote of sixty
qi
to sixteen. Finally, Mississippi possessed the necessary 
machinery upon which it hoped to construct a sound, effective 
currency system.
On December 19, Governor Pettus signed into law the far- 
reaching act "authorizing the issuance of Treasury Notes, as 
advances upon cotton." The total issue being established at 
$5,000,000, the notes were to be of a denomination as high 
as one hundred and as low as one dollar, thereby making them 
acceptable in ordinary business transactions. The notes 
were to be advanced upon cotton at the rate of five cents per 
pound, to any Mississippian who produced satisfactory affi­
davits attesting to his actual possession of a certain number
^^Natchez Courier, November 6, 1861.
^^Mississippi House Journal (November, 1861-January,
1862), p. 229.
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of bales of cotton. The cotton was to remain carefully 
stored at the risk of the grower until called for by the Gov­
ernor at such time after the raising of the blockade as the 
latter chose. The notes thus issued were to be redeemed out 
of proceeds from the sale of the pledged cotton, which could 
only be disposed of for gold or silver, or notes authorized
o n
by the act itself. Reacting to what some planters consid­
ered a serious weakness of the Confederate produce loan, which 
contained no provision for the redemption of the cotton by
O  O
the planter, the Mississippi law allowed the person who 
pledged his cotton to redeem such produce at any time by simply 
repaying in cotton notes the amount of such notes advanced.
This meant thair if the planter or farmer felt he had an oppor­
tunity to sell his cotton at a better price than the five 
cents allowed by the law, he could simply repay the money ad­
vanced by the state, and thereby regain complete ownership 
of his stored cotton. To prevent planters from dumping the 
unsold portion of their 1860 cotton crop on the state, the 
law provided that only cotton produced in 1861 was eligible 
to be pledged for a cash advance.
To increase the attractiveness of the cotton notes, as
^^Mississippi Laws, (November, 1861-January, 1862), 
pp. 59-66.
33w. C. Smedes to Jefferson Davis, July 10, 1861, Thian 
Correspondence, Appendix V, p. 204.
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
59-66.
146
they soon came to be called, the law provided for their ac­
ceptance for the payment of all dues to the state, with the 
lone exception of the military tax, for which only treasury 
notes issued under provisions of the January 26, 1861 ordin­
ance would s u f f i c e . 35
The basic "cotton note law" underwent some revision on 
January 29, 1862 when the legislature passed a supplemental 
act allowing the Governor to have the notes printed by the 
"electrotype processes," since the engraving procedure nor­
mally used proved too slow. To further expedite getting the 
notes into the hands of the anxious cotton planters, the 
supplemental act approved the hiring of additional clerks to 
sign the notes for the treasurer and auditor. Also, trustees 
controlling funds could invest them in these cotton notes. 
Finally, to defray the expense of printing the notes, each 
subscriber to the loan must furnish at the time he received 
the notes one half of one per cent of his a d v a n c e . 3®
Desiring both to increase still further the amount of 
money in circulation and to tap accumulated sources of wealth, 
the Mississippi legislature in November devised plans which 
permitted railroads operating in the state to issue script.
On December 20, 1861, an "Act to Authorize Railroad Companies 
. . .  to issue Notes" won approval by Governor Pettus. This 




tion than three dollars, nor smaller than one dollar, thereby 
furnishing an acceptable medium for small transactions. Six 
railroad companies, the Mississippi Central, Mobile and Ohio, 
Mississippi and Tennessee, Southern, West Feliciana, and the 
Grand Gulf and Port Gibson received authorization to issue a 
total of $380,000 in these small "change n o t e s . I n  Janu­
ary, the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern railroad 
received script issuing privileges, which added another
q Q
$300,000 to the previously allowed amount.
Determined to avoid some of the problems formerly en­
countered when one bank refused to receive the notes of an­
other, the legislature made the privilege to issue script on 
the part of the railroads dependent upon the understanding 
that each road must establish a redemption station within the 
confines of the state, and each must accept the issue of all 
the others for transportation and freight costs. Also cogni­
zant of the problems which formerly arose in Mississippi fi­
nancial history when banks refused to submit their books for 
inspection by state officials, the 1861 law provided that 
each railroad accepting the privilege of issuing its own 
notes must present its books at Jackson when and if called 
upon to do so.39
Tight controls were also instituted in relation to the
3?Ibid., pp. 78-81. 
38ibid., pp. 238-239 
39jbid., p. 81.
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redemption of their notes by the railroad companies. The 
subscribing railroads were required to redeem their notes 
at any time, either in specie, Confederate notes, or other 
"bank notes current at the time and place of presentation." 
Further, they must accept their own notes and those of the 
other railroads freely and at par value. In return, the 
railroads could re-issue their script an unlimited number of 
times, until one year after the close of the war.^O
On January 22, 1862, a supplemental act provided for the 
issuance of an additional $568,000 by the seven companies 
which operated railroads in Mississippi. The act also allowed 
the railroads to issue notes of a less than one dollar denom­
ination; in fact, anything down to five cents would be allow­
ed. Further, the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which 
traversed the northern part of the state, was granted banking 
privileges, and received authorization to issue $200,000 in 
script. This supplemental law, like the original, contained 
rather severe penalties for issuance of more notes than spe­
cifically allowed each railroad company, and the legislature 
reiterated its demand that each of the companies accept the 
notes of the others at par.41
Another financial scheme introduced into the legislature 
early in November involved the establishment of a system of 




John Hooker of Holmes County proposed a bill .designed to es­
tablish "banking in the state of Mississippi," tit failed 
to win immediate consideration for the measure. Hooker man­
aged to gain a new hearing for his bill in late November, 
when he obtained its referral to the committee of ways and 
m e a n s . O n  December 3, that committee submitted its report, 
in which it stated that though the plan seemed acceptable, 
the committee was "unable to arrive at any conclusion touch­
ing the practicability and policy of establishing a system 
of Banking" in Mississippi.43
For a brief time the re-establishment of a banking sys­
tem in Mississippi appeared doomed, but in early January,
1862, a new movement for the creation of such a system reached 
fruition and on January 17, Pettus signed into law an act in­
corporating several banks to operate within the state. The 
enactment provided for the establishment of ten banks, to be 
located in the cities of Jackson, Natchez, Vicksburg, Holly 
Springs, Aberdeen, Grenada, Enterprise, Yazoo City, Columbus, 
and Brookhaven. Collectively, these banks received authori­
zation to issue stock for a total capitalization of $6,300,000. 
Each bank could issue notes based upon its paid-in capital on 
the basis of one for one, until such time as they resumed 
specie payments. Thereafter, the law provided that the banks 
could circulate notes in the amount of two for one on its




paid-in capital s t o c k . ^4
Each of the banks received a twenty-year charter, and 
each could accept subscriptions to its capital stock in cot­
ton, to be valued at twenty-five dollars per bale. Like the 
state scheme for advancing money on cotton, the subscribers 
were to store the cotton until called for following the re­
moval of the blockade, and safe keeping of the staple thus 
pledged for bank stock remained the responsibility of the 
subscriber.
Aware of the problems which resulted from the lax na­
ture of the first Mississippi banking system, the legisla­
ture determined to prevent possible bank abuses by institut­
ing strict controls limiting freedom of action by the banks. 
As for privileges, each bank could issue script, deal in 
specie, Confederate notes, bills of exchange, drafts, promis­
sory notes and the like, charging ten per cent annual inter­
est until specie payments were resumed, at which time only 
eight per cent could be collected. In the area of control 
measures, the law required each bank to file with the state 
treasurer a semi-annual statement of the condition of the 
bank, in addition to an annual report to the governor, show­
ing the amount of notes in circulation, amount of capital, 
debts, deposits, and other relevant details. Further, the 
governor could at his discretion appoint a commissioner to
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
147-163.
45lbid., pp. 147-149, 151-153.
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examine the bank books if he suspected they were operating 
on a less than solid basis. Finally, each of the banks con­
templated by this legislative enactment must accept any 
treasury notes issued by the state or else forfeit their
charter.46
On January 25, Pettus approved yet another "well-digest­
ed financial scheme" devised by the legislature. The Col­
umbus Life and General Insurance Company and the Mississippi 
Mutual Insurance Company each received banking privileges 
which collectively added another $500,000 or so to the growing 
circulating medium in Mississippi. These companies, accord­
ing to the prefactory statements in the law, deserved banking 
privileges because they had "been in successful operation for 
a number of years," during which time they had paid "a large 
amount of taxes into the State treasury." Perhaps more to 
the point, as the preamble admitted, "there has arisen an 
emergency in the financial affairs of the country requiring 
the employment of concentrated banking capital or credit."4?
As with the banks previously chartered by the legisla­
ture, the insurance companies were required to file a periodic 
report to the state auditor, displaying their "true condition." 
As a further inducement to operate according to sound finan­
cial principles, the stockholders possessing securities in 




total amount of circulation, upon any failure of the company 
to redeem the same. Further, the companies must resume specie 
payments on their notes within ninety days after such action 
by Mobile and New Orleans banks. In return, the companies 
were granted the privilege of charging eight per cent inter­
est on their n o t e s . 48
Having thus created a plethora of banking institutions, 
the Mississippi legislature far surpassed Pettus' "most san­
guine expectations" in providing relief for a great number 
of Mississippians. The planters finally possessed a market 
for their produce, and at the same time received treasury 
notes in exchange with which to carry on daily financial 
transactions. The original treasury note law underwent revi­
sion so as to make the payment of taxes somewhat easier, and 
to get more notes into the hands of the state's citizens.
The largest and most important industries in the state— the 
railroads— obtained banking prerogatives as did two of the 
most prosperous insurance companies. In addition, private 
banking institutions received generous charters from the 
state. Still, none of these programs provided the state ex­
ecutive with a sufficient fund from which to provision Mis­
sissippi's soldiers, a necessary item as Federal troops moved 
ever closer to the state's boundaries in the fall of 1861.
This last deficiency received legislative attention in 
the final days of the lengthy session, and on January 29, 1862,
48lbid., pp. 290-2 96.
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Governor Pettus signed into law an act ’’Authorizing the Issu­
ance of Treasury Notes on Behalf of the State.” By the terms 
of this law, Pettus received permission to contract for the 
printing of up to $2,500,000 in treasury notes of denomina­
tions ranging from five to five hundred, to be receivable 
for all dues to the state except the military tax. These 
notes, secured only by ’’Faith of the State” were to form a 
’’military fund” to be expended ”in the defense of the State.” 
They were fundable in bonds bearing eight per cent interest, 
payable in ten years, when presented in sums of at least 
$500. Anyone holding a minimum of $500 worth of these notes 
could at any time exchange them for the eight per cent, ten- 
year bonds. The only pledge made in regard to redemption of 
either the notes or bonds was a brief statement that the 
’’faith of the state” guaranteed that they would be redeemed.49 
This final financial proposal represented a drastic de­
parture from the other currency laws previously passed during 
the Confederate period, in that in each of the other instances, 
very specific provisions clearly detailed how and from what 
source redemption funds would come. Significantly, when these 
notes appeared, the words ’’Faith of the State Pledged” ap­
peared on the face of each in a very dim ink, incorporated 
in a sort of blurred background pattern. Quite understandably, 
Mississippi’s record of living up to ’’faithful pledges to re­
deem” left much to be desired, a fact state authorities cer-
49lbid., pp. 286-288.
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tainly did not wish to call attention to in 1862.
As the Mississippi legislature moved to expand the state’s 
boundaries of financial responsibility, it became necessary 
to appropriately revise the existing tax structure. Consid­
erable uncertainty as to what amounts of taxes were due, and 
which currencies would be acceptable for the various types 
of assessments led several tax collectors throughout Missis- 
sippi to complain to state officials that they experienced
confusion and unwanted delay in attempting to collect any sig-
50nificant portion of the taxes currently due. By mid-Decem­
ber, conditions in relation to tax matters received the at­
tention of the legislature. On December 19, Pettus signed 
into law a measure extending the time allowed for the collec­
tion of all taxes for the current fiscal year, thereby giving 
some relief to the harried tax collectors. An extension was . 
also granted to the assessors, allowing them considerable 
extra time in which to prepare their new rolls.
Having dismissed an attempt to make cotton receivable 
for taxes,52 and suspended the collection of certain types 
of local and specific taxes collected in some parts of the
50por letters to the auditor and treasurer discussing 
some of the problems involved in assessing and collecting 
taxes, see W. H. Mangum to T. T. Swann, December 28, 1861, 
Ser. G., Vol. 34, MDAH; L. P. Fulton to A. B. Dilworth, De­
cember 28, 1861, Ibid ; T. Ward to the Auditor of Public Ac­
counts, December 26, 1861, Ibid.
^Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
106, 141.
^^Mississippi House Journal (November, 1861-January, 
1862), pp. 7, 42.
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state,53 the legislature passed and Pettus signed on De­
cember 16, 1861, the first of a series of comprehensive tax 
measures designed to relieve the distress of destitute fami­
lies left behind by army volunteers. The act provided for 
the collection of a special tax of thirty per cent upon the 
regular state tax, to be collected by local authorities and 
turned over to the state auditor, who in turn parcelled the 
funds out to the counties, according to the number of needy 
families of volunteers residing in each.54
The legislature also turned its attention to the previ­
ously-passed stay law, and on December 19, enacted an exten­
sion to that law providing that the collection of all judg­
ments of forfeiture previously rendered be postponed until a 
year after the ending of the war.55 This act encompassed the 
only major class of debts left immediately collectable in 
1861, and thus practically obviated the necessity to continue 
the chancery court system in the state during the remainder 
of the war.55
53Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
97, 134.
54^ Ibid. , pp. 53-56.
55ibid., p. 109.
• 56ouring the November-January session of the state legi­
slature, some nineteen acts were passed which substantially 
reduced the fees of various state and local officials. Of 
these, the majority directly lowered the salaries of probate, 
circuit, and chancery judges. See Mississippi Laws, (Novem­
ber, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 71-72, 75, 76, 84-85, 86-87,
89, 91-93, 96-97, 108, 126-128, 130.
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How to satisfy recently-enacted Confederate tax levies 
presented yet another problem to the legislature. In August, 
1861, the Confederate Congress levied a tax of one-half of 
one per cent on most classes of property in the South, the 
major exceptions being money on hand and Confederate bonds. 
Although this tax fell due on May 1, 1862, the Confederate 
Congress included a provision in its tax measure which allow­
ed the state to assume the tax burden, rather than allowing 
Confederate tax officials to collect the levy directly from 
the people. If the state government elected to follow this 
suggested mode of payment, the Confederacy agreed to reduce 
the tax by ten per cent, providing the state met its quota 
by April 1.5? The Mississippi legislature determined to take 
advantage of the ten per cent rebate, and in December, di­
rected Pettus to borrow an amount sufficient to meet Missis­
sippi's assessment of almost $2,500,000.58
In a further effort to make it easier for Mississippians 
to meet the heavily-increased tax burden, the legislature 
passed a measure in January, 1862, authorizing tax collectors 
to accept notes of some Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana 
banks. This proved an especial relief to those areas of Mis­
sissippi which bordered on these neighboring states, as they 
had since repudiation in the 1840's depended so heavily on
^^Confederate Statutes (February 8, 1861-February 18,
1862), p. 118.
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
136-138.
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out-of-state issues for their daily financial transactions.
Altogether, the legislative enactments with regard to 
establishing a financial framework for the Confederate period 
proved much more complete in the November session than had 
been the case with the earlier meetings. With the first ex­
citement over secession worn off, and with the grim realities 
of a protracted conflict more clearly recognizable, the Mis­
sissippi legislature realized a comprehensive financial pro­
gram was essential to the overall war effort. To provide 
such a program, which at once satisfied the demand for a 
circulating medium, met the financial demands of the state 
government, and tapped the main sources of concentrated 
wealth existing in the state, the several laws relating to 
money underwent careful consideration prior to their final 
passage and presentation to the people of Mississippi— upon 
whose acceptance their fate ultimately rested.
59Ibid., pp. 163-164.
CHAPTER VI 
DISLOYALTY, DISRUPTION, AND DISSENSION
The legislature that met in late 1861 and early 1862 
conscientiously attempted to meet the most urgent financial 
needs of all classes of Mississippians. Reacting to poli­
tical, social, and economic events which tumbled upon each 
other with bewildering confusion during the first year of 
the Confederacy, the legislators provided the legal frame­
work by which the main source of public and private wealth 
could be tapped to support the exigencies of a civil con­
flict. Yet despite the best efforts of the legislative 
branch of state government, the ultimate success or failure 
of Mississippi’s various financial programs rested with the 
people themselves. General support by most Mississippians 
needed to be forthcoming to sustain the ever-increasing fi­
nancial burden of the war as the Northern armies moved closer 
to the state’s boundaries. Without wide political and econ­
omic support, no financial program, regardless of its poten­
tial, could succeed.
Initially, most Mississippians lent their united strength 
to the Confederacy. In the first flush of excitement follow­
ing the signing of the secession ordinance in January, 1861,
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a host of the state's people rushed forward, eagerly donating 
material, money, and services to Mississippi and the Confed­
eracy. 1 By late 1861, prior to the enactment of the state 
cotton money scheme, planters generally hesitated, uncertain 
as to whether they could command the means to meet their per­
sonal debts, let alone helping the public cause.^ Many fami­
lies of volunteers looked to their wealthy neighbors for suc­
cor. The planters in turn, who appeared willing to help the 
less fortunate, found that "money pressures" rendered them 
practically "powerless in affording relief to the distressed."3 
But with assistance assured upon the passage of the cotton 
money law, the planting community, and especially the planter's 
wives and daughters devoted considerable time, effort, and 
money to the support of both the soldiers in the field and 
their families remaining at home.
The Natchez "Free Market," sponsored and operated for 
the most part by ladies in the Natchez area, offered a wide 
range of supplies to destitute families. Almost every issue 
of the Natchez Courier for the spring and summer of 1862 car­
ried a notice that the Free Market contained goods of all de­
scriptions, which the ladies "cheerfully dispensed to any 
needy people" who called during the appointed hours.4 By
^Mississippi House Journal (January, 1861), p. 7. 
o
Paulding Eastern Clarion, November 1, 1861; W. C. Smedes 
to Jefferson Davis, July 10, 1861, Thian, Correspondence, Ap­
pendix V, p. 204.
^Natchez Courier, December 27, 1861.
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October, however, numerous factors, including drought in a 
large portion of the state, invasion and occupation of sig­
nificant areas of the state by Federal armies, and the con­
tinued rise of speculation caused the Free Market to prac­
tically cease operations. The ladies in charge of the market 
requested help from "the planting community and others," as 
"the wickedness of the invader has brought distress to many 
a once prosperous and happy household." The Natchez market, 
and similar ones operated in Vicksburg, Jackson, and Meridian, 
continued sporadically during the fall of 1862, but goods and 
food became more difficult to obtain as the year wore on.G 
In addition to organizing a Free Market as did their 
counterparts in Natchez, a group of Vicksburg women formed 
the "Ladies Hospital Association," to care for the sick and 
wounded soldiers who with increasing frequency ended up in 
their town. As the contending armies moved ever nearer to 
Mississippi, these ladies not only operated a hospital in 
Vicksburg, but sent money to other areas of the state to be 
used in the establishment of additional hospital facilities.® 
In early April, following the disaster at Shiloh just a few
For notices of the Natchez Free Market, see most issues 
of the Natchez Courier throughout 1862. For a general dis­
cussion of the part Confederate women played in the over-all 
war effort, see Francis B. Simkins and James ¥. Patton, The 
Women of the Confederacy (Richmond, 1936).
^Natchez Courier, October 8, 1862.
®Walker, Vicksburg, p. 68; Morris Emanuel to Elizabeth 
Eggleston, April 9, 1862, Eggleston-Roach Papers, Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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miles from Mississippi's northern border, the Vicksburg hos­
pital became crowded with maimed and sick Confederate soldiers, 
a visible proof that the war was demanding daily a greater 
price in both money and men.?
Some people, in place of or in addition to personal 
service to the Confederate cause, contributed valuables such 
as jewelry or money. In February, Martha Boddie wrote to 
Pettus, asking his help in conveying her donation of $1,000 
worth of diamonds to the "Ladies of New Orleans," for the pur­
pose of procuring war supplies for Southern soldiers.® In 
March, James Gillard directed a message to the Governor, in­
forming him of the formation of the "Pontotoc Soldiers Aid 
Society" by ladies residing near Tupelo, in the northern part 
of the state. Gillard reported that the ladies had decided, 
in addition to sewing clothing for the soldiers, to make a 
"free-will offering of their jewelry, gold, and silver plate" 
to the Confederacy. Their object in donating jewelry "as dear 
to them as the bones of their fingers" was "to purchase or 
assist in purchasing a navy for the Confederacy." Many such 
donations would be forthcoming from Southern women, Gillard 
assured Pettus, if the ladies believed it would be "converted 
into engins of death against the ruthless invaders of our 
Country." Pettus could greatly assist this noble object, Gil­
lard added, if he would but secure space in the widely-circu-
?Mahala P. H. Roach Diary, April 10-23, 1861, University 
of North Carolinaj Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
®Martha S. Boddie to Pettus, February, 1862, Ser. E ., 
Vol. 56, MDAH.
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lated Jackson Mississippian for a "patriotic appeal" to all 
Southern women to sacrifice their vanity to save the Confed­
eracy.®
By no means all Mississippians supported the Confederate 
cause with services, money, or for that matter, sentiment. 
Even prior to the calling of the secession convention in Janu­
ary, 1861, a considerable number of the state’s citizens 
openly disavowed the rhetoric of the fireaters, and called 
for calm, rational discussion aimed at a peaceful adjustment 
with the N o r t h . I n  the election of delegates to the se­
cession convention, a number of counties returned clear Union­
ist majorities, and directed their delegates to vote against 
s e c e s s i o n . T h a t  this anti-secession sentiment received 
significant popular support was amply demonstrated in numer­
ous attempts to alter the proposed ordinance of secession, or 
at least submit it to the people for ratification, both of 
which movements failed by rather close votes.
Although temporarily stymied by the great rush of excite­
ment following the secession of Mississippi from the Union, 
sentiment favoring a peaceful readjustment never disappeared.
9james H. Gillard to Pettus, March 29, 1862, Ibid.
l®Vicksburg Whig, April 9, 1862, December 1^ 1860; Jack­
son Mississippian, December 5, 1860; Vicksburg /Mississippi/
Sun, December 3, 1860; Natchez /Mississippi/ Free Trader, No­
vember 30, 1860; Natchez CourieF, December 3, 1860; Paulding 
Eastern Clarion, December 12, I860.
^Manuscript records of the Secretary of State, Ser. F., 
Vol. 83, MDAH: Rainwater, Mississippi : Storm Center of Seces­
sion, pp. 196-201.
IBjournal of the State Convention (January, 1861), pp. 9-11
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Rather, the movement only suffered momentary retardation as 
most Mississippians, regardless of their view of the Union, 
closed ranks behind the leadership of such fireaters as Pet­
tus, and for a time lent their support to the Confederacy.
But as military reverses began to demonstrate that "whipping 
the yankees" would be no easy matter, and as Confederate mili­
tary and financial programs increasingly created doubt among 
the people as to their sagacity, the former Unionist senti­
ment rose with renewed strength, challenging the Confederates 
on every side.^^
In Mississippi, three identifiable views prevailed among 
those who may be collectively termed Unionist. The majority 
of such people, although inarticulate and poorly organized, 
consisted of those who simply opposed the policies of the 
Mississippi and Richmond Confederate Governments. Because 
dissatisfaction with these government formed the basis for 
the opposition of this class, they can be identified as 
Unionist only insofar as they were anti-Confederates. No 
single person or small group formed the leadership of this 
class; rather, it consisted for the most part of poor subsis­
tence farmers of the northeastern hill counties, and similar 
poor people living in the pine barrens of central Mississippi 
and along the Gulf Coast.
The second group, and by far the most articulate of the 
three, were those people who formed a recognized leadership
ISpaulding Eastern Clarion, April 19, 1861 and September 
22, 1861; Georgia L. Tatum, Disloyalty in the Confederacy 
(Chapel Hill, 1934), pp. 88-W:
164
class in Mississippi but who opposed the Confederacy on the 
grounds that the only hope for American survival lay in main­
taining the Union, odious as such Union might have become.
These men, like the anti-Confederates, were not pro-Northern, 
but simply pro-Union. They recognized and sympathized with 
many ideals of the Confederacy, yet sincerely belieyed that 
secession offered only war, hatred, dissension and ultimate 
defeat for the South, rather than the euphoristic promises 
touted by the Confederate leadership. Among this group were 
such outstanding men as the Reverend James Lyon, a respected 
Presbyterian minister; J. F. H. Claiborne, a planter, lawyer, 
and historian; Judge J. S. Yerger and his brother William, 
both outstanding attorneys; and Judge William L. Sharkey, 
formerly a prominent Whig l e a d e r . Although often perse­
cuted and scorned during the war, these men continued to openly 
advocate Unionism and to work for peace at every opportunity.
The third and smallest group of Mississippians who can 
also be classified as Unionist consisted of men who favored 
Northern policies much more than the constituency of the 
other two classes of Unionists. These men, in other words, 
were not only pro-Union, but pro-Northern, a distinction which 
brought considerable wrath down on them throughout the war.
l^ibid., pp. 90-99; Herbert H. Lang, "J. F. H. Claiborne 
at 'Laurel Wood' Plantation, 1853-1870," Journal of Missis- 
sippi History, XVIII (January, 1956), pp. 1-17; John K. Bet- 
tersworth, (Ed.), "Mississippi Unionism: The Case of the
Reverend James A. Lyon," Journal of Mississippi History, I 
(January, 1939), pp. 37-5^
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While those who held a more moderate view were at least tol­
erated, since several of them gave both sympathy and blood 
to the Confederate cause, those persons identified in the 
public mind as pro-Northern found it extremely difficult to 
retain both their "disloyal" stand and their physical resi­
dence in Mississippi. Representatives of this type of Union­
ist were the Reverend John Aughey, an outspoken Presbyterian 
minister,15 and Dr. Stephen Duncan, a physician-planter and 
one of the wealthiest, largest slaveholders in the entire 
South.15
There existed in Mississippi people who could not be 
clearly identified as adherents to any of the particular views, 
but rather fell somewhere between. Obviously Mississippi 
Unionists themselves recognized no such classifications as 
those pictured here, yet because of their distinctly differ­
ing views of the Union, the Confederacy, and the North, such 
divisions help to define their place in wartime Mississippi’s 
political and governmental life. Together they formed a sig­
nificant segment of that state’s society, as they collectively 
made the conduct of financial, social, and economic programs
15John H. Aughey, The Iron Furnace: Or, Slavery and Se­
cession (Philadelphia, Ï863). This graphic account written 
by one of the most outspoken pro-Northern Mississippi Unionists 
contains the best explanation of the workings of this class 
of Unionists during the Civil War in Mississippi,
IGwilliam K. Scarborough, "Heartland of the Cotton King­
dom," A History of Mississippi, ed. Aubrey McLeraore, I (Hat­
tiesburg"^ 1972), pp. 343-348; Paul W. Gates, The Farmer’s 
Age : Agriculture, 1815-1860 (New York, 1960)1 pl 1481
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infinitely more difficult to administer than would have 
otherwise been the case.
Of the many counties where a significant portion of the 
population opposed Confederate policies to such a degree as 
to be classified as Unionist, the northeastern county of 
Tishomingo best typifies this sentiment. Composed mostly 
of non-slaveholding subsistence farmers, the county’s inhabi­
tants evinced little interest in either the slaveocracy which 
held dominant political power in the state, of in cotton cul­
ture. Instead, these hill farmers produced livestock, wheat,
corn and peas, while confining their industrial endeavours
17mostly to lumbering. In the election of delegates to the 
secession convention in late 1860, Tishomingo County instructed 
its four delegates to vote against secession.18 Then in 1861, 
secession having led to war, many in Tishomingo County joined 
the Confederate army, only to be severely defeated in the 
disasters of Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee River.1® 
Then came the Confederate defeat at Shiloh in April, 1862, 
followed by the evacuation of Corinth and the capture of Mem­
phis later in the month. With the fall of these neighboring 
centers of commerce and transportation, Tishomingo County 
citizens again turned to Unionism in great numbers. Follow-
l?Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, pp. 213-217.
IBjournal of the State Convention (January, 1861), p. 16.
1®W. P. Lowry to Pettus, March 11, 1862, Ser. E ., Vol.
56, MDAH: Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. 10, Pt. I, p. 792;
"Petition of Tishomingo Citizens," Ser. E., Vol. 65, MDAH,
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ing the fall of Corinth, John Aughey, a vituperative pro- 
Northern Unionist, made his way into Tishomingo County, where 
be felt assured "the great heart of the country still beat 
true to the music of the U n i o n . "20 His estimate received 
substantiation when in February, 1862, Unionists from Tisho­
mingo and surrounding counties flocked to the banks of the
21Tennessee River in great numbers to welcome Federal gunboats.  ^
By 1862, Tishomingo County became a sort of neutral 
ground, where Unionists, Fédérais, and Confederates roamed 
at will, raiding the towns and pillaging the countryside with 
impunity.22 Civil government quickly disintegrated, and the 
county became the first in the Confederacy in which collection 
of taxes was suspended.23
With Tishomingo County leading the way, considerable dis­
affection occured in neighboring counties in northern Missis­
sippi, including Pontotoc, Itawambe, Alcorn, and Tippah, Like 
Tishomingo, they possessed little stake in either slvery or 
cotton, and traditionally eschewed meaningful participation 
in either state or national politics. The main objective of 
most of these northern Mississippians consisted of the desire 
to be let a l o n e . The Confederate conscription laws, passed
20Aughey, The Iron Furnace, p. 63.
. 21pfficxal Records, Ser. I, Vol. 7, pp. 155-156,
22Aughey, The Iron Furnace, pp. 65-90; Jackson Crisis, 
March 11, 1863.
23neport of H. T. Garnett, Chief Confederate Tax Collec­
tor to C. G. Memminger, January 6, 1863, Official Records, 
Ser. IV, Vol. 2, pp. 328-329.
24Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, pp. 217-218;
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in 1862, especially rankled these independent farmers, who 
deserted the Confederate military in alarming numbers, pre­
ferring simply to go home and take care of their starving
families.
Disloyalty also prevailed to a wide extent in the region 
extending eastward from the Pearl and Big Black Rivers to 
Alabama. This area, like the northeast, possessed little 
stake in slavery or the plantation system in general. People 
living there also maintained a subsistence economy, and when 
drought or other disasters resulted in short crops, as was 
the case in 1860, they appealed to the state for aid, but 
depended mostly upon their own enterprise to overcome their 
difficulties. Although Pettus asked for and the Mississippi 
legislature granted paltry sums to purchase corn for these 
central Mississippians in 1861, the official aid came too 
late to be of much help, and the farmers had already dis­
patched agents to and secured some corn from areas in the 
Midwest to avoid s t a r v a t i o n . T h e n ,  in 1862, a drought 
destroyed most of the growing crop in this section of the 
state, and again the state proved slow to aid their dis-
C. D. Fontaine to Pettus, January 10, 1863, Ser. E., Vol.
59, MDAH.
25official Records, Ser. I, Vol. 10, Pt. 1, pp. 791-792; 
J. Z. George to Pettus, November 3, December 25, 27, 1862, 
Ser. E., Vol. 58, MDAH.
BGRettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 218.
2?journal of the State Convention (March, 1861), pp. 81- 
82; Mississippi House Journal (November, 1861-January, 1862), 
p. 84; Natchez Courier, March 14, 1861; Vicksburg Whig, April 
3, 1861.
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tressed c o n d i t i o n . ^8 Little wonder then that the loyalty of 
these people proved so weak when Mississippi appealed to 
them for help against the "invading hoards," Like their 
counterparts in northeast Mississippi, these poor farmers 
deserted the army in large numbers during and after 1862 and 
returned home, determined to avoid further military service 
in a cause about which they knew and cared so little.29
The third section of Mississippi in which great numbers 
of people opposed the Confederacy included the Gulf Coast 
counties of Jackson, Harrison, Hancock, and Stone. In this 
area, more than any other, the lack of positive defense 
actions by either the Mississippi or Confederate Governments 
led directly to extensive disaffection among the people. This 
section of the state contained the poorest soil of all, and 
consequently the people raised little cotton beyond that ne­
cessary for family use. Therefore, they too possessed lit­
tle or no real interest in the slave economy. As in the 
other two main areas within Mississippi where disloyalty to 
the Confederacy prevailed, so few blacks lived in the area 
that even social control of the blacks as a motive for aiding 
in the maintenance of slavery appeared minimal. Due to the 
poor soil, most the wealthier citizens of this area owned and
28%, H. Henderson to Pettus, November 8, 1862, Ser. E., 
Vol. 58, MDAH.
29Aughey, The Iron Furnace, pp. 60-80; T^tum, Disloyalty 
in the Confederacy, pp. 89-95; Hinds County /Mississippi/ 
Gazette, August 6, 1862; Mrs. Mary B. Chesnut, Diary from 
Dixie (New York, 1905), p. 179.
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operated sawmills, while the poor became charcoal burners. 
Except for home-grown vegetables and fruit, these people de­
pended almost entirely throughout the war period upon agents 
in Mobile and New Orleans as sources of supplies and markets 
for their excess produce.
By January, 1862, Pettus had almost entirely abandoned 
the Gulf Coast counties, maintaining that they were indefens­
ible. Except for a few disorganized bands of "home guards," 
the Gulf counties were therefore abandoned early to Federal 
occupation and raiding parties— which action either forced 
the people living in that district to flee to the interior 
regions of the state, or submit to the Fédérais, which meant 
trading with the latter for the necessities of life.
This resort to illegal trade became especially unavoid­
able with the fall of New Orleans in June, 1862. Earlier, 
in April, Biloxi and Pass Christian, the principal coastal 
towns, fell to Federal assaults, resulting in such widespread 
neutralization of the area that the Fédérais did not even 
bother leaving garrisons, as they knew that the Confederates 
had little use for the coastal c o u n t i e s . 3 1
Early in the war, then, Pettus and other state and Con-
30j. F . H. Claiborne, "A Trip to the Piney Woods," Pub­
lications of the Mississippi Historical Society, IX, pp. 521- 
522; Goode Montgomery, "Alleged Secession of Jones County," 
VIII, pp. 13-15.
31j, F. H. Claiborne to Pettus, August 15, 1862; W. A. 
Champlin to Pettus, May 23, 1862; Lewis Pipes to Pettus, June 
22, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 57, MDAH; Official Records, Ser. I, 
Vol. 6, p. 502.
171
federate officials found it necessary to carry on their vari­
ous political, social, and economic programs in a state where 
at least passive resistance to their course of action found 
wide support in some areas. Still, this type of opposition 
to the Confederacy represented a leaderless, wandering, dis- 
unified, inarticulate sort of activity, which therefore offer­
ed no clear target for attack or reform. These people were 
the "croakers," the defeatists; those who simply experienced 
minimal motivation to fight what a great number of them con­
sidered a "rich man’s war and poor man’s fight.
The second classification of Mississippi Unionists, those 
who formed a recognized leadership cadre composed of outstand­
ing social and political figures in the state, were less num­
erous than those found in northeast, central, and south Mis­
sissippi. Yet, because they represented families of long- 
recognized standing in the state, their opposition proved a 
serious handicap to state officials responsible for creating 
and implementing financial policies in Confederate Missis­
sippi. Members of this group of Unionists lacked none of 
the political polish so conspicuously absent in the anti- 
Confederate horde. Politically sophisticated, many of these 
men recognized and supported some of the ideals for which the 
Confederacy fought. Some had sons in the Southern army, and 






G. W. Brame to Pettus, November 28, 1861, Ser. E., 
Richard Winter to Pettus, June 6, 1862, Ser. E., 
Isaac Applewhite to Pettus, July 15, 1862, Ser. E., 
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necessity for maintenance of the Union led them to work, 
write, and speak actively for immediate adjustment of dif­
ferences between the North and South.
One of the more outstanding Mississippians who supported 
the Union during the Civil War was J. F. H. Claiborne, former 
state representative and member of the United States Congress.
A descendent of W. C. C. Claiborne, Mississippi Territorial 
Governor, J. F. H. Claiborne operated a plantation on the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast, where he grew cotton with slave labor.33 
He held a commission from President James Buchanan as timber 
commissioner of a vast region composed of Mississippi, Alabama, 
and Louisiana,34 and lived quietly on his plantation. There 
he personally directed his slaves and wrote historical sketches 
of well-known Mississippians, as well as book-length biograph­
ical studies of General Sam Dale, and the most outspoken of 
Southern state rights men in Mississippi, John A Quitman.35
Claiborne's decision to support the Union cause during 
the Civil War was no easy one, for he adhered to many of the 
ideals and traditions which turned innumerable Southern plan­
ters into rabid secessionists. His biography of Quitman, for 
example, seemed above all else a defense of state rights doc-
33Lang, "J. F . H. Claiborne at 'Laurel Wood' Plantation," 
pp. 1-3.
34ibid., pp. 2-3.
35j. F . H. Claiborne, Life and Times of General Sam Dale, 
The Mississippi Partisan (New York, I860), and Ibid., Life 
and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, Major General, U.S.A., 
and Governor of the State of Mississippi, 2 Vols. (New York, 
i860).
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trines, so basic to the Confederate i d e o l o g y . 36 As a holder
of about one hundred slaves, and a cotton planter, Claiborne
believed he had suffered along with his contemporaries under
unjust tariff laws; as a slaveholder, he knew full well the
failure of the Confederacy would mean financial disaster.
Further, his son lost his life fighting in the Confederate
army, and some of his best friends, such as Albert G. Brown,
37served in the Confederate Congress.
Despite all these ties of friendship, economics, and even 
blood, Claiborne chose to support the Unionist cause in Mis­
sissippi during the war. Perhaps less obvious than the rea­
sons for which he should have supported the Confederacy, 
Claiborne's Unionist motivation nevertheless dictated his 
course. He took seriously his duties as an officer of the 
Federal Government as timber commissioner. He bore a name 
which stood second to none in the early political history of 
the old Southwest, and above all, Claiborne, a life-long 
Jacksonian Democrat, believed that the Union must remain in­
tact if America itself was to survive.
During the war years, Claiborne led a precarious exist­
ence as a sort of double agent. To all outward appearances, 
he overtly supported the Confederacy, purchasing a great num­
ber of Confederate bonds and even acting for a time as a Con­
federate officer responsible for administering oaths, taking




acknowledgement of deeds, and other such trivial duties.38 
Yet in reality, Claiborne became the most active Unionist in 
south Mississippi. In August, 1862, with many people in 
the Gulf Coast area on the verge of starvation, he pleaded 
with Governor Pettus to lend some aid to that region. He 
even wrote "We are now proving our loyalty by starvation—  
by the tears of our women and the cries of our children for 
bread!" He asked permission to import necessities of life
39from enemy-held New Orleans to alleviate these dire conditions. 
Yet, at the same time he appealed to Pettus for help, he main­
tained a considerable correspondence with Union General Na­
thaniel P. Banks, in command at New Orleans. His description 
of "starving neighbors" in letters to Banks presented a rather 
different picture than had his message to Pettus. To Banks 
he wrote that people remaining along the coast were "essen­
tially animal," and possessed no idea of government or poli­
tical principle. They had volunteered "with the hope of 
plunder," and deserted when the death rate among them proved 
greater than anticipated. Existing on the verge of starvation, 
Claiborne assured Banks that such conditions were sure to pro­
duce reflection, which would lead to regret, then to repent­
ance. "The Union sentiment is spreading," Claiborne wrote, 
and a "vigorous exclusion would bring this whole seaboard to
38ibid., pp. 9-10.
39j. F. H. Claiborne to Pettus, August 4, 15, 1862, Ser.
E., Vol. 57, MDAH.
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its allegiance in 3  m o n t h s . " 4 0  gy December, 1 8 6 2 ,  Claiborne 
appeared willing to even surrender his slaves to Federal 
forces if need be, although he maintained "the Southern views 
on the subject of slavery."41
Like other Mississippians who remained, in some respects 
at least, loyal to their state, Claiborne followed a danger­
ous course in daring to support the Unionist cause during the 
early war period, before a great number of his fellow Mis­
sissippians turned in disgust from the Confederacy which 
proved unwilling or unable to feed, clothe, and protect them. 
Still, despite the well-known Unionist sentiments of such 
men as Claiborne, Sharkey, Lyons, and the Yergers, they were 
allowed to remain in the state reasonably unmolested because 
they were only pro-Union, not pro-Northern. Sometimes perse­
cuted and threatened, these men continued to lead fairly 
normal lives during the Confederate period, while many around 
them gave their last measure to support their conception of 
the purposes of the war.^2
The third, and least numerous, type of Unionist in Mis­
sissippi during the war years consisted of those individuals 
of varied background who lent their deepest support to the
40^. F. H. Claiborne7, Memorandum to N. P. Banks, Banks 
Papers, Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts, quoted in Lang, 
"J. F . H. Claiborne at 'Laurel Wood' Plantation," p. 10.
41lbid., p. 11.
4^Ibid., pp. 1-16; Bettersworth, (Ed.), "Mississippi 
Unionism: The Case of the Reverend James A. Lyon," pp. 37-
52; Tatum, Disloyalty in the Confederacy, pp. 88-95.
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Union as represented by the Lincoln government. These men, 
who came from the poorest classes in the state as well as 
from the very richest, firmly believed that the Union must 
prevail, and they were willing to support their conviction 
to the dangerous extent of being avowedly pro-Northern. In 
the case of some, such as John Aughey, being a pro-Northern 
Unionist meant working actively to gain recruits both for 
Unionism and peace, and for the Federal armies. Operating 
mostly in the favorably disloyal climate of northeastern Mis­
sissippi, Aughey actively organized bands of Unionists to 
work among their neighbors, aiming at gaining additional con­
verts to the Unionist cause. Some followed this advice, and 
fought against the Confederates at Corinth, luka, and Shiloh, 
while others preferred to devote their energies to extensive 
spying operations along the Tennessee River in the northeastern 
part of the state, reporting Confederate troop movements to 
the Federal commanders. Still others demonstrated their loyal­
ty to the Union cause by encouraging and actively aiding will­
ing farmers to sell or trade their cotton to Union army com­
manders, rather than give, sell, burn, or pledge it to the 
Mississippi or Richmond Governments.^3
Also among the ranks of pro-Northern Unionists in Missis­
sippi were several of the wealthiest planters in the entire 
South, including Stephen Duncan, William N. Mercer, and L. R.
43Aughey, The Iron Furnace, pp. 60-73.
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M a r s h a l l . 44 of these, Duncan, a Pennsylvania born physlcian- 
planter, demonstrated perhaps most clearly the operations of 
this type of Unionist whose actions proved so detrimental to 
the success of Confederate and Mississippi economic and poli­
tical policies.
Duncan, through shrewd managerial coups and two econ­
omically fortuitous marriages, accumulated by 1851 over one 
thousand slaves which produced during the following decade an 
average of three thousand bales of cotton per y e a r . 45 Despite 
his willingness to extract immense wealth from Southern soil, 
Duncan never yielded his conviction that the North held ad­
vantages far greater than those found in the South. He re­
ported to a friend that the South was no place to bring up 
children, and that New England seemed "the only place where 
steady habits are to be a c q u i r e d . "46
Yet Duncan continued to reside in Mississippi, collecting 
huge sums annually from the production of cotton and sugar.
In 1861, his incredibly lucrative empire, carved out of the 
raw southwest, appeared to Duncan unquestionably threatened 
by s e c e s s i o n . 47 With the outbreak of war, Duncan yielded no
44scarborough, "Heartland of the Cotton Kingdom," p. 343; 
Morton Rothstein, "The Antebellum South as a Dual Economy:
A Tentative Hypothesis," Agricultural History, XLI, pp. 378-379,
45Gates, Farmer's Age, p. 148; Rothstein, "The South as 
a Dual Economy," pp. 378-379.
46gtephen Duncan to Judge Thomas Butler, November 28,
1833, Thomas Butler and Family Papers, Louisiana State Uni­
versity, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
47Rothstein, "The Antebellum South as a Dual Economy," 
p. 380.
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support to the Confederacy, and chose instead to invest his 
considerable excess capital in Northern securities, particul­
arly r a i l r o a d s . 48 When the Confederacy appealed to planters 
to pledge their cotton to the Richmond Government, Duncan re­
fused— establishing himself instead as a purchasing agent 
for a Liverpool, England, cotton-buying firm.49 Beginning 
in 1861 and expanding his operations in 1862, Duncan accepted 
pledges of cotton from several wealthy delta planters, keep­
ing careful records of the number of bales pledged, and for­
warding money to the planters for the cotton. Despite the 
presence of the blockade, Duncan managed to ship considerable 
cotton to England during the early years of the war.50 Later 
in the war period, Duncan returned to the North, leaving his 
son in charge of their vast joint Southern holdings.
Quite naturally, Mississippi Confederates were most in­
tolerant of the pro-Northern Unionist segment of their so­
ciety. While Duncan's social position insulated him and 
other wealthy Unionist planters from direct frontal assault. 
Confederate raiding parties delighted in surreptitiously de­
stroying whatever Unionist property they could find, and
48scarborough, "Heartland of the Cotton Kingdom, p. 349.
49c, Craig to Stephen Duncan, September 15, 1862, Stephen 
Duncan and Stephen Duncan, Jr. Papers, Louisiana State Univer­
sity, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
50journal, 1861, Duncan Papers. In this journal, which 
consisted of scribbled notes, usually without date except for 
year, Duncan kept an account of planters who entrusted their 
cotton to him as agent of the Liverpool firm. For a listing 
of these planters and the amounts of cotton they entrusted to 
Duncan, see various entries in the journal made throughout the 
years 1861 and 1862.
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impressment officials paid regular calls when the opportunity 
arose.51 But for people like Aughey, lacking any intrinsic 
defense due to social standing, the loyal Confederates re­
served their most fiendish measures. Aughey was trailed 
around the state, hounded wherever he went, and forced to 
undergo constant persecution and harrassment. He was arrested, 
beaten, threatened, and jailed; yet he continued to work for 
the Union whenever respite from Confederate vengance permitted. 
Aurhey and others like him formed the hard core of resistance 
around which increasing numbers of Mississippians, disillu­
sioned with Confederate policies, coalesced.
Aughey and others who held similar attitudes continually 
caused the Confederacy great trouble within the state. Yet 
far more important to the overall war effort were differences 
in basic attitudes between Mississippi cotton growers and a 
number of Confederate policies. The one policy pursued by 
the Richmond Government which pointed out these sharp dif­
ferences was that concerning the disposition of vast reserves 
of cotton in the state. This variance of opinion was closely 
linked in Mississippi to the disloyal attitude assumed by so 
many of the planters and farmers who depended upon a steady 
market for their cotton crop for their economic wellbeing.
5^Duncan*s plantation proved a favorite target of such 
vengeful activity, apparently, as Duncan presented the Con­
federate Government with an itemized bill for over $185,000, 
representing his losses during the first years of the war.
See "Record of S. Duncan’s Bill Against the Confederate States 
of America, " Duncan Papers, no date.
52john H. Aughey, Tupelo (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1888), pp.
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Therefore, Confederate action with regard to cotton repre­
sented an issue of major importance in that upon its settle­
ment rested the determination of whether the vast majority 
of Mississippians continued to lend wholehearted support to 
the Confederacy, or assumed a neutral or even hostile posi­
tion. Inherently, the Confederate and planter's respective 
objectives appeared at odds from the beginning.
Since cotton represented the most valuable staple of the 
South, it is not surprising that the Confederate leadership 
determined early in the war to utilize it as the very founda­
tion of their diplomatic endeavour.^3 In the South itself, 
social and economic institutions rested firmly upon cotton, 
so Confederate official diplomatic policy looked toward the 
use of cotton as a lever to force European intervention in 
the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy— a necessary 
goal in the eyes of most Confederate leaders if the Southern 
military effort was to s u c c e e d . 34 Consequently, from the be­
ginning of the war until well into 1863, the Richmond Govern­
ment's diplomatic policy decisions revolved mainly around this 
belief in the almighty power of cotton to draw Europe, and 
especially England and France, into the war.
86-92; and The Iron Furnace, pp. 67, 73-76,
GSpor a thorough treatment of Confederate diplomacy, with 
a special emphasis on the part cotton played in that aspect 
of Confederate Government, see Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton 
Diplomacy (Chicago, Rev. ed., 1959).
^^Atlanta /Georgiy/ Southern Confederacy; E. Merton 
Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (Baton 
Rouge, 1950), pp. 184-185; Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 1,
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With the faith in King Cotton pervasive in the South by 
1861, Confederate officials based their diplomatic effort al­
most completely upon Europe's dependence on Southern cotton. 
Rather than allow the Northern blockade to slowly cut off 
the supply of that staple to Europe’s textile mills, the 
Confederacy moved quickly and decisively to completely cut 
off the supply of cotton by implementing a strict e bargo.
In newspapers and speeches throughout the South, this policy 
gained wide dissemination, and practically universal accept­
ance— at least at first. The Memphis Appeal, the New Orleans 
Crescent, and the Mobile Register and Advertiser, represent­
ing the revailing sentiment in the three commercial centers 
most vital to Mississippi cotton planting interests, all sup­
ported a strict embargo.^5
Unwilling to impose such an embargo by law, the Confed- . 
erate Congress nevertheless passed several measures in 1861 
which effectively curtailed the exportation of cotton. These 
acts included a law forbidding commercial intercourse with 
the North, an act severely restricting the shipment of cotton 
to Confederate seaports, and the acts providing for produce 
l o a n s . 56 por the most part, however, restrictions against
55]v[emphis /Tennessee? Appeal, quoted in Savannah /Georgia? 
Republican, December 4, ^861; New Orleans /Louisian^? Crescent, 
March 21, 1862; Mobile /Alabama? Register and Advertiser, quot­
ed in the Charleston /South Carolina/ Courier, January 15, 1862.
^5journal of Congress of the Confederate States of Amer- 
ica, 1861-1865, VII (7 Vols.; Washington, 1904), pp. 205-206, 
251, 264. (Hereafter cited as Journal Confederate Congress); 
Schwab, A Financial and Industrial History^ ppT 12, 24-25.
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exportation of cotton in the early part of the war derived 
from state and local a c t i o n . 57
A number of Mississippi agriculturalists, in full agree­
ment with the Confederate goal of preventing the export and 
even cultivation of cotton, urged the growing of corn and 
other grain crops instead. Others, apparently dispirited 
over the sudden reversal in attitude toward cotton cultiva­
tion, refused to grow much of anything, preferring to allow 
their land to remain idle. This policy was especially detri­
mental to the Confederate cause, in that whereas prior to the 
war the West furnished most of the grain consumed in the South, 
that particular supply dried up when the West remained in the 
Union in 1861. Consequently, grain must be grown on land 
formerly devoted to cotton production in order to compensate 
for the loss of Western grain.
Reacting to the indifferent attitude toward growing grain 
crops exhibited by some Mississippi planters, one concerned 
farmer wrote Pettus in March, 1861, asking that he urge "the 
people of the State to plant corn, potatoes, peas, beans, 
everything necessary to subsist the people and the army."
Many people, the writer insisted, had "fallen into the idea 
that it is useless to attempt to make anything more than a 
bare subsistence until the war is over." If that idea pre­
vailed, the anonymous author concluded, the war would indeed 
soon be over, "and disastrously to the South."58 in this
57owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 34-37.
MDAH.
Anonymous to Pettus, March 22, 1861, Ser. E ., Vol. 51,
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same vein, the Paulding Eastern Clarion editorialized in May, 
1861, that Mississippians should plant corn instead of cotton, 
and let the "abolitionists of the west hereafter look to the 
fanatics of New England for their market."^9
In December, 1861, the Mississippi legislature took a 
stand in favor of encouraging the state's farmers to turn to 
the cultivation of grain crops, both as a way of preventing 
the growing of cotton and to feed the thousands of state resi­
dents faced with the threat of starvation. As for cotton 
cultivation, the legislative resolutions requested that farm­
ers plant no more than one-fourth the usual number of acres 
in cotton while the blockade continued, and that county as­
sociations of planters and farmers be formed to secure pledges 
to this effect.
The "resolves" of the legislature urging Mississippians 
to drastically reduce the number of acres devoted to cotton 
received wide public support in early 1862. Newspapers through­
out the state frequently published articles in support of this 
policy®^ and while some "disloyal" farmers ignored the plea 
and refused to reduce the number of bales of cotton grown, 
most backed the legislative appeal and either sharply curtailed 
their cotton production or abstained from its cultivation al-
59paulding Eastern Clarion, May 10, 1861.
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp.
77-78.
9%atchez Courier, December 21, 1861; Vicksburg Whig, 
December 20, 1861; Hinds County Gazette, January 15, 1862.
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t o g e t h e r . 62 As the time for planting the cotton crop drew 
near, some communities held meetings at which farmers "pledged 
not to raise cotton," and to devote more land to grain crops 
instead. In March, one such assembly in central Mississippi 
resulted in former cotton planters pledging themselves "one 
to another not to plant more than two acres of cotton to the 
hand for the present year."63 But in the same vicinity, other, 
presumably less patriotic citizens prepared to continue plant­
ing cotton, regardless of the pressure of public opinion 
against such a course. V. M. White, a planter and friend of 
the Governor's, reported to Pettus in late March that the 
nearness of the Northern army had demoralized the people, 
who refused to join the militia, demonstrating, according to 
White, that the former "spirit of volunteering is dead."
White, who returned to his home in Hernando after an absence 
of some months, repor ed being "shocked at the change in 
public confidence" in the Confederacy since August, 1861. 
Insofar as the cultivation of cotton was conctiued. White 
asserted, he feared "that too many are planting crops of cot­
ton for this winter, and everybody is deceiving themselves 
and their neighbors" in regard to their real intentions to 
plant cotton. White believed that such a situation, while 
"somewhat incredible," accurately reflected the mistrust felt
C O  '
Dr. H. G. Evans, Diary, (Typescript), MDAH; Robert 
Bowman, "Yazoo City in the Civil War," Publications of the 
Mississippi Historical Society, VII (1903), p. 65.
63Macon Beacon, March 19, 1862.
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by many farmers in the policies of the Confederate Govern­
ment.@4
At the same time Mississippi planters agonized over com­
pliance with the cotton embargo policy of the Confederate 
Government, that policy was undergoing a rather drastic meta­
morphosis. By late spring, 1862, it appeared to some high 
Confederate officials that the embargo had failed in its 
objective to force European intervention, so a different 
tact should be taken. Despite the tightening Federal block­
ade, which threatened to prevent any shipment of cotton to 
Europe even if such a course were desirable, the Confederates 
still believed measures could be taken which would yet shock 
England and France from their lethargy, and bring the entire 
cotton issue to a decisive head. Confederate leaders conse­
quently, aware that European textile manufacturing nations 
knew of the tremendous stockpiles of cotton existing in the 
South, determined to take drastic measures to reduce this 
growing cotton reserve. Therefore, partly as a result of the 
obvious failure of a complete embargo, and also to prevent 
the precious staple from falling into the hands of invading 
Northern armies, the Confederate Congress passed on March 
17, 1862, a law providing for the destruction of any cotton 
which appeared in the slightest danger of being captured by
the F é d é r a i s . G5
64y. M. White to Pettus, March 21, 1862, Ser. E ., Vol, 
56, MDAH.
65journal Confederate Congress, II, p. 69; Official 
Records, Ser. 4, Vol. 3, pp. 1066-1067.
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This new Confederate policy placed Mississippi cotton 
growers in another dilemma: to comply meant possible de­
struction of the only product of significant value in the 
hands of most of the planters, while to defy the Confederate 
directive meant acting in an illegal, or disloyal manner. 
Governor Pettus, anxious to obey the spirit of the new law, 
forced the issue immediately by ordering all cotton in Mis­
sissippi which appeared in any danger of falling into enemy 
hands to be either removed to safer localities, or put to the 
torch.66 Adding urgency to the problem was the Federal cap­
ture of New Orleans in April, Memphis in June, and the evacua­
tion of Corinth by the Confederates in May, 1862. This left 
the southern, western, and northern portions of the state 
extremely vulnerable to enemy invasion.67 Wishing to pre­
clude the possibility that any enemy invaders would confis­
cate large cotton stores, Pettus, as well as Confederate com­
manders in the area, ordered immediately burned any cotton 
susceptible to capture by the Union forces.68 This would 
both bolster the Confederate policy of dramatizing to Eur­
ope the South’s determination to destroy the cotton supply 
stored in the South, and prevent any of the precious staple 
from being captured and sent north to supply raw materials 
to Federal textile factories. But from the very beginning
66J. c. Wickes to Pettus, March 27, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 
56, MDAH.
67Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 
409, 455; Edwin C. Bearss, "The Armed Conflict,” A History 
of Mississippi, I, pp. 450-452.
66John J. Pettus to W. I. Pointdexter, May 2, 1862,
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of this policy of burning cotton, Mississippi and Confeder­
ate officials met considerable opposition from parties within 
the state. Some, like Stephen Duncan, simply disregarded the 
order to burn cotton because they did not support the Confed­
eracy, and therefore felt no compunction in avoiding its di­
rectives whenever possible. Others, less overtly anti-Con- 
federate than Duncan, yielded to the powerful profit motive, 
since smuggled cotton often brought prices ranging up to one 
dollar per pound.®®
For a variety of reasons, therefore, a considerable num­
ber of Mississippians refused to follow orders and burn their 
cotton. Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard, in command 
at Corinth, dispatched an order to General Earl Van Dorn, 
stationed at Memphis prior to the fall of that city, direct­
ing the latter to order "parties under proper officers to go 
in small steamboats to burn all cotton within their reach 
along the river." Complaining that planters along the Mis­
sissippi "hesitate to burn cotton," Beauregard directed Van 
Dorn to call on the planters to proceed with the destruction 
of their crops, keeping an account of the number of bales 
burnt.
In early May, Pettus determined to see that his procla­
mation ordering the destruction of all cotton susceptible to 
Federal capture was carried out. Acting in cooperation with
Ser. E., Vol. 56, MDAH.
69Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, pp. 148-151; 
Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 43-50.
TOpfficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, Pt. 2, p. 451.
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Beauregard, he directed state militia officers, and civilian 
officers where no militia authorities could be found, to 
travel up the Mississippi River and "stir up all the patri­
otic people," and silence’those who love money more than 
their Liberties, if such are to be found." Pettus concluded 
that he would personally "feel every bale of cotton taken 
from Mississippi a disgrace to the State," and unless he did 
all in his power to prevent it, he would himself "feel dis­
graced . "71
Where martial law existed, as it did in a number of 
counties in the western part of the state, the provost mar­
shals added their authority to that of Pettus and Confederate 
commanders in an attempt to force compliance with the order 
to burn exposed cotton. Directives appeared in the newspapers, 
sternly ordering all cotton within reach of the enemy burned, 
and this "to be done immediately. '7^  Yet stronger pressure 
needed to be applied to force compliance in some areas of the 
state. Appeals to "patriotism" and "duty" too often fell on 
deaf ears, as David Harrison informed Pettus in early May.
The boards of police should have authorization to see to the 
burning of cotton, Harrison argued, because, due to the pro­
pensity of a number of planters to hold on to their cotton 
despite the orders to burn, "this should not be trusted to
71john J. Pettus to W. I. Pointdexter, May 2, 1862, 
Ser. E,, Vol. 56.
72Natchez Courier, May 9, 1862.
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the people."73
As spring faded into summer, fires from burning cotton 
continued to light up Mississippi’s skies, while the contro­
versy over the efficacy of this desperate policy wore on just 
as heatedly. D. C, Graham, a farmer living near Meadville, 
reported to Pettus that a great number of bales of cotton had 
been shipped to his county from those along the river, and 
this cotton needed to be protected rather than burnt, which 
Graham intended to do "if supplied with arms and ammunition. 
Still, Pettus grimly ignored such pleas, and insisted on 
burning all cotton remotely exposed to Federal capture. The 
effectiveness of this policy is revealed in reports filed by 
one man assigned to burn cotton in Yazoo County. He forward­
ed to Jackson certificates attesting that he personally de­
stroyed over eight hundred bales in Yazoo County alone in a 
little more than a week.?^
The factor causing the implementing of harsh policies 
in regard to cotton, and all the distrust, dissatisfaction 
and disaffection emanating therefrom, involved the actual in­
vasion of the state by Federal forces. A main objective of 
the Lincoln Government included capture of the Mississippi 
River, thus splitting the Confederacy into two p a r t s . P u r -
f^David Harrison to Pettus, May 5, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 
57, MDAH.
c. Graham to Pettus, May 21, 1862, Ser. E., Vol.
57, MDAH.
75ficertificates of Cotton Burned," located in Ser. E., 
Vol. 56, MDAH.
^^Randall and Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
pp. 194-195.
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suant to this policy, Northern fleets worked their way up the 
Mississippi and captured New Orleans in April, 1862. Simul­
taneously, a Federal fleet descended the Mississippi and cap­
tured Memphis in June.?? While these naval victories crowned 
Federal efforts, winning control of the entire river with 
the exception of Vicksburg, General U. S. Grant moved south­
ward into Tennessee, capturing Forts Henry and Donelson on 
the Tennessee River, and then, following a victory at Shiloh, 
beseiged Corinth in northeast Mississippi.?& Thus, from the 
Mississippi River, from Memphis and New Orleans, and their 
bases in northern Mississippi, Federal forces launched re­
peated forays into the state.
The relative ease and suddenness with which Federal 
armies captured key posts so near their borders struck fear 
into the hearts of many Mississippians, who realized their 
weak defences placed them in a peculiarly vulnerable position, 
The sea coast counties, all but abandoned by Pettus early in 
the war, fell victim to Federal raids in December, 1861.?^
By spring. Federal raiding parties invaded the interior coun­
ties with distressing regularity— a fact which gave consider­
able impetus to Pettus’ cotton burning program. When summer 
came in Mississippi, raids by small Union ’’foraging parties” 
were commonplace occurances in most of the counties which
??Ibid., pp. 409, 445.
?8lbid., pp. 186, 202.
?9pfficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 6, p. 502; S. S. Davis 
to Pettus, December 10, 1861, Ser. E ., Vol. 56, MDAH.
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bordered on the Mississippi, as well as the Gulf Coast coun­
ties and those in proximity to Tennessee on the north. Sam­
uel M. Dulany reported to Pettus in late July that the "Féd­
érais are plundering this county of provisions, cotton, 
mules, waggons, and negroes: And immediate action is neces­
s a r y . "80 j n  early August, W .  Cooper, writing from near 
Coffeeville in the northwestern part of the state, informed 
the Governor that in the "Mississippi bottoms" the Fédérais 
infested the country, committing "heavy depredations daily." 
Further, Cooper reported, the Federal raids demoralized the 
slaves, captured a number of them, and induced others to run 
off. As an added insult, according to Pettus' informant, 
the Federal officers arrested several white Mississippians, 
including General James L. Alcorn, a leader of the Missis­
sippi militia. But an even greater danger existed. Cooper 
insisted, and that involved the absence of a sufficient num­
ber of whites on the plantations to effectively control the 
blacks. Cooper assured the Governor that there existed "a 
great many farms in this village which have large numbers of 
negroes . . . and not an owner, nor an overseer." "This 
country is resting on a fearful pivot," Cooper argued, and 
"a few Yankees may at any day or rather night find their way
into the bosom of this community arm the sub population &
81produce results fearful to contemplate."
80samuel M. Dulany to Pettus, July 29, 1862, Ser. E., 
Vol. 56, MDAH.
Cooper to Pettus, August 9, 1862, Ibid.
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As autumn approached, Federal raiders became bolder, 
often driving deep into Mississippi's interior, raiding and 
pillaging with impunity. There appeared little military im­
portance in these raids; rather, from the nature of the acts 
committed by the raiders, they seemed designed as a means to 
gain legal plunder, and at the same time demoralize the state’s 
population by demonstrating the inability of the Confederates 
to protect their own. Captain James E. Matthews of the Mis­
sissippi militia reported to General T. C. Tupper in late 
August that the Federal raiders "had desolated the country 
wherever they have gone, taking off all the cotton and negroes 
except the aged and infirm, throwing down the fences and turn­
ing the stock in growing crops, and burning the gins, mills, 
and dwellings of the planters." As for the white population, 
Matthews related, "Families were seen flying from their homes 
. . . and such planters as could not get off in time are 
either prisoners in the hands of the Enemy, or are at home 
on parole and dare not leave." Confederate or state forces 
in the area were simply not strong enough to challenge the 
Fédérais, Matthews complained, otherwise he assured Tupper,
"we would keep the cowardly robers ^ i c 7  and thieves off of 
our defensless citizens!"®^
Disposition of the increasing stores of cotton led to a 
continuing conflict between Mississippi growers of that staple 
and the Mississippi and Richmond Government. The resulting
BBjames E . Matthews to T. C. Tupper, August 21, 1862, 
located in Ibid.
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dissatisfaction of a number of the farmers, coupled with op­
portunities for graft and disloyalty presented by the near­
ness of Federal forces after late 1861, proved sufficient 
motivation to provoke even more widespread disloyalty in 
Mississippi. This disloyalty manifested itself not only in 
overt acts of treason against the Confederate Government, 
but in more subtle ways as well. One example, which created 
intense problems for Mississippi officials throughout the 
war period, involved the early rise in speculation, infla­
tion, and extortion practiced by a great number of Missis- 
sippians. This proved a powerfully disruptive factor of 
the cooperative spirit beginning very early in the war.
In November, 1861, G. W. Brame informed Pettus that in 
north Mississippi "Speculators are buying up the hogs and 
the cattle of the country, and are doubtless using every ef­
fort to buy up all the corn and wheat raised," with the result 
that "corn and wheat are at a new high in the face of a very 
large grain crop."83 Fully aware of the prevalence through­
out the state of conditions such as those described by Brame, 
the Mississippi legislature passed a bill in December, 1861, 
aimed at preventing or at least retarding further growth of 
the speculative mania which appeared to have seized a consid­
erable number of M i s s i s s i p p i a n s . 8 4  The practice was so wide-
B^G. W. Brame to Pettus, November 28, 1861, Ser. E ., 
Vol. 54, MDAH.
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1861-January, 1862), pp. 
144-145.
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spread that on Christmas day, 1861, the Natchez Courier edi­
torialized that the presence of "sharpers" prevaded the state, 
spreading mistrust and fear among the people, resulting in 
ravages "more terrible than the ’grand armies’ of L i n c o l n . "85
Since cotton represented the most valuable class of 
goods in Mississippi, speculators concentrated especially on 
that staple. J. T. Blair, writing from Columbus in the 
northern part of the state, informed Pettus on March 26 that 
his proclamation regarding the burning of cotton was being 
"taken in bad part by the speculators," who seemed disposed 
to "disregard it by their assuming that the Tombigbee is not 
a navigable stream," and therefore not subject to Union raids. 
Blair assured Pettus that such was not the case, and that the 
only people who refused to remove their cotton were the spe­
culators, who maintained their storage of several thousand 
bales of cotton at Columbus. The indignant Blair even offer­
ed to act as Pettus’ agent, "without a cents cost to the 
state" to see that the Governor’s order received closer at­
tention.^®
By late spring, 1862, extortion and speculation had 
spread throughout Mississippi, causing several of the state’s 
leading newspapers to decry the activity, and plead for unity 
in the face of eminent Northern invasion. In April, the 
Vicksburg Whig chided its readers for thinking "in the inno-
8®Natchez Courier, December 25, 1861.
8Gj. T. Blair to Pettus, March 26, 1862, Ser. E., Vol.
56, MDAH.
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cence of their verdancy" that extortion represented no sin, 
but a simple taking advantage of proffered opportunities.
The Whig argued against such complacency, asserting that in 
"the Holy Book," extortioners were "classed with murderers, 
adulterers, and liars, and not with common sinners." Even 
the apparently pious were guilty, asserted the Whig, which 
castigated church members who sold articles "at one hundred 
times their value," thus "preying upon the life blood of the 
people, and seriously jeopardizing the liberties of the coun­
try."8? The Brandon Republican joined in urging the specula­
tors to cease their wicked ways, decrying the veritable 
"furor for speculation" which gripped merchants generally.
Such extortionary practices were leading to a society which 
presented "one vast scene of wild distraction," the Republi­
can declared, yet speculators only grin "with horrible satis­
faction" at the thought that they collect fortunes, while "the 
poor soldiers are toiling in defense of their property at 
fifteen dollars per month." These men should be dealt with 
quickly and severely, the Republican concluded, as they but 
"laugh at the censure of good men and deride the potency of 
public opinion."®®
While civil authorities equivocated in the face of the 
desperate situation presented by the prevalence of speculation 
and extortion, the military authorities moved to slow down
®^Vicksburg Whig, April 9, 1862.
®®Brandon /Mississippi/ Republican, May 15, 1862
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the dizzying pace of the inflationary spiral. In early May,
A. K. Farrar, Provost Marshall in Natchez, issued a proclama­
tion declaring that all "dealers in provisions, groceries, 
and Family Supplies," must sell such provisions at a reason­
able profit, "to wit: Twenty-five cents on cost." Anyone
violating his order, Farrar warned, would be subject to hav­
ing his goods confiscated.89 In July, General Earl Van Dorn, 
Confederate commander in Vicksburg, placed sixteen western 
and southern Mississippi counties under martial law, and 
issued a detailed directive, which clearly set forth certain 
rules he intended to enforce in those counties. Van Dorn's 
rather severe order, although shortly invalidated by Confed­
erate authorities in Richmond, provided that anyone who traded 
or attempted to trade with the enemy would suffer death; any­
one who refused to accept Confederate money, or who dared to 
"do, or say, or write anything calculated to depreciate the 
same" should be subject to fine or imprisonment or both; any 
editor who published troop movements might suffer fine or 
imprisonment; and anyone asking exhorbitant prices "such as 
would indicate a want of confidence in Confederate money" 
might have his goods confiscated, be fined or imprisoned or 
all three.90 Although Van Dorn's order was repudiated by his 
superiors,91 its stringent measures indicate the serious
^^Natchez Courier, May 1, 1862.
90Fayette Æississippjy Gazette, August 2, 1862.
91official Records, Ser. I, Vol. 15, p. 771; Ibid., 
Vol. 17, pt. 2, p. 694.
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nature of the problems he attempted to deal with in the 
summer of 1862.
As early as November, 1862, speculation reached crisis 
proportions throughout the state. By that time a refined 
art, it appeared to some to be the invention of certain 
classes of people. R. C. Saffold complained to Pettus on 
November 3 that the "Speculators generally, or especially 
the foreigners, Dutch, Jews, etc. seem determined to win us, 
and our own people seem not slow to follow the example." Un­
less the legislature moved to "open the corn cribs that are 
now closed against the widowed and orphaned, and soldiers 
families who are destitute," Saffold warned, "I know that 
we are undone." When a mother stands helplessly by while 
her children starve for want of bread with "corn in sight but 
not to be had because of the deamon, love of gain, our country 
is certainly lost." He felt greater anxiety over this monopoli­
zation of food supplies than over all else, Saffold concluded, 
because he feared it was "not sufficiently appreciated amid 
the thunder of cannon & the collision of armies." Rather 
prophetically, he advised the Governor that "upon these silent 
and apparently unnoticed causes depend the fate of nations.
The first two years of war proved pivotal ones for Mis­
sissippi in its struggle to develop an acceptable financial, 
economic, and governmental structure. Factors which could 
have been controlled at least partially by decisive state
®^R. C. Saffold to Pettus, November 3, 1862, Ser. E.,
Vol. 58, MDAH.
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action, such as inflation and speculation, were instead large­
ly ignored by state officials, except for ineffective rhetor­
ical admonitions. Other elements, including invasion by 
Federal armies, and Confederate policies relating to the dis­
position of cotton lay essentially outside the realm of ef­
fective manipulation by Mississippi officials. Unionism also 
represented a development which added greatly to the state's 
difficulties, both in spite of and in part because of state 
action. A number of Mississippians simply did not believe 
from the beginning that secession and war offered any real 
hope for a better situation for themselves; others embraced 
disloyalty out of frustration over the inability of Mississippi 
governmental officials to deal with the basic needs of most 
of the state's people. Mainly, these needs involved minimum 
protection against Federal raiding parties, and the furnish- . 
ing of food and clothing to the growing number of indigent 
families. Adequate stores of foodstuffs existed in most 
areas of the state; yet starvation stalked the countryside.
Most white Mississippi men were called into militia camps, 
and either remained there, inactive while their crops ruined 
and their families fell victim to Federal raids, or else they 
were transported out of the state to fight the invading Union 
armies far from home. And this while Federal raiding parties 
pillaged their homes and communities with impunity.
All these difficult problems— starvation, inflation, 
speculation, invasion, and disloyalty— presented Mississippi
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officials with a situation so complex, so constantly changing, 
that to concentrate on any particular problem was to allow 
the others to get out of control. Yet, in attempting to deal 
simultaneously with all these problem areas, harrassed state 
officials found their resources inadequate to effectively 
control any particular one. Consequently, while some steps 
were taken to check inflation, prices continued to rise. 
Speculators, usually subjected to nothing more harsh than 
castigation in the public print, continued to allow personal 
greed to prevent their aiding the needy in the state. Since 
some of the state's most influential, respected, and wealthi­
est citizens adhered to Unionist sentiments throughout the 
war period, that problem proved an especially delicate one.
CHAPTER VII 
THE COURSE OF MONETARY ACCEPTANCE
Mississippi legislators, who virtually created from 
nothing a financial system for the state in the final ses­
sion of 1861, apparently realized that their program might 
fail in its aim of stabilizing the state’s economy. To de­
termine, therefore, the effectiveness of their enactments, 
the legislature passed a resolution requiring the treasurer 
to keep careful accounts of the operation of the various tax 
and money measures, and report his findings to the next legis­
lative session. The treasurer was also to ’’suggest such 
amendments or additions thereto as in his jungment /sic7 will 
most conduce to increase or diminish the revenue arising under 
the law at present in force” in the state.^ What did occur 
during 1862 which drastically effected the operation of the 
state’s financial schemes was, for the most part, impossible 
to assess and commit to debits and credits in a ledger. With 
inflation and speculation rampant, specie practically disap­
peared altogether. Severe depreciation brought currency is­
sued by the Confederate Government plunging downward. Inva­
sion of the state by Federal detachments brought the intro-




duction of greenbacks, which eventually became far more valu­
able than any of the dozens of issues of Confederate currency. 
Still, some hopeful developments occurred which appeared for 
a time to bolster Mississippi's own issues of paper money 
and bonds. But as a whole, the state’s financial schemes, 
so optimistically inaugurated in early 1862, faced a real 
acid test as Mississippians survived the second year of war.
Early in 1862, specie practically disappeared from cir­
culation in Mississippi. This was due partly to the scarcity 
of gold and silver in the South prior to the War, and partly 
to hoarding by those few who possessed hard currency. Some 
newspapers placed the blame for the paucity of specie on 
"parties in the South who are buying it up to pay for goods 
that they are smuggling through from the North," and advised 
that such persons were depreciating Confederate currency and 
"should be w a t c h e d . A s  late as May, some Mississippians 
still paid a small part of their taxes in specie,^ but the 
Confederate tax collectors in Mississippi appeared to get al­
most no gold or silver in payment of taxes. In his statement 
of taxes collected in one district of Mississippi in late May,
F. A. R. Wharton reported accumulating $97,010.00 in "notes," 
and only $768.30 in coin. By September, his report indicated 
he had recently collected $605.00 in various types of paper
^Hinds County Gazette, January 15, 1862.
^T. L. Sumrall to A. B. Dilworth, April 25, 1862; Samuel
B. Matthews to A. J. Gillespie, May 8, 1862, Ser. G., Vol.
35, MDAH.
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currency, but only $1.67| in specie.^
With the gold supply drying up early in the war, Pettus 
determined to push the state's paper money issues, hoping to 
achieve their wide acceptance in order to establish some 
basis for trade both within and without the state. The most 
difficult problem to overcome in negotiating Mississippi's 
bond issues was the fact that the state's bonds repudiated 
twenty years prior to the war remained unredeemed. Although 
some effort was mounted to try to persuade the state to make 
some settlement of the Union and Planter's bank bonds, the 
state leadership adamantly refused, thereby obviating any 
possibility that Mississippi's bonds could be negotiated a-
broad.5
This problem was partly solved when Mississippians them­
selves accepted a large number of the bonds, purchasing them 
with state treasury notes. Several of the railroads operat­
ing in the state, seeing an opportunity to both aid in the 
disposal of the state bonds and reduce the interest due on 
their indebtedness to the state, bought up a considerable 
number of the bonds.® Despite the willingness of Mississip­
pians to purchase their own bonds, these never did sell well.
^Receipt of C. S. A. War Tax, signed by Jno. Handy, F. 
A. R. Wharton Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History, Jackson, Mississippi.
®G. Holland to Pettus, January 20, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 
56, MDAH.
®Wm. Murdock to Pettus, September 19, 1862, Ibid.
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and consequently never became very important in the state's 
financial program.
The state issues, as well as those of the Confederate 
Government, suffered considerable depreciation due to the 
widespread practice of counterfeiting. Even though elabor­
ate precautions were taken with all the early issues of both 
the state of Mississippi and others within the state issuing 
paper money, counterfeiting flourished throughout the war.? 
Each note, for example, was initially individually signed 
by both the treasurer and auditor, but as the number of is­
sues became greater, these officials hired clerks to sign 
the notes for them, thereby defeating the purpose of having 
the notes signed by hand. Since so many different people 
legally signed the notes, it became easy for counterfeiters 
to forge the signatures of state officials. Crude printing 
methods, including the use of poor-quality paper and ink, 
made the task of those who practiced this particular mode of 
deception quite easy. Although other preventive measures 
were tried, such as the frequent change in design in the notes, 
none completely eradicated counterfeiting, and therefore from 
the very beginning, this problem plagued state officials.®
Another factor which operated to the detriment of the 
state's financial program involved the different reaction of 
the people to the various types of money offered or authorized
?Natchez Courier, September 23, October 28, 1862.
^Richard Cecil Todd,
1954), pp. 98-100, 116-117
O
 Confederate Finance (Athens, Georgia,
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by the state. Some types of notes early achieved general 
acceptance, and even passed at a premium, while others stead­
ily sank in value from their initial appearance on the market. 
This, too, added to the general confusion which grew in in­
tensity during 1862.
Without question, the so-called "cotton money” quickly 
became the most popular currency in Mississippi, either state, 
private, or Confederate. Upon passage of the act, some scof­
fed at the idea that planters would pledge their cotton to 
the state, arguing that the notes would be useless when ob­
tained, as no merchant would accept them.® But once the 
notes appeared, planters proved such pessimistic predictions 
unfounded, for by summer over eight thousand applications for 
advances on cotton were recorded in the auditor's office.^0 
Some pledged as little as a single bale, while others pledged 
from one to two hundred bales. Many of the requests for ad­
vances on cotton specifically asked that most of the notes 
sent them be of small denominations, indicating that they 
intended to use them in the course of ordinary transactions.^^ 
Some farmers in sending their own request forms to the audi­
tor asked that functionary to return to them a number of addi­
tional blank forms, in order that they might be distributed




ner to John Echols, March 1, 1862, Ser. G., Vol. 35, MDAH
^® on Bonds and Receipts for Cotton, 1862," Ser. GG, 
^  Buntin to John Echols, March 11, 1862; James Tan-
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1 9among their neighbors.
Those Mississippians participating in the cotton loan 
arrangement represented all social and financial classes in 
the state. A great number of people sent in their requests 
for one or a few bales, but a large number also participated 
who pledged huge lots of cotton to the state, receiving cot­
ton notes in exchange. John D. McLemore, one of the largest 
slaveholders in the state, pledged a considerable portion of 
his 1861 cotton crop in return for the notes.13 R. 0. Ed­
wards, another of Mississippi's largest planters, pledged 
five hundred bales, receiving in return $10,750.00 in cotton 
n o t e s . 14 An analysis of the records of fifty participants 
in the loan, selected at random from the auditor's archives, 
revealed that twenty-one farmers pledged less than ten bales; 
fifteen pledged from ten to twenty; seven promised from twenty- 
five to fifty; four received notes on from fifty to one hun­
dred bales, while three pledged from one hundred to two hun­
dred bales of cotton.1^ This representative selection indi­
cated wide participation in the Mississippi cotton note cur­
rency scheme by agriculturalists representing all economic
1^1. D. Gibbs to A. J. Gillespie, March 13, 1862; Geo. 
K. Morton to John Echols, March 13, 1862, Ser. G., Vol. 35, 
MDAH.
13J. D. McLemore to A. J. Gillespie, May 30, 1862, Ser, 
G., Vol. 35, MDAH.
14"Exhibit B," Receipt of R. 0. Edwards, Ser. G., Vol. 
196, MDAH.
13''Cotton Bonds and Receipts for Cotton, 1862," Ser. 
GG., Vol. 2, MDAH.
206
classes in the state.
As the cotton notes gained wider circulation during the 
summer, their advantages proved so great that they soon pass­
ed at or above par, unlike all issues of the Confederate 
Government, as well as other types of notes issued by the 
state. The main attractiveness of the cotton notes lay in 
their ability to relieve part of the heavy tax load, and to 
furnish a much-needed circulating medium to Mississippians.
With regard to taxation, the cotton money law acted somewhat 
like direct suspension of taxes. For example, if an indi­
vidual owed one hundred dollars in taxes to the state and 
county, he could pledge five bales of cotton, receiving in 
return a one hundred dollar note from the state, which re­
presented the required rate of advancing five cents per pound 
for the cotton pledged. The farmer then took the one hundred 
dollar note, paid his tax bill of equal value, and took a 
receipt in return. Thus, his taxes were paid, not a dollar 
passed hands, and yet it was as though the farmer had pledged 
his cotton directly in liquidation of his tax bill.16
At that point, the cotton note’s second advantage became 
apparent, for the one hundred dollar note, received for pledged 
cotton and paid back into the treasury for taxes, did not re­
main there, idle and cancelled. Instead, the state could at 
that point pay the note out for its own indebtedness, thus 
placing the note in circulation, satisfying the need for a
16Natchez Courier, July 16, 1862.
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currency with which to carry on daily transactions. As for 
security, the cotton drought caused by the blockade would 
raise the price of cotton to a figure many times larger than 
the five cents per pound advanced under the terms of the law. 
As additional security, each person desiring to pledge cot­
ton to the state was required to obtain two additional signers 
to his loan, pledging to meet any indebtedness arising from
the defalcation of the party who actually obtained the ad- 
17vance
As a final pillar supporting the cotton money issued by 
Mississippi, the law provided that upon the raising of the 
blockade and the call of the governor which would cause the 
cotton to be transported to market, it could only be sold 
for specie or notes issued under the act, that is, gold or 
silver or the cotton notes themselves. With this shrewd 
device, state officials were assured that the cottc' notes 
would remain popular, and circulate at or near par.18
At its first appearance, the cotton money issued by Mis­
sissippi passed at a discount. But as the summer brought 
sharp rises in the price of cotton, and the blockade tight­
ened, it appeared the price would continue to rise and the 
money issued for pledged cotton rose in value. By September, 
many of those who had pledged cotton to the state in the




spring now desired release from their pledge, which could by 
the terms of the original cotton loan law be obtained only 
by use of the cotton notes, or specie. No specie was to be 
found, and most of those who received the cotton notes for 
their pledged cotton had either returned them to the treasury 
for tax debts, or passed them along to their creditors, most­
ly merchants. Consequently, some planters, wishing to obtain 
additional cotton notes with which to achieve such redemption, 
appealed to the Confederate Government for relief. The main 
hope of such appeals seems to have been based upon convincing 
the Confederates that the popularity of the Mississippi cot­
ton money acted to depreciate Confederate issues. B. F.
Moore, a Mississippi planter, wrote to Memminger, urging the 
Confederate Secretary of the Treasury to use his influence 
with Pettus to persuade the state officials to accept Confed­
erate money in redemption for pledged cotton in Mississippi.
As matters stood, Moore warned, merchants, who held most of 
the cotton money, demanded a premium for it over Confederate 
money, thereby depreciating the latter. "If this is allowed," 
Moore advised Memminger, "the State of Mississippi will be 
the first state in the Confederacy to depreciate its money.
The consequences of it will be a total bankruptcy of the 
Confederacy." Unless Governor Pettus was "called to his 
duty to the Confederate Government," Moore concluded, and 
persuaded to accept Confederate money in redemption of cotton 
pledged to Mississippi, the "consequences will be horrible
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to contemplate."19
Such an unwarranted interference in state finances 
never occured, but it is ironic that the Mississippi cotton 
loan scheme resulted in cotton notes rising well above Con­
federate currency in value; and the Confederacy had initially 
been urged to establish just such a program of cotton money. 
Instead, the Confederacy resorted to the "printing press" 
method of financing, and its notes quickly fell far below 
those issued on cotton. By the autumn of 1862, Mississippi 
cotton money commanded a premium of ten per cent over most 
Confederate issues, and the dichotomy continued to grow 
throughout the winter as cotton prices soared.^® The dis­
parity became so marked that when the Mississippi legislature 
met in December, 1862, any further issuance of cotton notes 
was prevented, because of the damage the popular cotton notes 
appeared to cause both Confederate money and other issues of 
the state.21
As for the state treasury notes, issued under the con­
vention ordinance of January 26, 1861, confidence and neces­
sity dictated their course during the first two years of the 
war. While some people feared that notes of the surrounding 
states, particularly Louisiana, would cause the depreciation
l^B. F. Moore, Jr. to C. G. Memminger, September 29, 1862, 
Thian, Correspondence, Appendix V, p. 643.
20Thomas B. Carroll and others. Historical Sketches of 
Oktibbeha County (Gulfport, Miss., 1931), p. 107.
2lMississippi House Journal (December, 1862), pp. 20, 30.
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of this particular issue of M i s s i s s i p p i ,2 2  this apprehension 
proved groundless as these treasury notes, like those issued 
for pledged cotton, remained at or near par value throughout 
1862.^3 Two factors contributed to these notes maintaining 
their value: they paid the extremely high rate of ten per
cent interest, and only they or specie were acceptable for 
the Mississippi military tax. Since specie all but disap­
peared early in the war, these treasury notes were the only 
practical method of meeting the military tax when the first 
assessment fell due in June, 1862.
Speculators, so eager to capitalize on rumors, took ad­
vantage of the widespread confusion in Mississippi over taxes 
and which types of notes would be acceptable for certain tax 
assessments. Newspapers, aware of this type of speculative 
activity, warned their readers to hold onto their military 
notes, as they and only they would be acceptable for the 
state military tax. Many people, reacting to rumors that 
the tax providing funds for the redemption of these military 
notes was about to be suspended, readily sold their treasury 
notes to speculators, who seemed only too aware that these 
notes were bound to rise in value, as gold disappeared and 
the deadline for collection of the military tax approached.
^^Mississippi House Journal (November, 1861-January, 
1862), p .  323.
23j. H. Jones to Pettus, March 31, 1862, Ser. E., Vol 
56, MDAH.
B^Macon Beacon, January 8, 1862.
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J. H. Jones, Sheriff of Panola County, advised Pettus that 
many of these treasury notes fell into the hands of "Sharpers" 
who then asked "50% to 80% for them," that some people were 
refusing to pay their tax, and "Swear resistance to its Col­
lection." If only Pettus would agree to accept other types of 
money for the tax, Jones suggested, it would be "a great bless­
ing to the People & a Sharp rebuke to the money Shavers.
But Pettus and other state officials stood by the terms 
of the act, and required the collection of the military tax 
either in specie or in notes issued under the provisions of 
the act. The Natchez Courier, alarmed over the approaching 
deadline for payment of the military tax, advised its readers 
who found themselves with no treasury notes on hand with which 
to pay the tax to "sacrifice their household silver," and let 
it "be melted into bullion and be placed in the vaults of the 
Treasury." Since this military tax collection in June, 1862, 
represented Mississippi's first effort at redeeming any of its 
currency, it appeared to the Courier most important that the 
debt be met promptly, if only for the sake of the future sta­
bility of the state's other types of currency. So, as a con­
sequence of their exclusive acceptance for one type of tax, 
and because the high rate of interest on them was paid on time 
by state officials, these notes continued to remain a popular 
currency in Mississippi.^6
Notes issued by the various railroads operating in Mis­
sissippi also proved a popular currency. These issues were
25j. H. Jones to Pettus, March 31, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 
56, MDAH.
^^Natchez Courier, April 8, 1862.
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in notes of denominations as low as five cents, which made 
them tremendously popular as "change notes." Also, since 
each railroad accepted the notes of the others, these notes 
could be used throughout the state, unlike some of the script 
issued by the counties or cities, which circulated only at 
large discounts outside their immediate area of i s s u a n c e . ^7
From the beginning of 1861, when it became apparent that 
issues authorized by the state treasury were limited to de­
nominations of one dollar or more, the popular clamor for 
small "change notes" increased. Pointing to their advantage 
in preventing "worthless and irresponsible rags which are 
now manufactured at distant points" from circulating as 
change notes in Mississippi, the Hinds County Gazette urged 
the local board of policy to sponsor the issuance of small- 
denomination notes. Otherwise, "New Orleans hucksters must 
furnish us with a change currency, as the New Orleans banks 
furnish us with paper money of large denominations— they 
pocketing all the profits, and we submitting to all the 
losses.
Several of the cities and counties issued such small 
currency, which provided a much-needed supplement to the high­
er denominations state issues. For example, Natchez issued 
$25,316.30 in these change notes in 1862, including notes of 
denominations from five dollars to ten cents, with the pre- 
ponderence of the notes being of ten and twenty-five cent
B^Vicksburg Whig, quoted in Natchez Courier, February 7,
1862.
^^Hinds County Gazette, January 8, 1862.
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d e n o m i n a t i o n s .29 Given the need for such small notes, this 
type of currency circulated freely in Mississippi throughout 
1862.
In some cases, private mercantile houses printed and 
issued their own script, which also alleviated the paucity 
of notes of small denominations. Even though this type of 
private issue script saw limited use for a brief time in 1862, 
it proved popular among the people who needed such notes. A 
Natchez newspaper in its columns praised W. A. Britton, a 
banking firm in that city, "for their issuance of small notes 
to meet the constant exigencies of trade.
These small change notes became very popular, which en­
couraged some citizens to hoard them, and the ever-present 
speculator to collect them in great quantities, hoping for 
scarcity to force the price of such notes upward. This prac^ 
tice of hoarding became so widespread in Natchez, where the 
notes were quite popular, that the Courier queried wearily, 
"Can anything get below this in smallness of soul?"^^
The extreme popularity of the notes also led to counter­
feiting of these usually poorly-printed notes, which only 
added to existing confusion created in the state by the cir­
culation of literally dozens of varieties of legitimate notes. 
Counterfeiting and graft became so prevalent that some of the
^^Natchez Courier, July 10, 1862. 
^^Ibid., December 18, 1861. 
Sllbid., April 3, 1862.
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railroads "resolved to take no more shinplasters of indi­
vidual issue," although they continued accepting those of 
companies, banking houses, and cities as before.32 Abuses 
in relation to these change notes became so flagrant that 
the legislature meeting in December passed a bill taxing such 
issues one hundred per cent, if they remained in circulation 
after March 1, 1863. This law, which applied to all issues 
of small notes except those of the counties, or cities, or 
others authorized specifically by the legislature, effectively 
curtailed many of the illegitimate practices concerning such 
n o t e s . 33 Still, this law contributed to further hoarding 
and speculating, in that it drastically reduced the number 
of such notes in circulation, thereby creating greater demand 
for those which remained.
Notes issued by the Confederate Government were never 
as popular in Mississippi as those issued by the state. The 
fact that the state issued money based upon a saleable commod­
ity, such as the cotton money, or redeemable by a tax, such 
as the treasury notes, contributed to the belief among Mis­
sissippians in the relative high value of their currency.
Lack of these same types of foundations led to quick and 
sustained depreciation of the Confederate issues. Then in 
1862, Federal armies penetrated deeply into some areas of 
the Confederacy, especially in the Tennessee-Mississippi-
32payette Gazette, October 3, 1862. 
33Mississippi Laws (December, 1862), p. 77.
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Louisiana area. This apparent inability of the Confederacy 
to protect its own citizens from Northern aggression, coupled 
with a variety of other reasons, led in 1862 to widespread 
disaffection and outright Unionism in Mississippi— which in 
turn meant a growing general reluctance to accept Confeder­
ate currency. Even those loyal to the Confederacy, those 
"most sanguine and strongest believers in the righteousness 
of the cause," one Mississippian asserted, "had ever present 
before them the fact that the odds were largely against suc­
cess; that the element of luck was too large a factor" in Con­
federate chances of s u c c e s s . ^4 Horace Fulkerson, an agent 
and sometime purchasing officer for the Confederate Government, 
after the war asserted that the belief that "Arithmetically 
we were whipped from the start, and this fact was within the 
comprehension of all." He found it no wonder, then, "that 
Confederate money was held to be worthless except as a conveni­
ent medium of exchange for properties at exorbitant prices." 
Except for the convenience factor, Fulkerson stated, "it 
would have been discarded entirely and the primative mode of 
bartering one product for another directly would have been 
resorted to."^5
Fulkerson, and a number of other officials of the Confed­
eracy, claimed to have been convinced early in the war that 
European intervention represented an idle dream; "that the
S. Fulkerson, A Civilian's Recollections of the Far 




chances of aid were too remote and the contingencies of it 
entirely beyond" Confederate control.^® As early as June, 
1862, articles appeared in some of the leading newspapers 
of the South expressing serious doubt that Europe had any in­
tention of intervening. "The error is counting upon outside 
influence and upon discord in the country of our eiemy," the
Richmond Dispatch declared in a story which the Natchez
37Courier reprinted, adding its editorial approval. Since 
the main thrust of Confederate diplomacy and hope of ultimate 
military victory rested so heavily on the hope of foreign 
intervention, when chances of such interference became more 
remote, as they did in 1862, many people refused to have any­
thing more to do with the Confederacy, including accepting 
its currency.
Mississippians joined others in the South in refusing 
to accept Confederate money, a movement which gained momentum 
in 1862 as it became clear such currency was based on little 
more than hope. Some Mississippians deplored this tendency, 
and as one resident of the coast area informed Pettus, he 
"would toil day and night on barely enough to sustain life 
rather than receive money from those who suck the life blood 
of the noble sons of the South." E. A. Pierce begged the 
Governor to take steps to "force people on the Coast to sell
36Ibid., pp. 112-113.
3?Richmond Dispatch, quoted in the Natchez Courier, June
7, 1862.
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provisions, for Confederate money," or risk total disaffec­
tion when the Fédérais offered the only source of money and 
provisions available.Others,  like Confederate Captain J. 
M. Montgomery, "scorned the filthy lucre" when opportunity 
arose for them to obtain the hated "yankee m o n e y . "^9 Yet, a 
growing number of Mississippians refused to accept any Con­
federate money, thereby creating problems for both the state 
and Confederate Governments.
By April, 1862, so much opposition existed to the Con­
federate monies that an effort was undertaken in some areas 
of the state to force its acceptance. A. K. Farrar, provost 
marshall in Adams County, issued a directive stating that 
anyone refusing to accept Confederate money, or who "other­
wise depreciate such notes below their legal standard," would 
be "regarded as inimical to the Confederate States, and as 
giving aid to the enemy, by impairing the credit of the Con­
federate States, and will be dealt with a c c o r d i n g l y . De­
spite such warnings, the practice of refusing Confederate 
money spread throughout the state. McGehee's textile manu­
facturing firm, according to one merchant, sold cloth in the 
autumn of 1862 only in exchange for meat, lard, and other
A. Pierce to Pettus, July 10, 1862, Ser. E., Vol.
57, MDAH.
39j. H. Montgomery, "Reminiscences of a Cavalryman," 
Memoirs of Henry Tillinghast Ireys: Papers of the Washington
County Historical Society, 1910-1915, eds. William D. McCain 
and Charlotte Capers (Jackson, 1954), p. 143.
40Natchez Courier, May 8, 1862.
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types of provisions. They would not sell for Confederate 
money, as it was "sinking in value every day."^!
By late 1862, Mississippi's financial and economic situ­
ation appeared every bit as serious as it had a year previ­
ously when the legislature met and created such a plethora of 
"well-digested financial schemes." Adding to the problems 
of widespread Unionism, disloyalty, disaffection, inflation 
and speculation was a growing feeling among a number of 
people from the poorer classes that the war then raging "was 
a rich man's war and a poor man's fight."4% One apparently 
dissatisfied backwoodsman expressed a very common feeling 
when he complained to Pettus in July that "it pears hard that 
some of us have to gow off to war and others stay hat home 
swaring the will not go and thare is not Jeff Davises nor 
bauagardes a nuff to get them to ware."43 Others complained 
of "treason" among the large planters, including one of the 
very largest. Miles H. McGehee who, according to W. R. Steward, 
"had several interviews with Fitch the commander of the ex­
pedition of Yankee Gun Boats down the river," and he feared 
"too great an intimacy exists between them." The same cor­
respondent also named several other wealthy Delta planters 
as being altogether "too friendly" with the Fédérais.44 These
4lMrs. B . Beaumont, Twelve Years of My Life (Philadelphia, 
1887), p. 186. :
42isaac Applewhite to Pettus, July 15, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 
57, MDAH; Fulkerson, A Civilian's Recollections, pp. 106-107.
43h . l , K. to Pettus, July 18, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 57.
44w. R. Stewart to Pettus, July 20, 1862, Ibid.
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sorts of complaints found their way to the Governor through­
out the war period, but no full-scale class movement, or 
anything approaching it, ever developed as a result of either 
real or imagined class discriminations.
Impressment of slaves, and their subsequent abuse at the 
hands of Confederate officers unfamiliar with handling that 
species of property, led to further dissatisfaction among 
Mississippi slaveholders of all classes,45 as did apparent 
favoritism in the burning of "endangered cotton."46 Complaints 
to Confederate officials of depredations committed by their 
troops all too often received no attention, which led one 
irate victim to exclaim if "that is the way our friends treat 
us, Lord deliver me from our friends."4?
Aware of these problems, Pettus determined to call the 
legislature again into special session in December. His 
brief message to the assembled delegates contained recommenda­
tions for conscripting all whites in the state from "sixteen 
to sixty years of age" into the state militia; a plea to hunt 
up and return to the army the hundreds of deserters who roam­
ed the state; and a request that he be given power to impress 
slaves to work on fortifications when the need arose. The
45official Records, Ser. I, Vol. 10, pt. 2, pp. 430-431; 
Mississippi House Journal (December, 1862), pp. 6, 23, 41;
M. L. McGuire and others to Pettus, March 23, 1863, Ser. E., 
Vol. 60, MDAH.
46wailes, Diary, entry for August 23, 1862.
4?Beulah M. D'Olive Price, ed., "Excerpts From the Diary 
of Walter Alexander Overton, 1860-1862," Journal of Mississip­
pi History, XVII (July, 1955), p. 202.
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Governor also pleaded for more state aid to the growing num­
ber of destitute families in the state, and he urged the 
legislature to make some appropriation for obtaining salt, 
which he characterized as "the most pressing want of our
people."48
Pettus had little to say concerning financial matters.
He urged the legislature to take some action in regard to 
inflation and speculation, or risk the transfer of the wealth 
of the state "to the hands of the worst and least patriotic 
of our population." The Governor proudly pointed out that 
all the notes authorized to be advanced on cotton had in fact 
been paid out, asserting that this act "for the relief of the 
people and for supplying a sound circulating medium for the 
State has accomplished all that its most sanguine friends ex­
pected." The only other comment made by Pettus relating to 
financial affairs was to inform the legislature that only 
$381,534 of the "Faith of the State" treasury notes had been 
dispensed, and that he anticipated no further expenditure 
from that fund.49
One of Mississippi’s most urgent needs involved some 
governmental control of inflation and speculation. Pettus 
recognized this, and recommended the passage of legislation 
prohibiting the buying and selling of food grain for profit.50
48]\iississippi House Journal (December, 1862), pp. 9-10,
49jbid., pp. 11-12.
SOMississippi House Journal (December, 1862), p. 11.
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The legislature, however, took no action on Pettus’ suggestion, 
but did pass several important measures designed to afford 
some relief to the growing number of Mississippians impover­
ished by high prices and speculative activity. Reacting to 
the growing crisis produced by the paucity of salt, the legis­
lature appropriated $500,000 to be used to procure this 
precious article for the d e s t i t u t e . As a further relief to 
those who sacrificed their land for lack of money to pay the 
higher rate of taxes, a law was enacted which extended the 
time for redemption of land sold for taxes until two years 
after the close of the war.^B Finally, the legislature sus­
pended until a year after the close of the war the collection 
of the military tax imposed under the ordinance of January 
26, 1861.^3 This "irrepealable” tax was supposed to be used 
to fund the treasury notes issued under the act, but the real­
ities of war interferred to so alter the situation within the 
state that as the legislature admitted, it was ”a physical 
impossibility to collect this tax in gold and silver.” Lest 
its action be interpreted as outright repudiation, an extremely 
sensitive subject in the light of the state’s financial his­
tory, the legislature published detailed ’’resolutions” in 
regard to the suspension. These statements were designed to 
demonstrate the dichotomy between its action and that of the
^^Mississippi Laws (December, 1862), pp. 79-81. 
5 % I b i d ., p. 78.
5 3 l b i d . , pp. 77-78.
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repudiationist legislature in 1842. The resolution made it 
very clear that the present act was only a temporary suspen­
sion, necessitated by the exigencies of war, and that col­
lections would resume as originally provided one year after 
the cessation of hostilities.^4
An examination of several of the more important legisla­
tive enactments passed by this December, 1862 session of the 
legislature reveal a definite shift of emphasis from predom­
inantly military concerns to more civilian-oriented needs. 
Salt, for example, represented a basic and absolutely neces­
sary item for all Mississippians, regardless of their social 
standing, as the main staple in almost everyone’s diet was 
salted meat, particularly bacon. This bacon could only be 
cured by the use of quantities of salt, and by late 1862, 
almost none existed in Mississippi. Increasingly, Mississip­
pians of all social classes urged Pettus to take some action 
to provide salt, the price of which had risen from about $1.50 
per sack in 1861 to $15 for the same amount by January, 1862. 
Later in the year, salt sold in some areas for as much as 
$100 per sack.55 The legislature, reacting to the dire need 
for salt, authorized the Governor to withdraw a half million 
dollars from the military fund to use in an effort to pro­
cure salt. The act even authorized Pettus to impress slaves 
and trains if necessary to expedite this essential project.56
54Ibid., pp. 97-99,
55vicksburg Whig, January 9, 1861; Aughey, Tupelo, p. 91, 
56Mississippi Laws (December, 1862), pp. 79-81.
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The new emphasis on civilian needs also surfaced in the 
matter of tax reform. Whereas the general trend definitely 
pointed toward a lightning of the tax l o a d , 5? the legislature 
nevertheless created a new tax, equal to one half of the cur­
rent state levy, for the sole purpose of better providing for 
destitute f a m i l i e s . 58 other detailed measures provided for 
the distribution of this additional revenue among the desti­
tute, particularly those families of soldiers serving in Con­
federate or state armed f o r c e s . 59
Meanwhile, Confederate fiscal policies led to conse­
quences with which the Mississippi legislature found it ne­
cessary to deal. Throughout 1862, the Confederate Government 
continued to issue huge amounts of notes, which only added 
to the already redundant i s s u e s . T h i s  policy contributed 
to a greatly increased rate of inflation; such that by Decem­
ber, Confederate notes were passed in Mississippi at a dis­
count of approximately sixty per cent.51 In a desperate ef­
fort to curtail this critical situation. Confederate officials 
in late 1862 requested the state to consider legislation guaran-
5 7 i b i d . , pp. 77, 78-79. 97-98.
5 8 j b i d . , p. 70.
SBibid., pp. 70-72.
^^Matthews, Public and Private Laws of the C.S.A., Acts 
of April 18, 1862" pp. 28-29; September 23, 1862, p. 59; Todd, 
Confederate Finance, pp. 107-109; Schwab, A Financial and 
Industrial History, p. 45.
Glyreeman Jones to Pettus, December 24, 1862, Ser. E .,
Vol. 58, MDAH.
224
teeing a portion of the growing Confederate debt.62 Some 
Mississippians objected to this, on the grounds that it would 
tend to strengthen Confederate currency at the expense of 
state issues. After all, many argued, the Confederacy's ir­
responsible fiscal policies had caused their own woes, and 
had Memminger only listened to the suggestions of those who 
urged the creation of a "sound" Confederate currency, based 
on cotton, for example, the present crisis would have been 
avoided altogether.63 Nevertheless, the Mississippi legisla­
ture in January, 1863, voted to endorse the state's portion 
of the Confederate debt, based upon Congressional representa­
tion in the Congress in Richmond. In order to secure time 
to see how other states reacted to this measure, however, a - 
clause was inserted in this act which required its affirmation 
by the next legislative body.64
By the end of 1862, Mississippians found their economic 
and financial— to say nothing of their political— situation 
critical. In general, fiscal programs designed a year earlier 
weathered invasion, inflation, speculation, and disaffection 
surprisingly well, yet the state's overall condition steadily 
worsened. Mississippi's own financial programs proved rela­
tively successful, but certain factors— including a drought 
in portions of the state. Confederate fiscal irresponsibility.
62?odd, Confederate Finance, pp. 69-70. 
63Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 108. 
64Mississippi Laws (December, 1862), pp. 75-76.
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and Federal invasion— made any strictly state effort particul­
arly difficult. Stronger state action in the areas of infla­
tion and speculation would have helped, however, in the solv­
ing of some problems— problems which unchecked drove a signifi­
cant number of Mississippians to reluctantly turn to the enemy 
for succor. This represented the greatest failure of state 
officials in the early years of the war, and made their task 
in the remainder of the Confederate period much more diffi­
cult .
CHAPTER VIII 
POLICY CONFLICTS BETWEEN MISSISSIPPI AND 
CONFEDERATE OFFICIALS
As Mississippians entered the third year of the war, 
signs pointing to increasing social and economic disruptive­
ness appeared far more frequently than during the first two 
years of civil conflict. Disease, disloyalty, and drought 
had left their mark on Mississippi's once optimistic people. 
Federal raids into the interior regions of the state demon­
strated both the growing strength of Federal power, and the 
proportionate decline in the Confederacy's ability to protect, 
its citizens. The wake of devastation which followed the 
footsteps of the Union soldiers was to be expected, if not 
welcomed. The thoroughness with which the Northern fighting 
men stripped the countryside of food, livestock, and all 
other portable valuables inevitably created consternation 
among Mississippi ns,l but far more demoralizing than these 
expected Federal depredations were similar forays mounted by 
soldiers of the Confederacy against their own people. Scarcity 
reigned throughout the South, and Confederate soldiers in-
^Mrs. Hugh Miller, "Reminiscences of Argyle, the Home of 
William R. and Margaret Campbell," McCain and Capers, eds., 
Memoirs of Henry T. Ireys, p. 169. Richard T. Archer to Pet­
tus, June 17, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 61, MDAH.
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créasingly found themselves in a position of having to de­
pend upon the produce of whatever area they were in for 
sustenance for themselves and their livestock.
Such Confederate raids, sometimes under the guise of im­
pressment or conscript parties, but as often as not results 
of individual caprice or greed, occurred with distressing 
frequency as thousands of deserters and draft dodgers took 
to the hills and swamps of Mississippi. Parties organized 
to search out and return these deserters to their commands 
often deteriorated into orgies of vengence and theft. Such 
actions resulted in frequent pleas by the victims to state 
and Confederate officials for aid in putting a stop to de­
predations by these relatively small bands of deserters or 
disgruntled soldiers, but more often than not such requests 
were ignored. This led to further dissatisfaction, which 
brought on demoralization and disaffection, so that by the 
end of 1863, Mississippians had lost much of the fervor so 
characteristic of the first two years of the war.^ What many 
failed to realize, however, was that the failure of several 
Confederate revenue programs, due to enemy invasion and some 
domestic squabbling, had necessarily forced Confederate field 
commanders to resort to extensive impressment to provide the 
basic forage for their men and animals.
2l . B. Gaston to Pettus, January 30, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 
59; Richard T. Archer to Pettus. Ser. E., Vol. 61; Theodora B. 
Marshall and Gladys C. Evans, They Found it in Natchez (New 
Orleans, 1939), pp. 162-165; Walker, Vicksburg, pp. 216-218; 
Price, ed., "Excerpts From the Diary of Walter Alexander Over­
ton, 1860-1862," p. 202; Wailes, Diary, entry for August 23, 
1862; Fayette Gazette, August 2, 1862.
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Further complicating the situation in Mississippi during 
the final years of the war was a growing tendency toward di­
rect conflict between Confederate and state authorities over 
a wide variety of issues. It appeared to some state offi­
cials that Confederate lenience in such matters as control 
of scouting; conscription, and impressment parties were the 
main causes which drove citizens of the state to dissassoci- 
ate themselves from the Confederate effort. This in turn 
made the task of state officials in trying to successfully 
implement their own programs exceedingly difficult, as people 
living in the outlying districts usually drew no distinction 
between Confederate and state troops when their property was 
destroyed or impressed. Other differences between the Mis­
sissippi and Richmond Governments manifested themselves 
clearly by 1863, which generally disrupted Confederate-state 
relations to the point of significantly reducing the overall 
war effort. After all. Confederate policy differed signifi­
cantly from those programs favored by state officials in a 
number of instances, and in the implementation of such dichoto- 
mous policies, disagreements were bound to arise. Still, 
whether these differences be regarded as conflicts over policy 
directions, state rights, state sovereignty, or simple jeal^ 
ousy, the effect was the same— a distinct cooling of Confed- 
erate-Mississippi cooperative relations which redounded to 
the detriment of both governmental entities.
Of the recurring problem areas causing friction between
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Confederate and Mississippi authorities, none proved more 
constant or bitter than that of control over Mississippi’s 
fighting men. Pettus was understandably most concerned with 
protection of his own state, a twofold problem concerned 
mainly with keeping enough men scattered throughout the state 
to prevent possible slave insurrections, and to protect the
q
exposed borders of the state from Federal attack. Confeder­
ate policy, on the other hand, looked toward using massive 
concentrations of armed men to prevent attacks of similarly 
massed Northern armies, regardless of whether such enemy 
forces threatened in Mississippi or in another of the Confed­
erate states. Nevertheless, considerations regarding dispo­
sition and control of Mississippi’s fighting forces caused 
both Pettus and his successor in the governor’s chair. General 
Charles Clark, to withhold men, arms, and supplies from the 
Confederate forces throughout the war.
In 1861, the main conflicts between Mississippi and Con­
federate authorities concerned control of the state’s troops 
which had been sent outside the confines of Mississippi to 
aid in the defense of some of the border states, particularly 
Kentucky. Mississippians were recruited for sixty days— a 
short enough time to induce many to enlist, but too brief a 
period to be of any real use to Confederate commanders— and 
placed under the command of Mississippi militia major gener-
^Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 61.
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4als. Once these officers and troops arrived outside the
state, Confederate generals often attempted to issue orders 
to them so as to coordinate the activities of their entire 
force, but such action aroused the ire of the Mississippi 
generals. Brigadier General James L. Alcorn, sent to Ken­
tucky with the First Mississippi Brigade in October, 1861, 
expressed the feeling of many officers and men toward the 
Confederate generals when he declared in exasperation that 
his "service as brigadier-general of Mississippi is due that 
State only. If the Confederate Government wished me, I would 
be appointed. This not being done, I am an intruder. My 
self-respect, my own honor, is dearer to me than country or 
life itself." His bitter experience with the Confederate 
officers led him to conclude, "I had about as soon be shot as 
to leave here, but would rather be shot as remain a hermaph­
rodite in the s e r v i c e .
Confederate military practices in 1862 proved even more 
unpopular in Mississippi than had th^ir earlier programs.
Since the initial strategy of requisitioning troops from the 
states had failed to provide adequate personnel for the Con­
federate service, Richmond authorities in 1862 sponsored the 
passage of a conscription act. This act raised the age limit 
to forty-five, thereby including a number of soldiers enrolled
^Theodore Mandeville to Rebecca Mandeville, December 29, 
1861, Henry Mandeville Family Papers, Louisiana State Univer­
sity, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Davis, Recollections, pp. 422- 
426; Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 7, pp. 688-689.
^Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 4, pp. 464-467.
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in the Mississippi militia. These Pettus refused to release, 
claiming them necessary for the defense of the state, par­
ticularly since the Fédérais appeared about to launch a con­
certed attack on Vicksburg.® Complicating this tense situ­
ation further, the Confederate exemption laws failed to make 
provision for an overseer to remain on each plantation, ex­
cept for some of the larger ones. This resulted in an outcry 
in Mississippi, where not only were slave insurrections in­
ordinately feared, but state law required the presence of at 
least one white man on each plantation.?
Pettus chaffed under this Confederate conscript law, 
but determined to provide protection to the plantations de­
spite it. He detailed groups of state troops, organized as 
"partisan rangers" to guard the unprotected plantations, com­
plaining all the while that in the matter of exemptions, 
"state authorities are entirely ignored."® From the Confed­
erate point of view, however, such conscriptions were neces­
sary to fill the depleted ranks of the Southern armies which 
by then had suffered terribly at the hands of experienced 
Union armies.
Considerably demoralized at being derided as inferior
^Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 64.
?A. B. Longstreet to Pettus, June 7, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 
57, MDAH.
^Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 52, pt. 2, p. 309; note 
on letter of A. B. Longstreet to Pettus, June 7, 1862, Ser. 
E., Vol. 57, MDAH.
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whenever they came into contact with regular Confederate 
troops, the Mississippi militia suffered a more serious prob­
lem due to state action in the summer of 1862. Fearing an 
attack on Vicksburg, Pettus called out the state militia, and 
retained them idly in camps throughout most of the planting 
season. Farmers, who composed most of the militia forces, 
especially decried this action, as they were forced to sit 
in camp while their crops went unattended. Many of these 
state troops, including officers as well as enlisted men, 
sent petitions to Pettus, asking that they be allowed a brief 
furlough to go home and attend to their crops, but the Gov­
ernor, fearing a Federal attack at any moment, refused, there­
by alienating a number of Mississippians.® Some left anyway, 
and refused to again muster at the call of the Governor dur­
ing the war years. Even Jefferson Davis asked Pettus to re­
consider and allow some of the men to return home long enough 
to cultivate their crops, but Pettus adamantly refused on the 
grounds that the troops must remain in the field to protect 
the grain and meat producing areas of northern Mississippi.10
^"Petition," signed by thirty-six officers, January 16, 
1863; H. Johnson to Pettus, February 21, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 
59; For representative letters asking that soldiers be allow­
ed time to go home and see to their crops see W. V. W. McLen­
don to Pettus, March 12; Phil. Gully to Pettus, March 11; J. 
R. Bowles to Pettus, March 12; A. L. Crumby to Pettus, March 
11; B. A. Smith to Pettus, March 19; S. J. Gholson to Pettus,
May 21, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 60, MDAH.
•^Opettus to Jefferson Davis, April 16, 1863, Ser. E.,
Vol. 60, MDAH.
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With the coming of 1863, conflicts between state and Con­
federate authorities over military matters reached crisis pro­
portions. Confederate General Lloyd Tilghman even went so 
far as to arrest Mississippi militia General James Z. George 
when the latter refused to allow his soldiers to obey an or­
der which George considered demean i n g . F o l l o w i n g immediate­
ly on this touchy situation came reports of serious diffi­
culties between Colonel Willian C. Faulkner, a Confederate 
officer trying to recruit northern Mississippians into the 
service, and state agents sent into that area for the same 
purpose. Ultimately this conflict was settled when Confed­
erate authorities agreed to abandon their recruitment efforts 
in the border areas, leaving those regions to state agents.1%
Later in the summer, when the loss of Vicksburg left 
Mississippians especially depressed as to their future, new 
conflicts arose between state and Confederate authorities. 
General S. J. Gholson, in command of Mississippi militia 
forces, supported by Pettus, strenuously objected when Con­
federate General Gideon J. Pillow attempted to renew Confed­
erate conscription agent's efforts to recruit in the exposed 
areas of the s t a t e . B o t h  Pettus and Pillow appealed to 
President Davis for support, and ultimately a compromise was 
reached, whereby Pettus agreed to transfer all of Gholson's
llj. Z. George to Pettus, March 4, 1863, Ibid.
C . Faulkner to Pettus, March 9, 1863, Ibid. 
Inofficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 718.
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troops to the Confederate army, provided their military or­
ganization remained intact. Even this did not end the con­
troversy, as Pettus almost immediately decided to retain a 
portion of the state troops under his command, as well as 
all of the horses formerly belonging to the m i l i t i a . 1 4  This 
conflict remained in abeyance, however, as in the midst of 
it former Confederate General Charles Clark assumed the gov­
ernorship of Mississippi. More familiar with the needs and 
procedures of the military than his predecessor, Clark man­
aged during the remainder of the war period to calm conflicts 
over military jurisdiction between the state and Richmond 
governments. Eventually, near the end of the war, all state 
troops were transferred to the Confederate service, but by 
then defeat was so near as to make such a move meaningless.
Equally as detrimental to cordial Confederate-Mississippi 
relations as conflicts over military control of state forces 
were those related problems which involved civil rights. The 
initial action in this area occurred in 1862, when Congress 
authorized Davis to declare martial law and suspend the privi­
lege of the writ of habeas corpus in cases of emergency. Act­
ing under this authority, Grenada and even Jackson, the capi­
tal of Mississippi, were placed under martial law in the 
spring of 1862, while eleven counties in the river area, in­
cluding the cities of Natchez and Vicksburg underwent the 
same action later in the s u m m e r . A l t h o u g h  this latter case
14lbid., Ser. 4, Vol. 2, pp. 759-760.
Inofficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 10, pt. 2, p. 373; Ibid.,
Vol. 15, pp. 771-772.
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was overthrown when it became apparent that General Van Dorn, 
Confederate commander responsible for institution martial 
law, had acted without Davis' sanction, the precedent was 
there, and state authorities were quick to see where such 
action might lead.^®
Jealous of their few remaining powers, Mississippi state 
courts commenced circumventing Confederate conscript officers 
by granting writs of habeas corpus wholesale to applicants 
who intended avoiding being forcibly enlisted in the Confed­
erate a r m y . O b s e r v i n g  this trend, the Confederate Bureau 
of Conscription in January, 1863, appointed Wiley P. Harris, 
an outstanding Mississippi attorney, to represent the Richmond 
Government in state cases involving the granting of habeas 
corpus in Mississippi courts. The Bureau even went so far as 
to actually direct Harris to do all in his power to get around 
the jurisdiction of state courts, including appealing all ad­
verse decisions handed down by these judicial bodies to high­
er c o u r t s . IB Governor Clark, while a strong guardian of 
state prerogatives, mostly agreed with the Confederate conten­
tion that cases regarding conscription should be tried in Con­
federate courts. But other state officials, notably Attorney 
General T. J. Wharton, disagreed with Clark, and protested 
vehemently that this represented an outright usurpation of
IGlbid., Vol. 18, pt. 2.
l?Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, pp. 78-79.
IBj. A. Campbell to M. R. Clark, January 16, 1863, lo­
cated in Ser. E ., Vol. 59, MDAH.
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state authority.19
The Mississippi legislature meeting in November, 1863, 
took cognizance of the fact that Confederate officials had 
deliberately attempted to evade the jurisdiction of Missis­
sippi courts by, among other expedients, rushing conscripts 
onto trains and transporting them beyond state lines before 
the conscript had a chance to apply for a writ. This proved 
more than the legislature would tolerate, and they conse­
quently passed a law which allowed each conscript a minimum 
of five days after suing for a writ before he could be re­
moved.^0
Another continuing problem which greatly aggravated al­
ready strained relations between the Confederate authorities 
and Mississippi officials involved the tendency of the former 
to practically take over and completely monopolize railroads 
in the state exclusively for military purposes. From the be­
ginning of the war, Confederate authorities utilized the 
railroad facilities to a large extent, and as more troops con­
centrated in the Vicksburg vicinity in 1862, Confederate de­
mands upon the railroads increased. By the winter of 1862- 
1863, Confederate General John C. Pemberton, a Northern-born 
man who replaced the popular Mississippian, General Earl Van 
Dorn, in command at Vicksburg, went so far as to issue an 
order forbidding the shipment of any private freight over
l^Ibid.; T. J. Wharton to M. R. Clark, December 21, 1863, 
Ser. E., Vol. 65, MDAH.
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), p. 159.
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the railroads.21 This act brought quick criticism upon Pem­
berton, and a number of complaints to Pettus to try to get 
the order revoked.22 Eventually, complaints over Pemberton's 
order reached Richmond, resulting in a review of the policy 
which in operation allowed empty cars to be pulled along the 
road for want of cargo while citizens within sight of the 
railroad starved.23
On January 8, 1863, the Adjutant and Inspector General's 
office in Richmond issued a directive ordering military 
authorities to permit the transportation of civilian freight 
whenever space permitted.24 Pemberton's quartermasters and 
commissaries continued to prohibit most such shipments, how­
ever, which led Mobile and Ohio Railroad officials to take 
steps on their own designed to implement the Richmond order. 
At a meeting of the directors of the railroad in February, 
it was decided that because Pemberton's agents had "involved 
the shipment of corn and Provisions in endless difficulties, 
producing great suffering in the community for want of neces­
sary supplies," henceforth the directive emanating from Rich-
2^Jackson Daily Crisis, January 8, 1863.
22l . B. Gaston to Pettus, January 30, 1863, Ser. E., 
Vol. 59; A. M. West and S. J. Gholson to Williams & Hull, 
December 3, 1862, located in Ser. E ., Vol. 58; George Wood 
to Pettus, January 9, 1863, Ser. E ., Vol. 59, MDAH.
23L. J . Fleming to Pettus, February 1, 10, 1863, Ser.
E ., Vol. 59; J. M. Rives to J. C. Pemberton, March 9, 1863, 
Ser. E., Vol. 60, MDAH.
24unidentified newspaper clipping attached to letter 
of L. J. Fleming to Pettus, February 10, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 
59, MDAH.
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mond would be taken as the proper guide by railroad officials. 
This would, hopefully, effectively circumvent Penberton's 
agents, who seemed bent upon "seeking absolute control over 
the shipment of private freights."25
Even this decisive action did not prevent Pemberton from 
often usurping the railroads for his own exclusive use. Oc­
casionally throughout 1863, Pettus found it necessary to re­
mind the Confederate commander that destitute people were to 
be allowed to ship freight on the cars of the railroad when­
ever possible. Otherwise, as some of his correspondents in­
formed the Governor, a good possibility existed that actual 
violence would occur, resulting in destruction to the tracks 
and rolling stock of the r a i l r o a d s . ^6
Still another series of disagreements between Mississippi 
and Confederate authorities developed over the practice of im­
pressment, which first became an issue in 1863. Since the 
Federal attack on Vicksburg launched in the summer of 1862 
ended in failure. Confederates believed an even greater mili­
tary effort against the last Confederate bastion obstructing 
the Mississippi River would be launched the following year.
To prepare the defenses of Vicksburg for such an eventuality, 
therefore. Confederate agents began urging Mississippi slave-
25"Resolutions," passed at a board of directors meeting, 
in Ibid.
26^ ,. Mims to "Quartermasters on the M & 0 Rail Road," 
located in Ser. E., Vol. 59; J. M. Rives to L. T. Fleming, 
August 11, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 61; J. Lowry to Pettus,
Ibid.
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holders to volunteer the services of their chattels early in 
January. Planters were urged to send "one half of their men 
force, with Axes, Spades, and Shovels, and rations to last 
them to Port Hudson" in order to work on fortifications at 
that p l a c e . 27 Most area slaveholders responded generously 
to this request at first, usually sending white overseers 
along with their s l a v e s . 28 Following the initial request at 
Vicksburg, Pemberton issued calls for Mississippians to vol­
unteer their slave laborers to work on fortifications at 
other vulnerable points in the state, and these requests 
likewise elicited generous initial response.29
By the middle of February, however, a serious problem 
developed when slaves began showing up back at the plantations, 
maimed, sick, and determined to risk severe punishment for 
running away rather than remain at work on the fortifications. 
As the story unfolded, it appeared that upon arrival at the 
assigned work area, the slaves had been taken from control 
of overseers sent along with them, and placed instead under 
Confederate military authorities, who proceeded to abuse this 
very expensive species of property in a shameful manner. "The 
negroes are returning now by droves sick and numbers of them
2?Natchez Courier, January 6, 1863.
28John Ghney to A. M. Cummings, February 17, 1863, Cum­
mings-Black Family Papers, Tulane University, New Orleans, 
Louisiana; Natchez Courier, January 3, 1863.
29"Special Requisition," signed by Gen. Daniel Ruggles, 
located in Ser. E., Vol. 59, MDAH.
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have died of pneumonia," John Ghney complained.^® Reports 
of maiming and excessively cruel treatment poured into Pettus' 
office. M. L. McGuire and some of his neighbors wrote to 
Pettus in March, expressing their determination to answer no 
more calls for slaves as those whom they had sent "were put 
under Military overseers, who we learn treated them badly & 
roughly using cudgels or sticks in chastisement which after 
the expiration of three or four weeks caused the almost en­
tire number to run off home, leaving their tools, and some 
their bedding."31
Other impressment practices of Pemberton led to more 
difficulties for Mississippi officials. In April the Confed­
erate commander issued an impressment order for the collection 
of horses and other livestock. When his officers appeared 
slow in collecting the required number, Pemberton voiced his 
dissatisfaction, and ordered them to get the horses immedi­
ately, regardless of the means r e q u i r e d . 32 This led to indis­
criminate impressment and numerous complaints that the Con­
federates were creating intense hatreds for their cause by 
such gross methods. The impressment process was so abused 
by Confederate officers in Greene County that a grand jury
3®John Ghney to A, M. Cummings, February 17, 1863, Cum- 
mings-Black Papers; M. L. McGuire and others to Pettus, March 
23, 1863; 0. P. Anderson to Pettus, March 22, 1863, Ser. E.,
Vol. 60, MDAH.
31m . L. McGuire and others to Pettus, March 23, 1863,
Ser. E., Vol. 60, MDAH.
32j. c.  Taylor to Pettus, April 27, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 60.
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found several bills against the agents for "Cow Stealing," 
and other illegal acts. Agents "ran the cattle off," then 
"offered the owner less than half the market value." At one 
point, the Confederate agent in that county reportedly or­
dered the sheep owners to hurry up and shear their animals, 
as he was coming for them immediately. A. E. Lewis, who in­
formed Pettus of these atrocious acts in Greene County, as­
serted that he and his neighbors were "perfectly willing to 
give the government the preference of all they can spare, 
but insist on being seen & heard on the disposition of their 
private property." These and similar incidents by impress­
ment agents, Lewis stated, had created "a reign of terror" 
such as never before witnessed, even among the Fédérais.33
When Pemberton's agents began halting trains and impress­
ing the private freight Pettus had worked so hard to obtain 
permits for, the Governor reached the end of his patience.
In the summer of 1863, after many reports reached Pettus com­
plaining of this sort of activity, the Governor angrily de­
manded of Pemberton that he order his agents to cease and 
desist. In one instance, members of a community in north 
Mississippi combined their resources and sent one of their 
number in search of wheat. The agent located three hundred 
bushels of wheat, bought it for three dollars per bushel, and 
loaded it on railroad cars for shipment home. Confederate 
agents swooped down at that point, and claiming that the wheat
33a . E. Lewis to Pettus, April 21, 1863, Ser. E., Vol
60, MDAH.
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was purchased on behalf of a "notorious speculator," seized 
it in the name of the Confederate Government. Upon hearing 
of this incident, Pettus demanded that the Confederates im­
mediately release the wheat. Grudgingly, the impressment 
agents agreed to release "20 or 30 bushels" to J, Lowry, from 
whom they had seized it, if he "could prove his ownership."
This angered Pettus even more, and he ordered the release of 
all of the wheat immediately, saying that he had studied the 
records of the case, and remained convinced that the wheat 
"belongs to widows & orphans and was seized illegally." Pet­
tus assured the Confederates that he would do all in his 
power to aid them in their continuing effort to prevent specu­
lators from using the available railroad cars for their own 
devious purposes, but insisted the agents "must keep their 
hands off . . . bread which lawfully belongs to the destitute 
families of soldiers." Several similar incidents occurred 
during 1863 which together contributed significantly to a 
decline in respect for and willingness to aid the C o n f e d e r a c y . 34 
Confederate officials also continued the policy of burn­
ing cotton in the exposed districts of Mississippi during the 
last two years of the war. As in all of their other policies, 
the Confederates somehow managed to arouse considerable oppo­
sition to this continuing program, chiefly among people who 
complained of partiality in its operation, and of course
Lowry to Pettus, August 20, 1863; John T. Shaff to 
Pettus, September 9, 1863; Pettus to John T. Shaff, September 
27, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 61, MDAH.
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among those who planned extensive speculation in the precious 
s t a p l e . 35 Since this Confederate policy usually devolved 
upon low-grade field military commanders for execution, the 
practice at times doubtless proved unfair in operation, but 
the scattered nature of the Confederate garrison in the Mis­
sissippi area prevented really adequate communication, and 
therefore control, over the carrying out of the cotton burn­
ing program. Some Mississippians, however, objected to the 
practice of burning cotton on principle, as well as in par­
ticular methods used. Planters in this richest of all cotton- 
producing areas were still convinced, despite the failure of 
cotton to bring expected European intervention, that it should 
then be used to some positive advantage, rather than burned 
as a sort of ill-conceived revenge upon recalcitrant Euro­
peans. T. A. Ventress expressed this general feeling when 
he rhetorically asked the recently-elected Governor Clark 
"Does not the Government know full well, that the two great 
sinews of war, are Men and Money, and that each is powerless 
without the other?" Has the Richmond Government forgotten, 
Ventress wondered, that "National wealth is naught else than 
the sum of the wealth of the individual Citizens of the na­
tion?" "In a word," he concluded, "destroy our cotton and 
you sever the tendon Achilles of the war— there can be no fur­
ther progression; the sword of the warrior will drop from his
35c. R. Dickson to Jefferson Davis, June 13, 15, 1863, 
Jefferson Davis Correspondence, Duke University, Durham, 
North Carolina.
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hand . . . our Country will be no m o r e . "36
Beginning fairly early in the war period, then, in its 
official policies, the Confederate Government appeared deter­
mined to pursue a path of narrow self-interest, disregarding 
Somewhat the physical and psychological needs of Mississippi's 
citizens. Minor irritations, normal between two governmental 
units in wartime, seemed magnified in the disturbed condi­
tions which prevailed in Mississippi. Fights over control 
of troops, civil rights controversies, monopolization of the 
state's railroads, impressment abuses, the continuance of a 
drastic cotton burning policy— all combined to create in 
Mississippi wide-spread distrust in and disgust for Confeder­
ate programs generally. Dislike for one or more Confederate 
policy decisions caused many Mississippians, though loyal to 
the Confederate ideal, to turn in dismay from further sup­
port for Confederate policy in practice. Somehow, in carry­
ing out their government's programs, the Confederate repre­
sentatives in Mississippi managed to alienate about everybody 
in one way or another, and although a great number continued 
to lend support to the Confederate war effort, such support 
was being offered more grudgingly as the war dragged on.
As a final humiliation causing innumerable Mississippians 
to turn forever from any further support for the Confederacy, 
the Northern-born commander of Confederate forces at Vicks-
A. Ventress to Charles Clark, February 6, 1864,
Ser. E., Vol. 65.
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burg, General John C. Pemberton, surrendered his entire army 
to Federal General U. S. Grant, thereby yielding the last 
significant Confederate fortress in Mississippi. Adding to 
the defeat at Vicksburg, Jackson fell to Federal forces in 
1863 also, forcing state officials to begin a nomadic exist­
ence for the remainder of the war.3?
In short. Confederate policies demanded great sacrifices 
on the part of the Southern people, and in Mississippi at 
least it appeared, offered almost nothing in return. Conse­
quently, Mississippians increasingly turned away from any­
thing to do with the Confederates, including taking their 
money. Even in the matter of finances. Confederate authori­
ties seemed determined to pursue a program of self-defeat.
For example, at a time when many Mississippi merchants began 
to accept Confederate money only with reluctance, and then 
at a discount ranging from fifty to ninety per cent, the Con­
federate treasury officials themselves admitted that counter­
feiting of their notes had become so prevalent that Secretary 
Memminger felt compelled to make special provision for the 
replacement of large portions of some Confederate i s s u e s . ^8 
Due to the Confederate’s seeming distrust of their own issues, 
several Mississippi merchants simply refused to accept certain 
of these notes. C. A. Dubissen addressed a communication to
. ^^Francis V. Greene, The Mississippi (New York, 1882), 
pp. 143-150.
38Todd, Confederate Finance, pp. 98-100.
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Memminger in February, 1863, advising the Secretary that some 
"of the leading merchants of Yazoo City have refused to take 
Treasury notes of the Hoyer & Ludwig plate; others, following 
their example, also refused, and this class of notes have 
ceased to be currency."39 In this instance particularly, 
Confederate policy fostered bad feelings among local resi­
dents, for the paymasters continued dispersing those types 
of notes which the merchants rejected, and the Confederates 
themselves then refused either to provide agencies where the 
notes could be exchanged for goods or other, more acceptable 
issues. For soldiers subsisting on fifteen dollars per month—  
when a single pair of shoes cost twice that amount— being 
forced to take what amounted to worthless notes creates seri­
ous problems of morale in the ranks.^0
For some, reasons for refusing to have anything fur ; >r 
to do with Confederate money went much deeper than the mere 
fact that most of such money either passed at large discounts, 
or not at all. Mississippians, in their own minds, connected 
all the Confederate programs— military, social, as well as 
strictly economic— together, and basing their decision upon 
this combination of factors, denied further support for any 
of these policies. "I have taken this abuse at their hands 
as long as patience will allow," W. L. Copeland declared in
3®C. A. Dubissen to C. G. Memminger, February 19, 1863, 
in Thian, Correspondence, Appendix V, p. 26.
40lbid.; W. J. Taylor to C. G. Memminger, April 2, 1863,
in Ibid., p. 72.
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October, 1863. "Those rascally conscript renegades hound ray 
neighbors, raen representing theraselves as impressraent offi­
cers run off ray stock, steal ray horses, and throw down ray 
fences. Now they offer rae a paltry pittance in their filthy 
rags in return, not one of which is worth the paper and ink 
used in its.ill-begotten manufacture. No by God, I ’ve had 
it."41
And so had a lot of other Mississippians "had it." Of 
course, not all of the increasing disaffection raanifested 
in the later war years could be blamed on obstinate, arbi­
trarily-administered Confederate programs, but these certain­
ly contributed significantly to the growing mood of despair 
and defeat. "At Brandon, Canton, and Jackson all act as 
though the thing were ended," Federal General William T. 
Sherman reported in July, 1863, after the fall of Mississip­
pi's capital c i t y . 42 indeed "the thing was ended" for a lot 
of the state’s citizens who reluctantly concluded, with the 
fall of Vicksburg and Jackson in Mississippi, and the Confed­
erate defeat at Gettysburg, that the Confederacy was doomed 
to failure.
As realistic hope for victory receded, more and more 
Mississippians turned to a search for peace in the midst of 
war. Mississippi soldiers by the thousands, disgusted with 
the failure of either state or Confederate authorities to
41w. L. Copeland to Pettus, October 10, 1863, Ser. E ., 
Vol. 61, MDAH.
42Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 24, pt. 2, pp. 530-531,
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provide adequate sustenance for their families, simply left 
their commands, returned home to seek supplies to prevent 
starvation, and refused to return to the army when summoned. 
Early in 1863, General Gideon Pillow, acting under orders 
from General Joseph E. Johnston, moved into the northern part 
of the state, and commenced a massive man-hunt for these de­
serters, Pillow's tactics, which some compared to a steam­
roller, caused even greater consternation among the populace 
than the presence of the deserters, with the result that the 
War Department in Richmond ordered him to cease his opera­
tions.43 Southwestern Mississippi also harboured "swarms of 
deserters" in such numbers as would require, according to one 
estimate, "a good force of well-disciplined cavalry to get 
back into the a r m y . "44 Following the debacle at Vicksburg in 
July, even greater numbers deserted the army, and returned 
to their homes, disgusted with their Confederate commanders. 
Desertion became so commonplace that by August, one conscript 
officer estimated the number of men absent without leave from 
the army in Mississippi alone to be about five thousand.45 
Deserters received considerable encouragement from Mis­
sissippi Unionists representing the upper social classes. Fol­
lowing the fall of Vicksburg and the loss of Jackson, several 
of these Unionists, among them Judges'William Yerger and Wil-
43Ibid., Ser. 4, Vol. 2, pp. 403-404.
44ibid. , Ser. 1, Vol. 52, pt. 2, p. 493.
45%bid., Ser. 4, Vol. 2, p. 717.
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liam Sharkey, met in Jackson to discuss plans to organize a 
peace party in the state. General Sherman actively encour­
aged their efforts, and urged General Grant to allow him to 
give substantial rations to "some 800 women and children" at 
Jackson who would "perish unless they received some relief." 
Grant agreed, and Sherman reported with pride that their plan 
to use this gift of provisions to further encourage the pre­
vailing dissatisfaction of the people with the Confederates 
appeared to be succeeding. "I profess to know nothing of 
politics," Sherman asserted, "but I think we have here an 
admirable wedge which may be encouraged. . . .  If prominent 
men in Mississippi admit the fact of being subdued, it will 
have a powerful effect all over the South."46
In addition to the destitute who deserted in great num­
bers, and those Mississippians like Sharkey and ex-Governor 
A. G. Brown who actually took the oath of allegiance to the 
United States in the summer of 1863,47 many wealthy planters 
in the river counties felt secure enough to openly express 
the Unionist sentiments which they claimed to have repressed 
earlier. Lavish parties were arranged in the homes of these 
planters, where such notables as Grant and Sherman were feted.46 
In return, the Federal officers granted their protection to
46lbid., Ser. 1, Vol. 24, pt. 2, p. 531.
47james W. Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi (New 
York, 1901), pp. 51-53.
48Marshall and Evans, They Found it in Natchez, pp. 162-
167.
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the property of these planters, offering to establish regular 
trading posts in the area if either Confederate General Jo­
seph E. Johnston or President Davis would agree that no "Con­
federate soldiers or guerrillas will operate west of Pearl 
River."49
Confederate policy in regard to impressment, railroads, 
civil rights, troop control, confiscation of private property, 
and cotton burning all contributed significantly to a great 
decline in support for the Confederacy among Mississippians 
by 1863. Since Confederate currency formed so vital a part 
of the overall Southern program, when Mississippians rejected 
so many of their other policies, they also rejected Confed­
erate money. Thus, when a growing number of Mississippians 
refused to accept Confederate currency, that currency fell 
in value. The fate of fiscal policies, in other words, fell 
in the estimation of the people along with other programs 
not directly related to money matters. As a result, there 
occurred a widespread return to barter among Mississippians—  
including trading with the enemy, who appeared the only source 
of so many necessary articles in the later war years.
49pfficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 24, pt. 2, p. 531
CHAPTER IX 
THE ADVENT OF SERIOUS DISILLUSIONMENT
A main cause of the deteriorating morale which became 
so evident among Mississippians by late 1863, involved seri­
ous confrontations between Confederate and state authorities. 
Yet Mississippians expressed a growing dissatisfaction as 
well with some policies carried out by state officials. Af­
ter all, Pettus, like the Confederates, resorted to the al­
ways unpopular expedient of impressing both slaves and sup­
plies to meet defense needs. Also, the inability of state 
officers to arrange for the importation of necessities, par­
ticularly salt, led a number of citizens to seek their own 
avenues of supply— which meant trading with the enemy. This 
humiliating necessity promoted the introduction of Federal 
money, commonly known as greenbacks, into Mississippi, which 
tended to further undermine both state and Confederate cur­
rency. Thus scarcity of essentials, coupled with the almost 
daily decline in the value of Confederate money boosted in­
flation. With inflation came greater opportunities for col­
lecting huge profits, which led to more speculation. This 
deadly cycle, which achieved significant proportions in 1862, 
grew to vigorous maturity during the third year of the war,
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and continued unabated until the end of the conflict.
Neither Confederate nor Mississippi officials resorted 
to direct confiscation of property belonging to Southerners 
loyal to the Confederate cause during the Civil War. Yet in 
operation, the policy of impressment came very close to con­
fiscation in that it was occasionally used as a tool to "pun­
ish" those even suspected of disloyalty. At best, it proved 
unfair in that the general policy of impressment agents 
seemed to involve obtaining goods and slaves from those who 
resided nearest to military camps or along main lines of com­
munication and transportation. Other avenues for abuse were 
opened when wide discretion was allowed low-ranking officers 
charged with actually collecting the impressed property. These 
officers were sometimes guided by motives of jealousy and per­
sonal prejudices rather than a sense of fairness.!
The impressment law passed by the Mississippi legisla­
ture in January, 1863, provided rather strict guidelines re­
garding the mode of impressment, payment for goods or slaves 
impressed and otherwise stated clearly the conditions under 
which such items might be taken and used for purposes of state 
defense.2 Yet, almost immediately complaints started coming 
into the Governor’s office, relating instances of overt par­
tiality shown by the impressment agents operating in the
!por a general discussion Qf impressment see Coulter, 
The Confederate States of America, pp. 251-253, 258-260; Ows­
ley, State Rights in the Confederacy, p. 219ff.
%Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), pp. 81-86.
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field. In some instances the main objection was that the 
agents simply impressed slaves and other necessities from 
those in the community whom the agents disliked, leaving
O
others completely undisturbed. In some cases, however, the 
agents appeared to have far overstepped their actual authori­
zation, and proceeded to impress as much property as whim 
suggested, rather than abiding by the actual instructions of 
state officials. Richard T. Archer, a planter of some stand­
ing in the state, complained to Pettus in February that the 
agent collecting property in his county resorted to the simple 
rule of impressing exactly twice as many slaves as were call­
ed for. Archer, obviously agitated over such tactics, vigor­
ously protested "against this illegal and despotic" practice. 
"Between the petty tyrannies of small sinecurists and specu­
lators both official and non-official the people are being 
ground under oppression," Archer explained to the Governor. 
Like most of his fellow planters, he concluded, he was willing 
to "suffer much for our beloved country, but it is unnecessary 
that we be oppressed to gratify avarice or m a l i c e .
Eventually, it became more and more difficult to get the
farmers and planters who formerly loaned their slaves willing­
ly to Confederate and Mississippi authorities to continue to
^M. L. McGuire and others to Pettus, March 23, 1863, Ser.
E. , Vol. 60; F. Dillard to Pettus, February 18, 1863, Ser. E., 
Vol. 59, MDAH.
-Richard T. Archer to Pettus, February 25, 1863, Ser. E.,
Vol. 59, MDAH.
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do so. O. P. Anderson, Sheriff in Goodman, informed Pettus 
of some of the main reasons for this change in attitude to­
ward impressment. According to Anderson, the county had 
been "under impressment" since the preceeding fall, and the 
people now wanted their hands at home to help in spring plant­
ing. Equally important however, the Sheriff reported, was 
the fact that those slaves already impressed often returned 
home maimed or sick from lack of attention or outright abuse 
at the hands of military officers put in charge of overseeing 
the labor of slaves. Given this state of affairs, Anderson 
informed the Governor, the only way additional slaves could 
be impressed from his county involved the use of an armed 
possee.5
As the spring of 1863 dragged on, Pettus changed his 
tactics from force to persuasion, due mainly to the fact that 
his agents repeatedly returned from impressment searches 
empty-handed. One state militia officer reported to Pettus 
in May that he and his men rode for three days, without find­
ing a single horse fit for service. This resulted from a 
dual situation: first, volunteer drives and repeated impress­
ment forays had literally drained the state of livestock, and 
more importantly for state efforts, the Confederate agents 
usually paid cash on the spot for horses impressed, while the 
state officers could but issue warrants, and leave it up to
^0. P. Anderson to Pettus, March 22, 1863, Ser. E.,
Vol. 60, MDAH.
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the owner to collect when and how he could.® Cognizant of 
such practices, Pettus changed his methods when the state 
capital appeared imminently threatened in early May. He 
issued a simple appeal to the "patriotism of the people as 
no impressment is deemed necessary." Pettus made it very 
clear his "appeal" should receive due attention, however, as 
his proclamation carried the warning that the "names of those 
who fail to respond . . . will be handed to me."?
This change in tactics proved a fortuitious one, as 
people again forwarded tn^ir slaves and other property to 
Jackson to aid in the construction of fortifications about 
the city.® Still, serious harm resulted from impressment 
practices of both Confederate and state agents during and 
after 1863. Originally, both the governmental units resorted 
to impressment as a substitute for additional taxes, yet the 
end result proved very detrimental as in practice impressment 
antagonized a great number of Mississippians, and contributed 
to a further loss of confidence by the average citizen in 
the sagacity of this particular state and Confederate program. 
Opposition became so widespread by December that the Missis­
sippi legislature took decisive action to at least curb some 
of the abuses so prevalent in the matter of impressed prop-
®P. Henry to Pettus, May 1, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 61, MDAH.
^"Proclamation of Governor Pettus," May 3, 1863, Execu- 
tive Journal, p. 387, MDAH.
®H. C. Bennett to Pettus, May 5, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 61; 
Canton /Mississippi/ Tri-Weekly Citizen, December 1, 1863.
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erty. The more stringent legislative enactment made the im­
pressment of private homes dependent upon the owner’s con­
sent, and extended the prescribed time limitations for bring­
ing court action to recover property. The law further re­
quested the governor to intervene when possible to prevent 
illegal seizures by Confederate officials, and provided heavy 
penalties for violating Mississippi's own laws with regard 
to impressment. Finally, the legislature demanded that Con­
federate authorities make a reasonable settlement of all out­
standing claims of Mississippi citizens against the Richmond 
Government for property impressed.®
While impressment practices produced a critical shortage 
on many farms and plantations of labor, tools, and livestock, 
the scarcity of other items proved just as productive of dis­
content among the state’s people. Chief among the absolutely 
necessary items which practically disappeared early in the 
war was salt. This element not only made the meagre diet en­
joyed by most Mississippians more palatable, but was essen­
tial in the curing of meat, especially bacon which formed a 
basic staple of consumption of most of the state’s population, 
regardless of social standing or relative wealth. Although 
initially state officials were expected to furnish salt, this 
staple was one that the people determined to have, regardless 
of the source.10
^Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), pp. 106-107, 129-138, 
156, 226, 228.
lOoarner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, p. 46; M. M.
Fortinberry to Pettus, December 1, 1862, Ser. E., Vol. 56.
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Placing it above all other necessities, Pettus declared 
in December, 1862, that the "most pressing want of our people 
at the present time is a supply of salt." He had dispatched 
agents to Virginia, Alabama, and Louisiana the previous sum­
mer in an effort to locate an adequate supply, but except 
for the mission to Louisiana, they failed u t t e r l y . A u g u s t i n  
Chein, whom Pettus sent to New Iberia, Louisiana, reported to 
the Governor that most of the salt presently being produced 
in that state was being consumed by its own citizens, and 
that in addition, prices asked on the little available for 
export far exceeded Mississippi’s ability to pay.^^ Nonpulsed, 
Pettus dispatched Captain D. S. Pattison about a month later, 
together with $20,000 and a steamboat with which to attempt 
to purchase and transport some salt from the Louisiana mines. 
Pattison succeeded in procuring a boatload of the precious 
salt, but upon his return voyage, was stopped by Confederate 
agents, who warned that he and his cargo stood in imminent 
danger of capture by Federal gunboats. While Pattison could 
probably have completed his journey unharmed if allowed to go 
unmolested by these Confederate agents, they managed to delay 
his departure from the bayou where he was detained until Fed­
eral boats indeed proceeded to blockade the mouth of the chan­
nel. Despite this unexpected turn of events, Pattison smuggled
llMississippi House Journal (December, 1862), p. 10.
l^Ella Lonn, Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy (New 
York, 1933), pp. 92-93.
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forty thousand pounds of his precious cargo out of the bayou 
and into Vicksburg, where it was distributed to the desti­
tute.13
Although he contracted with a Mississippi firm to manu­
facture salt from a small mine in central Mississippi, Pet­
tus determined to prosecute his search for adequate supplies 
f u r t h e r . 14 He asked and the legislature granted permission 
in January, 1863, to use $500,000 of the Military Fund to 
purchase salt— if it could be found anywhere. Using a portion 
of these funds, Pettus also sent an agent into Alabama to try 
to buy salt there, but although contracts were entered into, 
they were never fulfilled.15
Meanwhile in the fall of 1862, Pettus conceived the idea 
of trading cotton directly for salt. Planters throughout the 
state, believing the Governor would be able to consumate this 
plan, rushed to Jackson, eager to supply the needed cotton 
in exchange for salt. But in this instance also, the Confed­
erate authorities stepped in and refused to allow the exchange, 
Pettus appealed directly to Jefferson Davis to have mercy on 
starving Mississippians and allow the trading to proceed, but 
the Confederate President, having sent Pettus* letter to Se­
cretary of War George W. Randolph for his opinion, upheld the 
latter*s assertion that such trading constituted a breach of




the Constitution, and forbade Pettus to carry out his scheme.^®
Although chagrined by Davis’ negative attitude, Pettus 
proceeded nevertheless to contract with a French citizen, 
Adolphus Minnet, to furnish the latter with cotton to be ship­
ped to some European port and there exchanged for salt. Con­
federate authorities again stepped in and ordered this opera­
tion stopped, which brought a temporary halt to state efforts 
to obtain salt.l? When this happened, it appeared to many 
Mississippians that the only remaining recourse was to open 
trade with the Fédérais in the area.
Thus because of the intransigence of Confederate offi­
cials and the inability of state authorities to effectively 
circumvent such obstructionist policies, illicit trade with 
the enemy received considerable impetus. Some people first 
resorted to digging up the packed earth forming the floor of 
their smoke houses and boiled the dirt, thereby obtaining a 
quantity of useable salt, but when this source dried up, an­
other had to be f o u n d . S i n c e  cotton represented the one 
product owned by most Mississippians which the Fédérais de­
sired, and since the latter willingly furnished salt, clothing, 
and even food in exchange for it, trade with the hated "aboli-
iGpfficial Records, Ser. 4, Vol. 2, p. 126; J. G. Carro- 
way to Pettus, October 16, 1862, Ser. E;, Vol. 56.
^^"Contract,” in favor of Adolphus Minnet, signed by 
Pettus, Ser. E., Vol. 56, MDAH; Mississippi House Journal (No­
vember, 1863), p. 94.
ISWailes, Diary, August 28, 29, 1862; Bettersworth, 
Confederate Mississippi, p. 155.
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tionist hoards" became a commonplace occurence in Missis­
sippi by 1863. This represented no easy matter to those 
loyal Confederates who had for decades nurtured a festering 
hatred for people in the North. Most Mississippians would 
sacrifice a great deal to remain faithful to the Confederate 
cause, but there existed a point beyond which even dedicated 
Southerners refused to go.^^ For most, that point was the 
verge of actual starvation and physical discomfort incurred 
from lack of proper nurishment and clothing. In the case of 
some, trade with the enemy proved easy to justify ui a num­
ber of grounds, including widespread loss of confidence in 
the possibility of a Confederate victory, disillusionment 
with Confederate and state officials who appeared utterly in­
capable of defending their property against constant raiding, 
and the absolute impossibility of obtaining necessary articles 
within the Confederacy.^® For Unionists, whose numbers were 
continually augmented throughout the war period, trading with 
the Fédérais was not looked upon as either a moral or physical 
dilemma, but rather embraced as a welcome relief from the
F . Meek to Mamie Meek, March 21, 1863, Samuel M.
Meek and Family Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History, Jackson, Mississippi; Natchez Courier, March 17, 
1863; Alexander B. Swanson to Maris Swanson, December 8, 1863, 
Swanson Family Papers,. Mississippi Department of Archives and 
History, Jackson, Mississippi; 0. J. E. Stuart to Secretary 
of War, January 10, 1863, Mayes-Demitry-Stuart Papers, Missis­
sippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, 
0. J. E. Stuart to General Joseph E. Johnston, January 10,
1863, in Ibid,; M. M. Fortinberry to Pettus, December 1, 1862, 
Ser. E., Vol. 56; Moses Jordan to Pettus, January 23, 1863,
Ser. E., Vol. 59; W. M. Haley to Pettus, March 7, 1863, Ser.
E., Vol. 60, MDAH.
2®Moses Jordan.to Pettus,January 23, 1863, Ser. E., Vol.
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scarcity which stalked the Confederacy.^^
Opinion towards the growing illegal trade appeared di­
vided in the higher circles of command in and around Missis­
sippi by early 1863. General Pemberton, in command of Con­
federate forces at Vicksburg, frequently reported to his 
superiors in the War Department that real necessity caused 
a great number of Mississippians to trade with the enemy, and 
since this could not be stopped, he urged a policy of tacit 
non-interferency.22 General L. L. Polk, also operating in 
the area in 1863, favored going so far as to license the 
illegal traffic, on the grounds that such a move would help 
in the fight to defeat inflation and speculation. In a con­
fidential letter to Confederate General Wirt Adams, Polk 
advised the latter to "see that the Yankees get cotton now 
and then, but not faster than suits our p u r p o s e s . " ^ 3
In some instances at least, Richmond authorities agreed 
with the policy line suggested by Pemberton, Polk, and others. 
One confederate soldier reported receiving orders directly from 
the Secretary of War to escort a train load of cotton to Fed-
59, MDAH; 0. J. E. Stuart to General Joseph E. Johnston, Janu­
ary 10, 1863, Mayes-Dimitry-Stuart Papers; Mrs. B. Beaumont, 
Twelve Years of My Life, pp. 207-208.
BlAughey, Tupelo, pp. 91-92.
^^Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 52, pt. 2, pp. 453-454, 
460, 4631
B^Ibid., Ser. 4, Vol. 2, p. 242; Schwab, Industrial and 
Finanacial History, p. 263; Samuel J . Bartlett to Mary S. Bart- 
lett, September 22, 1863, Bartlett-Basore Papers, Folder 6, 
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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eral gunboats in Lake Maurepas, where it was intended to 
trade it for medicines and other s u p p l i e s . T h i s  policy 
seems never to have been adopted generally, however, as re­
quests by substantial citizens to be allowed trading privi­
leges with Federal authorities in New Orleans were denied.
Pettus and other state officials discouraged trading 
with the enemy, although they realized how widespread the 
practice had become. The Governor was willing to engage in 
such illicit trade as long as it fell under the control of 
state officials, and for limited objectives, but in principle 
disapproved of such activities being carried out p r i v a t e l y .26 
Brigadier General James Z. George of the Mississippi militia 
reported to Pettus in late March, 1863, that considerable con­
traband trade existed with Memphis, and urged Pettus to use 
his authority to suppress it. George complained that the 
military authorities in north Mississippi had adopted a rule 
which actually encouraged the trade by exempting from seizure 
goods which though evidently brought through the lines, had 
been purchased within the Confederate territory. This rule 
meant, according to George, that speculators "and traitors" 
went into Memphis, bought Federal goods with cotton, trans­
ported them through Confederate lines, then quickly sold them 
to a middleman, thus meeting the requirement that the goods
B^McCain and Capers, eds., Papers of the Washington 
Historical Society, p. 187.
25o .J.E. Stuart to General Joseph E. Johnston, January 
10, 1863, Mayes-Dimitry-Stuart Papers.
26This is evidenced by Pettus' plea to Jefferson Davis 
to allow the trading of cotton for salt in the winter of 1862.
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had been bought within the Confederacy. Then the goods could 
be parceled out at leisure to anyone who brought cotton to 
the trading posts, with no danger of confiscation by Confed­
erate officers.27
Such practices, born of necessity and fostered by greed, 
avarice and disloyalty acted to greatly demoralize Missis­
sippians. Reasons for the trade, though often sufficient in 
the minds of the participants, proved very harmful to Confed­
erate and state financial measures. Anything which adversely 
effected already low morale consequently lessened respect for 
and faith in the Confederacy. This was especially true in 
Mississippi after the fall of Vicksburg, when a great number 
of Mississippians believed defeat imminent; therefore it 
seemed foolish, if not downright criminal, to sacrifice the 
health and wellbeing of their families needlessly. Under 
such conditions, anything which aided the fight to survive 
appeared justified— including trading with the hated enemy, 
deserting the army, and refusing to pay taxes to the Missis­
sippi or Richmond Governments.28
Matters of finance were inextricably involved in all 
these perplexing questions of inflation, speculation, illegal 
trade, scarcity and disloyalty. With the fate of the Con-
27james Z. George to Pettus, March 24, 1863, Ser. E., 
Vol. 60, MDAH.
28Beaumont, Twelve Years of My Life,, p. 207; Moses Jor­
dan to Pettus, January 23, 1863; J. Fleming to Pettus, Feb­
ruary 1, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 59, MDAH.
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federacy itself increasingly evident, upholding the value of 
practically worthless money based on nothing more substantial 
than faith, hope, and a "promise to pay two years after the 
end of the war" hardly appeared reason enough for accepting 
Confederate currency. And since if the Confederacy collapsed 
so too would the Mississippi government founded under its pro­
tection, the state issues also fluctuated according to the 
shifting tide of Confederate fortunes. Then there remained 
the problem of the increasing flow of Federal greenbacks into 
the state as the volume of trade picked up sharply after the 
fall of Vicksburg and Jackson in 1863. This "contraband 
money" rose in value even as those issues of the Confederacy 
and Mississippi fell c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y . ^9 This situation led 
to increasing inflation, which caused an astronomical rise 
in prices in the third year of the war, both in Mississippi 
and throughout the South.
As the Confederate financial structure began to crumble 
in 1863, Mississippians renewed their earlier efforts to 
persuade the Confederate Congress to make fuller use of the 
immense amounts of cotton stored in the South. In January,
^^Beaumont, Twelve Years of My Life, p. 207.
S^Riley, éd., "Diary of a Mississippi Planter," p. 481; 
Louisa M. Blyot to Pettus, April 15, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 60, 
MDAH; Jackson Crisis, January 15, 1863; Natchez Courier, 
February 26, 1863; Jackson Mississippian, March 11, 1863.
For a treatment of prices throughout the South generally dur­
ing the war, see John C. Schwab, "Prices in the Confederate 
States, 1861-1865," Political Science Quarterly, XIV (1899), 
pp. 281-304.
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1863, Confederate Senator James Phelan of Mississippi intro­
duced a bill in Congress which would provide for the seizure 
of all cotton in the South, to be paid for at the rate of 
fifteen cents per pound in Confederate bonds. This would 
end speculation and illegal trading in cotton, as well as 
bolster the seriously sagging Confederate financial structure. 
Congress, however, rejected Pehlan's plan, though the legi­
slators did continue the produce loan and even obtained some 
foreign credit on cotton already hypothecated.31
In Mississippi, the movement urging a fuller use of cot­
ton gained new momentum as Confederate and state financial 
programs faltered. Gray A. Chandler, an outspoken advocate 
of the use of cotton as a financial basis, published in the 
winter of 1862 a Letter on the Currency and Public Debt of 
the Confederate States. His main argument urged immediate 
funding of the Confederate debt, and like Phelan, he advocated 
the purchase by the Richmond Government of the South's cotton 
stores.32 Throughout the state, newspapers picked up Gray’s 
argument, and pleaded for a currency based upon cotton. "Cot­
ton is the peer of gold," the Jackson Mississippian asserted, 
and the "value of our currency compared with cotton, is nearer 
the truth than its value compared with the gold that is now 
in this country."33
3%atchez Courier, February 25, 1863; Jackson Crisis, 
February 21, 1863.
qo
Gray A. Chandler, Letter on the Currency and Public 
Debt of the Confederate States (Columbus, 1863).
33jackson Mississippian, April 9, 15, 1863; Natchez
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Rejecting all pleas to reexamine their financial struc­
ture, which by July, 1863, was circulating notes which gen­
erally passed at a discount of around ninety per cent of their 
face value,Confederate treasury officials instead attempted 
to check the downward slide of the currency by funding mea­
sures. In March, 1863, the Congress passed a compulsory 
funding measure by which it hoped to revitalize the sagging 
currency. By the terms of this act, all Confederate non-in­
terest bearing notes, dated before December 1, 1862, were to 
be funded in eight per cent bonds until April 22, 1863. After 
the latter date, these notes could be exchanged only for seven 
per cent bonds until August 1, and after that date, they could 
only be utilized in paying debts to the Confederate Govern­
ment. In addition to these stringent measures, the act pro­
vided that all notes issued after December 1, 1862, and. be­
fore April 6, 1863, must be funded in seven per cent Confed­
erate bonds prior to the first of August; after then, only 
four per cent bonds could be obtained in exchange for this 
class of notes.35 gy these measures, the Confederate offi­
cials hoped to withdraw from circulation some of the more 
worthless of their issues, and at the same time, force people 
to accept the Confederate bonds. Since these bonds need not
Courier, February 25, 1863.
34carroll and others. Historical Sketches of Oktibbha 
County, p. 107.
35xodd, Confederate Finance, pp. 70-72.
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be redeemed immediately, the treasury officers were in ef­
fect buying time in which to stabilize their currency. How­
ever, continuing their standard policy of undermining their 
own programs, the funding measure also allowed treasury agents 
to issue up to $50,000,000 in new notes each month, thereby 
nullifying any positive effects compulsory funding might have 
had on the depreciated Confederate currencies.^®
In addition to compulsory funding measures, the Confed­
erate Congress in 1863 resorted to taxation, which it had 
earlier rejected as a major policy direction. In April, 1863, 
a new tax measure passed the Congress which provided for a 
direct eight per cent levy on all real and personal property, 
an income tax, a graduated tax on professional license fees, 
an assessment on profits realized from the wholesale traffic
in provisions, and a tax in kind on a tenth of the total agri-
37cultural production of 1863. These tax measures, coming 
as they did at a time when taxes were already excessively bur­
densome, particularly state and local taxes, dealt a severe 
blow to most Mississippians. In fact, Mississippi still owed 
some $200,000 in previously assessed Confederate taxes. Then 
in the summer of 1863, Vicksburg fell to Federal attacks, 
thereby removing the last significant commercial center in 
the state from the control of state officials. Further, the 
Gulf Coast, all the river counties, and most of northern
36Ibid., p. 71.
37public Laws of the Confederate States of America, Sec, 
1, pp. 115-126; Todd, Confederate Finance, pp. 140-142.
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Mississippi were in the hands of the Fédérais, making tax 
collections in those areas practically impossible. As a 
consequence of these factors, the new Confederate taxation 
measures proved especially difficult for Mississippians to 
obey.38
In their zeal to collect the additional tax levies. Con­
federate agents, who appeared to one harrassed Mississippian 
like an "army of Barnacles" sent in "swarms like the locusts 
of Egypt," contributed to even greater inflation of prices. 
These agents, anxious to collect their commissions, "offered 
four prices" for articles wanted by the Confederacy, with the 
result that "from that hour that article was raised to that 
price to every poor family in the land!" Merchants and farm­
ers, quick to perceive the opportunity thus presented for 
raising their profit margin, held on to their goods, trying 
to drive the prices up even higher.39
Once Mississippians generally caught on to what was 
happening as a result of the Confederate tax measures, par­
ticularly the tax in kind, complaints and suggestions for 
remedial action poured into the Governor’s office. News­
papers reported that citizen groups were compiling a list of 
those guilty of extortion and speculation, ostensibly to be 
used after the war to bring justice upon these m i s c r e a n t s . 40
38Brough, "Taxation in Mississippi," pp. 189-190; Schwab, 
Confederate Finance, pp. 304-305; Official Records, Ser. 4, 
Vol. 2, pp. 328, 576.
39jackson Crisis, January 16, 1863.
40Natchez Courier, April 10, 1863; John G. Humphries to
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In some cases, outright confiscation of goods of the worst 
offenders was advocated.41 These efforts were scattered and 
sporadic however; the only really effective control over such 
circumstances must be brought about through legislative action,
When the Mississippi legislature convened in November, 
1863, Mississippi's position appeared a great deal changed 
from what it had been when the legislators gathered the previ­
ous December. Vicksburg and Jackson were lost. With the 
abandonment of the latter city, state officials began a no­
madic existence, first being shuttled to Enterprise, then 
Meridian, and finally to Macon. Even with these moves, often 
one jump ahead of the Federal armies, it proved impossible to 
collect all the state offices in Macon, which forced the legi­
slature to meet in Columbus. State records were scattered 
here and there in warehouses, which made the business of con­
ducting state affairs even more difficult.42 Despite these 
handicaps, the legislature managed to undertake the task of 
reforming the state’s financial programs with at least a 
modicum of success.
Of all the urgent problems facing Mississippians in the 
winter of 1863, the two most requiring the attention of the 
legislature were speculation and the overall financial struc­
ture. Pettus, who had not run for another term in the guber-
Pettus, June 13, 1863, Ser. E., Vol. 61, MDAH.
4lBettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 113. 
42Massissippi House Journal (November, 1863), p. 89.
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natorial election held earlier in the autumn, all but ignored 
both these matters in his final message to the legislature. 
Instead, he confined his remarks almost exclusively to sweep­
ing generalities, including generous blame for the failure 
of some of his programs on the state press and the people as 
a whole. He singled out "opposition of a part of the press" 
as a main cause of his failure to protect the state against 
Federal raiding parties. Had his efforts to organize the 
state troops only "received that support which . . .  I had 
a right to expect," Pettus grumbled, "the condition of Mis­
sissippi would now be much better than it is."'^^
The legislature, composed of more conservative men than 
any since the beginning of the war,44 followed Pettus' lead 
and refused to deal directly with the complex problems of 
inflation and speculation, on the grounds that such action 
would be "inexpedient and unconstitutional."45 At that point 
in time, those Mississippi officials labeled "conservative" 
represented a change from the "fireaters" who had led Missis­
sippi into conflict with the North. The conservative posi­
tion included less dependence upon blind rhetorical platitudes 
regarding the inevitability of a Confederate victory, and a
43ibid., p. 99.
44Lock E. Houston, a conservative, won election as 
speaker of the Mississippi House of Representatives, and in 
the election for Confederate Senator, a former Whig, J. W.
C. Watson was elected over the Democratic encumbent. Missis­




much greater emphasis instead upon actually taking care of 
the basic physical needs of the state's citizens. Conserva­
tive opinion regarded trading with the enemy, for example, 
as a valid means of replenishing the depleted supplies of a 
number of necessary articles, including salt and medicines.
Despite their failure to deal meaningfully with specu­
lation and inflation, the legislature passed a series of acts 
which, combined, altered considerably the existing financial 
structure. In relation to taxes, for instance, the legisla­
ture faced two problems ; relief for some Mississippians 
from burdensome tax assessments, and raising additional rev­
enue to meet increased state expenditures. Addressing the 
question of tax relief first, several acts were passed de­
signed to alleviate excessive tax burdens in some areas. Of 
special concern was relief for some twenty-four of Missis­
sippi's counties which lay wholly or in part behind enemy 
lines. The Confederate tax in kind law demanded the payment 
of cash where goods themselves could not be collected. Since 
it proved impractical for state tax agents to collect in those 
counties held by the Fédérais, the Mississippi legislature 
"resolved" to urge Congress to amend the tax in kind law "un­
til such time as . . . produce can be made available to the
Government.46
Even in counties ostensibly under the control of state 
and Confederate officers, inflation, speculation, and raiding
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), p. 109.
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forced the legislature to extend the time for collecting 
taxes for 1862.4? in addition, assessors were allowed extra 
time in which to prepare their rolls for 1863.48 %n some 
counties, collection of the levee taxes were suspended, while 
in all cases property seized by the enemy was exempt alto­
g e t h e r . 4 ®  Finally, while the legislature allowed the con­
demnation and sale of property upon which overdue taxes were 
not paid, it forbid such action in regard to property held 
by soldiers in the a r m y . ^ O
The legislature went further than mere tax relief in 
the serious matter of providing for the indigent families 
of soldiers. On December 2, a lengthy act was passed whereby 
the tax assessed for care of indigent families was raised to 
one hundred and fifty per cent of the regular state tax. In 
order to ease the burden such increased tax levies might 
create on those who possessed little cash, the law provided 
for a partial payment of this tax in produce and goods, in­
stead of money. To insure its fair distribution, commission­
ers were to be appointed in each county to administer these 
tax revenues.
With expanded aid in the forms of direct tax relief and
4 ? I b i d .
4 8 % b i d . , pp. 109-110. 
4 9 j b i d . , pp. 123-124. 
SOlbid., pp. 112-113. 
Sllbid., pp. 113, 117.
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increased assessments for the benefit of the indigent, Mis­
sissippi treasury officials urged the passage of a law pro­
viding for tax collections on a great number of items either 
presently exempt or lightly taxed. In response to this need, 
the legislature early in December, 1863, passed a measure 
which represented the first reworking of the tax structure 
since 1861. Confederate bonds, bills, and notes— all form­
erly exempt— were added to the list of taxable items. In 
addition, taxes were either instituted or increased on dozens 
of other items, including most classes of merchandise, whis­
key, livestock, slaves, carriages, theatres, bowling alleys,
52pianos, bridges, and ferries.
Having thus reorganized the state's tax structure the 
legislators turned to Mississippi's various currencies, with 
a view toward evaluating their success. The most popular 
issue continued to be the cotton money, long since subscribed 
in full and currently forming the most acceptable currency 
in the state.53 Resisting the temptation to issue additional 
amounts of these popular notes, the legislature determined to 
avoid the problem of overissue which plagued Confederate notes, 
and instead ordered burned any cotton notes which found their 
way into the treasury in redemption of cotton p l e d g e s . 54
In relation to the convention treasury notes, they too
52ibid., pp. 153-155.
53Mississippi House Journal (November, 1863), p. 97. 
54jiississippi Laws (November, 1863), p. 217.
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had been issued in the maximum amount authorized. Despite
the suspension of the special tax levied to pay the interest
on these notes, state officials determined to uphold the
integrity of this initial wartime issue. Accordingly, the
treasurer announced in November that about $304,610 of these
55notes had been redeemed. Then in December, Governor Clark 
issued a proclamation announcing that holders of any of this 
class of notes upon which interest had been due in June, 1862, 
could now receive their interest in s p e c i e . 56
The ’’Faith of the State” treasury note issue of January 
29, 1862, was not yet exhausted, therefore no particular 
action appeared necessary with regard to that fund. One prob­
lem in relation to redeeming these notes did, however, re­
ceive the attention of the legislature. It developed that 
while the original act authorizing these notes called for 
their redemption in eight per cent bonds, the exact form of 
the bonds was never decided upon. As a result of this negli­
gence, a number of these notes had collected in the state 
treasury, which could not reissue them since they remained 
unredeemed. Desirous of releasing these idle funds into 
circulation, as well as satisfying the demands by holders that 
they be redeemed as originally promised, the legislature set­
tled on a form for the bonds, and ordered that they be pre-
^^Bettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 115.
56"proclamation,” December 9, 1863, Executive Journal, 
p .  431.
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pared.57 This action served to both increase the amount of 
state notes in circulation, and strengthen public faith in 
the determination of state officials to uphold the credit of 
their treasury issues.
Although the legislature did not provide for any addi­
tional issue of its various notes, county boards of police 
did receive authorization to issue warrants to circulate as 
m o n e y . 58 In addition, the Columbus Life ai i General and the 
Mississippi Mutual Insurance Companies, both of which already 
possessed money-issuing privileges, received authority to is­
sue new notes to replace some of their earlier i s s u e s . 59 These 
laws, like that regarding funding the treasury notes, acted 
to increase the actual amount of currency circulating within 
the state.
One motive behind legislative enactments placing addi­
tional state-authorized notes into circulation involved a 
desire to replace some of the almost worthless Confederate 
currency which inundated the state. Despite the creation of 
societies in Mississippi pledged to receive Confederate money 
at par, coupled with legislative threats to impose heavy 
penalties on people who refused to do likewise, that parti­
cular currency continued to fall in value throughout the
5?Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), pp. 215-217. 
58ibid., p p .  119-120.
59lbid., pp. 184-185.
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S t a t e . GO Actually the legislature itself at least tacitly 
recognized the general valuelessness of Confederate money when 
it forbade the investment of school funds in such notes.
In a final effort to salvage something from the wreck 
of Confederate finances, the Mississippi legislature in one 
of the last acts of the 1863 session, urged the Confederate 
Congress to "retire from circulation the present outstanding 
Treasury notes," and issue new ones which would "be declared 
a legal tender."G^ But Memminger always opposed such a move 
as unnecessary, and never throughout the war period did Con­
federate currency receive even this token support it so des­
perately needed.G3
Altogether, 1863 proved a disastrous year for finance 
in Mississippi. Never after then did financial measures in­
augurated by either Confederate or Mississippi officials re­
ceive anything approaching general acceptance, but rather 
these structures continued to crumble at an increasing rate 
until the end of the war. This was in consequence of a num­
ber of factors, some of which Mississippi officials could 
have dealt with meaningfully; but it resulted more from poli­
cies and incidents over which state authorities exercised
GOt . Otis Baker Diary, T. Otis Baker Papers, Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi; Mis­
sissippi Senate Journal (November, 1863), p. 117; Mississippi 
House Journal (November, 1863), p. 195.
^^Mississippi Senate Journal (November, 1863), pp. 127, 140.
G^Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), p. 234.
G^Todd, Confederate Finance, pp. 118-119.
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no control whatsoever. The legislature could have taken posi­
tive steps to curb the evils arising from unchecked inflation 
and speculation. Also, rather than entering into competition 
with Confederate loan, tax, and impressment agents, Pettus 
and the legislature could hrve instituted price controls, and 
enforced them with outright confiscation belnj the penalty 
for noncompliance.
In the matter of illegal trade with the enemy this too 
could have been strictly controlled by the state, .aid used 
to obtain necessary medicines, salt, and food, or it should 
have been forbidden altogether. As it stood, hot' Confeder­
ate and state officers sometimes ignored the trade, and in 
other instances extracted extreme penalties from those caught 
participating in it. This inconsistent policy contributed to 
a decline in respect for the integrity of both state and Con­
federate officials which combined with the loss of the last 
important Mississippi cities to the Federal armies in 1863, 
led to widespread dissatisfaction and disaffection. Thus, 
each area where Confederate or state officials actually did 
or even appeared to fail in their function as protectors of 
the rights and property of their citizens compounded the dif­
ficulty of the total war effort. In Mississippi, this 
general dissatisfaction manifested itself in a dramatic lead­
ership change which occurred in the fall elections. From 
November when the new administration took office, Mississippi 
assumed a rather different course for the remainder of its 
brief existence as a Confederate state.
CHAPTER X 
THE DOWNFALL OF A DREAM
Governor Pettus' final year in office proved a disastrous 
one for Mississippi. This did not result directly from the 
backwoods Governor's policies, but nevertheless the fall of 
Vicksburg and the reduction of vast portions of the state to 
neutral territory, traversed freely by Fédérais, Confederates, 
and deserters made the Governor appear largely to blame. The 
daughter of Pettus' successor expressed the resultant feeling 
of deep frustration when she asserted that a majority of the 
state's people were now convinced of "their mistake in being 
guided by the 'hot heads' who had led them into this disas­
trous war."l
Realizing the unpopularity of many of his programs, Pet­
tus refused to run for another term in office, leaving the 
field to several leading contenders. General Charles Clark, 
wounded at Shiloh and again near Baton Rouge, had retired 
from the service, crippled for life, and now determined to 
make the race for the governor's chair bn a conservative plat­
form, eschewing the fireating rhetoric which had led to the
1 Annie E. Jacobs, "The Master of Doro Plantation," p. 
92, quoted in Bettersworth, Confederate History, p. 51.
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institution pf policies inimical to the best interests of 
the state. Clark's campaign instead stressed the need to 
take care of families of wounded and dead soldiers, regard­
less of the means necessary to achieve this end. Other lead­
ing candidates included A. M. West and Reuben Davis, both of 
whom suffered from close identification with the Pettus ad­
ministration, particularly the latter's benighted militia 
policies. West, in addition, represented the old Whig party, 
while Davis was understood to be a fireating Democrat.^
When the votes were counted, Clark, the Delta planter- 
aristocrat won by a count of 16,428 to West's 4,863 and Davis' 
2,009. Clark's victory, coupled with the subsequent defeat 
of several fireating members of Congress, appeared a triumph
O
for conservatism in Mississippi. At that point, the con­
servative position differed from the "fireating Democrats" 
in that the former stressed much more moderate programs, in­
cluding for instance a compromise position on trading with 
the enemy. Also, Clark and the other conservatives elected 
in the fall of 1863 were willing to work more cooperatively 
with the Richmond Government in the areas of military cooper­
ation than had Pettus.
The same spirit of conservative cooperation which char­
acterized Clark's brief administration was also manifested
^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi, I 
(Chicago, 1891), p. 1094.
^Mississippi House Journal (November, 1863),-pp. 112-
114; Natchez Courier, October 23, 1863.
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in the newly-elected legislators who promptly installed Lock 
E. Houston, known to lean toward more conservative policies, 
as speaker of the house.^ Confederate Senator James Phelan, 
who among other activities had introduced a bill providing 
for the confiscation of all the South’s cotton crop in Con­
gress some months earlier, withdrew from the race for reelec­
tion when his strength in the new legislature dwindled to 
only eight votes at one point. Likewise, Samuel J. Gholson 
and John J. McRae, both fireating Democrats, went down to 
defeat in their bid for Congress at the hands of a conserva­
tive and former Unionist respectively.5 Clark’s programs, 
certainly more flexible in approach than those instituted by 
Pettus, received much vital support in the final depressing 
phase of Mississippi’s war effort as a result of the more 
conservative, traditional make-up of this last of Mississippi’s 
wartime legislatures.
Charles Clark— urbane, quiet spoken, and aristocratic—  
appeared the very antithesis of Pettus, the abrupt, tobacco- 
chewing former backwoods hunter. A well-educated man, Clark 
never firmly believed that secession represented the only 
honorable reaction to Northern aggression, but nevertheless 
fought valiantly in the Confederate service once hostilities 
erupted.® His inaugural speech clearly pointed up his deter-
^Mississippi House Journal (November, 1863), p. 85.
^Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi, I, 
p. 1094; Mississippi House Journal (November, 1863), pp. 141- 
151, 167-171.
^Russell, My Diary North and South, pp. 299-300, 308.
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mination to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion if 
possible, as failure would mean reconstruction in which, Clark 
assured his auditors, "we shall reach the climax of infamy."
To prevent such an eventuality, the new Governor suggested a 
plan designed to completely reorganize and upgrade the state's 
militia. But just as important in the Governor's comprehensive 
plan was a reworking of the state's financial structure. To 
achieve this latter goal, Clark actually suggested resorting 
to illegal trade with the enemy, if found necessary to pro­
cure vital medicines and cotton and wool cards. Then in Feb­
ruary, 1864, when the Confederate Congress instituted a forced 
funding act, Clark again demonstrated his determination to 
take care of the state's poor by recommending measures which 
appeared drastic, even in those troubled times.?
The Mississippi legislature, in an attempt to urge the 
Confederate Congress to take some positive action with regard 
to its rapidly-deteriorating financial structure, recommended 
in November, 1863, that the Confederate Treasurer call in all 
old, depreciated issues and replace them with new notes which 
would be made a legal tender.® While the Confederate offi­
cials refused to go as far as the Mississippi legislature de­
sired, it did pass a "forced" funding act in February, 1864. 
This represented the only really comprehensive reorganization
?Jacobs, "The Master of Doro Plantation," p. 56; Missis­
sippi House Journal (November, 1863), p. 159, 202-204; Mis­
sissippi House Journal (March, 1864), pp. 43-45.
SMississippi Laws (November, 1863), p. 234.
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of the Confederate treasury during the entire war. By the 
terms of this stringent piece of legislation, Confederate 
notes issued prior to the passage of the act of 1864 could 
be funded in a variety of ways, depending upon denomination. 
Notes of the denomination of one hundred dollars or more 
could be exchanged for four per cent bonds until the first 
of April, after which time they would be taxed one third of 
their face value, plus ten per cent, each month until they 
were either funded or worthless. Notes in the denomination 
of five dollars to one hundred dollars must be exchanged for 
four per cent, twenty-year bonds before April 1, after which 
they would be taxed one third face value until January 1, 1865. 
After the latter date, this class of notes would be taxed one 
hundred per cent. One advantage of this type of four percent 
bonds lay in their acceptance at Richmond for taxes— except 
the cotton export tax— throughout 1864. As for notes of less 
denomination than five dollars, they would be fundable at par 
until July 1, after which they would be taxed one third face 
value. They too could be exchanged, at their reduced rate, 
for notes of the new issue.®
The funding act of February 17, 1864 provided that the 
states could exchange their "old issue notes"— that is those 
issued prior to the date of the act— for "new issue notes," 
those provided by the terms of the act, any time prior to 
January 1, 1865, for six per cent, twenty-year bonds. If a
®Schwab, A Financial and Industrial History, p. 65
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state accepted any of the old issue notes after that date, 
according to the funding act, they would be discounted if 
presented for taxes just as if they emanated from private 
sources.10
Mississippi officials, determined to salvage whatever 
possible from the old issue Confederate notes deposited in 
the state treasury, immediately established depositories 
throughout the state to provide the necessary machinery for 
funding. Mississippians, rushing to these depositories to 
unload their depreciated Confederate currency before the 
April 1, deadline, inundated state treasury officials with 
so many of these notes that ultimately it became impossible 
to even count the money turned in. Receipts were hastily 
written out for funds received, with the counting postponed 
until later.11 Clark, determined to keep the inevitable loss 
resulting from this funding measure to a minimum, issued a 
circular to all the sheriffs throughout the state, urging 
them to hasten their collections lest they be caught after 
the deadline with the sharply depreciated Confederate issues.1^ 
Despite hiring special emissaries to deliver his notice, Clark 
discovered that a number of the sheriffs did not receive his 
instructions in time to meet the required date for their re­
demption. Fearing the effect such failure might have on the
iQjbid.; Todd, Confederate Finance, pp. 74-77.
H f . W. Williams to Memminger, April 2, 1864, in Thian, 
Correspondence, Appendix V, pp. 347-348.
12"Circular," Executive Journal (A), p. 431.
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already low morale of the state's citizens, Clark determined 
to call the legislature into special session to try and al­
leviate some of the severe problems created by the latest 
Confederate effort at currency reform.
Blaming the Confederate Congress for necessitating an 
extraordinary meeting of the Mississippi legislature, Clark 
made it very clear that while he felt many of the funding 
provisions ill-advised, he nevertheless believed that as long 
as such legislation remained in force, it must be obeyed.13 
Clark particularly pointed out the inadequacies of the pro­
posed six per cent bonds, observing that no arrangement was 
made for paying the interest thereon. Further, they were not 
receivable in payment of public dues, nor were they assign­
able. In other words, as far as their usefulness in meeting 
the debts of the state, or as investments drawing interest, 
they were useless, therefore undesirable. As for the four 
per cent bonds comtemplated in the "ill-digested" currency 
funding act, Clark pointed out that since they were taxable 
to the full extent of their interest, they too would be 
"worthless in the market" after January, 1865.14
Agreeing with Clark that the lack of proper communica­
tion would delay the reception by many county sheriffs of his 
circular, the legislature provided for the state treasury to 
accept the old issue notes for a month after the original
l^Mississippi Senate Journal (March, 1864), p. 7 
14jbid., pp. 7-8.
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deadline, provided the sheriff swore an oath that he had not
received Clark's notification prior to April 1.15 Cognizant
of the doubtfulness of the future worth of the six per cent
bonds, the legislature determined to rid itself of them as
soon as possible, and consequently authorized the Governor
to sell them on the open market for whatever he could get for
t h e m . 16 As for the four per cent bonds, the legislature also
agreed with Clark's estimation of their future value and
authorized the investment of only $400,000 in old issue notes
for this class of bond. The remainder of Mississippi's old
issue notes the legislature determined to exchange for notes
of the new issue, with the rest turned in for the highly un-
17desirable six per cent bonds.
Regardless of the distribution of its old issue notes 
relative to the alternatives presented by the forced funding 
act, Mississippi could only lose valuable money reserves in 
the transaction. Since this came at a time when increased 
levels of fighting daily added additional names to the length­
ening lists of indigent families of soldiers in the state, 
the only alternative appeared additional taxation. Although 
reluctant to increase the already heavy load on those still 
able to bear any taxes at all, Clark felt strongly that his 
and the legislature's first duty was to adequately provide 




method of replenishing the state treasury should only be 
utilized as a last resort, since Confederate taxes had re­
cently been raised considerably. In February, the Confed­
eracy placed taxes on solvent credits, corporation shares,
coin, bullion, gold and silver plate, and currency other
1 Athan Confederate which was not taxed already. Clark par­
ticularly felt the tax on solvent credits reprehensible, since 
he believed it would force what little industry existed in the 
Confederacy out of business. Thus despite his act, Clark re­
commended that the legislature refrain from levying additional 
taxes above an absolute minimum necessary to carry on vital 
programs within the state. Clark estimated that prudent spend­
ing would necessitate the raising of no more than $2,000,000 
for the coming fiscal year. To raise this needed revenue, the 
Governor suggested the issuance of half that sum in six per 
cent bonds, rather than a tax increase. That way, Clark point­
ed out, only those who could bear the additional burden need 
participate, leaving those too poor to buy bonds or pay taxes 
alone.
Although the Ways and Means Committee advised the full 
membership of the house to go along with Clark's s u g g e s t i o n ,  
the legislature instead authorized the Governor to reissue old
iSTodd, Confederate Finance, pp. 149-150.
^^Mississippi Senate Journal (March, 1864), pp. 9-11. 
^^Mississippi House Journal (March, 1864), pp. 114-117.
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"Faith of the State" treasury notes of the January 29, 1862 
issue, provided the executive felt such action absolutely 
necessary to meet outstanding state w a r r a n t s . T o  supple­
ment this possible source of revenue, the legislature also 
authorized the treasurer to have printed $500,000 in treasurer's 
"change warrants" as they came to be called. These notes were 
to be paid out upon demand in redemption of any other types 
of outstanding state treasurer's notes. As for their own re­
demption, no provision was contained in the law authorizing 
their issue, except that they would be "redeemed in current 
money when the sum of ten dollars" was presented. These notes 
were to be of twenty-five cents to three dollars denomination, 
thus readily useable as a change c u r r e n c y . 2%
While the legislature met in the spring of 1864, general 
conditions in war-torn Mississippi continued to deteriorate 
rapidly. Taxes could not be collected at all in some counties, 
while in others collectors were threatened if they attempted 
to carry out their assigned duties. G. W. Bradley, Sheriff 
of Perry County, reported to Clark in February that to attempt 
to collect state and county taxes would be "at the risk of my 
life." Deserters roamed the country freely, Bradley pointed 
out, and Confederate soldiers sent to arrest them neglected 
their duty in favor of "frolicking and s t e a l i n g . e . M.
^^Mississippi Laws (March, 1864), pp. 51-52.
22lbid., pp. 37-38.
M. Devall to Clark, March 21, 1864, Ser. E., Vol.
65, MDAH.
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Devall, Sheriff of Jones County reported similar conditions 
existed there, which prevented his collecting any of the taxes 
then due. According to Devall, deserters in his county held 
open meetings, and determined not to pay any taxes, either 
county, state, or Confederate. Furthermore, they constantly 
plundered warehouses sheltering government stores and produce 
collected under the tax in kind laws. Two government agents, 
the harried Sheriff reported, were shot and killed when they 
attempted to drive government stock out of the county.
Also despite the latest legislative efforts, aid to the 
destitute appeared unacceptably slow in reaching the needy 
in some areas of the state. The commissioners charged with 
obtaining and distributing supplies in some counties found 
such supplies impossible to locate and purchase. From Choctaw 
County came the report that the commissioners had "tried in 
vain to buy meat but they cannot for neither love nor money 
because it is not to be had in the country." This was due 
partly, according to one informant, to the Confederate tax in 
kind, which together with the impressment agents literally 
stripped the country of any meat, vegetables, or grain which 
might otherwise be obtained for the benefit of the destitute.
Throughout the spring and early summer of 1864, Missis­
sippi officials continued their efforts to supply the want
M. Devall to Clark, March 21, 1864, Ser. E., Vol.
65, MDAH.
B^The /Greensboro, Mississippi/ Southern Motive, May 7,
1864.
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of the state’s needy, particularly the distribution of funds 
as provided for by various statutes. Still, the Confederate 
treasury authorities constantly shifted the ground under their 
own financial schemes and eventually, it became impossible 
for Mississippi officials to distribute the money so desper­
ately needed by the destitute. The main reason for this in­
ability involved changes in the February funding act, which 
by alterations approved by the Congress in June, made it pos­
sible to exchange old issue Confederate notes for the new 
issue notes and four per cent bonds— rather than the much 
less desirable six per cent bonds as originally p r o v i d e d .
Since the state would lose less money by taking advantage of 
these changes in the law, Clark determined to hold Confeder­
ate old issue notes in the state treasury until the new Con­
federate bonds could be prepared. But such a course presented 
the Governor with a knotty problem; while he waited for the 
additional bonds to be prepared, the time came when state law 
demanded the distribution of about $600,000 to the destitute 
in Mississippi. Since the funds were collected specifically 
for distribution to the needy, and since the time for such 
distribution had arrived, Clark felt obliged to make such 
disbursement. Yet he could not dispense old issue Confeder­
ate notes, since they must be exchanged or become worthless—  
and the treasury contained insufficient state notes to meet 
the distribution obligation.^7
2®Todd, Confederate Finance, p. 77.
^^Mississippi House Journal (August, 1864), pp. 6-7.
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Reluctantly, Clark again assembled the legislature in 
special session to deal with these urgent financial matters. 
Having informed the legislators of Confederate action which 
necessitated a reviewing of Mississippi’s funding measures, 
the Governor recommended that the Confederate notes in the 
state treasury be funded and exchanged as provided for by the 
June revision in the funding law, since this would save the 
state a considerable loss in the transaction. Then, to meet 
the demands of immediate distribution to the needy, Clark 
suggested that the bonds thus obtained be held in the treasury 
until they could "be sold out or sold at par," and that a fur­
ther issue of state paper be authorized to meet the pressing 
requirements of the n e e d y . ^8
Responding positively to Clark’s suggestions, the legis­
lature immediately authorized the Governor to exchange the 
old issue Confederate notes and bonds for the new issue and
the four per cent b o n d s . ^9 Then, to provide for the immedi-
* '
ate needs of the destitute, the legislature authorized the 
issuance of $2,000,000 in ten-year, eight per cent state bonds, 
Realizing that the credit of the state and the Confederacy 
had fallen so low as to make the negotiation of such bonds 
difficult, the act allowed the Governor to dispose of these 
bonds for any price, so long as they sold for at least half 




posed of, then the Governor might cause to be issued a suffi­
cient amount of "Faith of the State" treasury notes under the 
same regulations as stipulated in the original act of January 
29, 1862, provided the total issue of such notes and eight 
per cent bonds not exceed $2,000,000.^® Ultimately, Clark 
did resort to the issuance of $180,000 in these notes.
In the midst of these fiscal difficulties, it became ap­
parent that irregularities might have occurred in the opera­
tion of the treasury department of Mississippi, since that 
official’s books had not been properly kept. Even as early 
as December, 1863, the legislature had been trying to obtain 
an accurate report of the treasurer’s records, but for a num­
ber of reasons, this effort had proven u n s u c c e s s f u l . T h e  
frequent moves by the state government from one town to an­
other resulted in confusion and misplacing of documents, and 
competent clerical help was difficult to obtain. In addition, 
the treasurer had failed, through no fault of his own, to 
obtain proper account books, and so no record existed as to 
the daily operations of the treasury d e p a r t m e n t D e t e r ­
mined to obtain a complete record of the operations of the 
treasury, the legislature in December, 1863, authorized the 
appointment of a committee of businessmen to investigate the
qo
financial activities of the treasurer’s office. In the
30jbid., pp. 21-24.
^^Mississippi House Journal, (November, 1863), 'pp. 217, 298. 
3%Ibid., p. 310.
^^Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), pp. 218-219.
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autumn, this committee reported a deficit in the treasurer’s 
r e c o r d s , 34 and despite his confidence in the honesty of M. D. 
Haynes, who held the office, Clark asked for the treasurer’s 
resignation. In early January, 1865, Haynes complied, and 
that same night, committed s u i c i d e . 35 Upon further investi­
gation, the shortage in Hayne’s books was determined to be 
a result of unreported warrants from before the war not being 
properly credited. Despite this discovery, the treasurer’s 
office remained under a cloud throughout the rest of the war
period.36
As the war’s end drew near. Confederate money became 
practically worthless, and the state treasurer’s office ap­
peared tarnished. Still, most Mississippians continued to 
prefer state issues to any other. ’’State money buys every
thing to be had in the County,” R. Barksdale assured Clark
37shortly after the latter assumed office. Often those who 
lost horses and provisions to impressment officers requested 
state issues specifically, when attempting to collect the 
money owed them. As had always been the case, the issue of 
state treasury notes based on cotton remained the most popular
of all types.33
34Mississippi House Journal (February, 1865), pp. 25-27.
35Executive Journal, (A), pp. 493-494.
36Mississippi House Journal (February, 1865), pp. 25-27.
37r . Barksdale to Clark, June 29, 1864, Ser. E., Vol.
65, MDAH.
38Jno. M. Greaves to Clark, July 24, 1864, Ibid.
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As the final drama of civil conflict played itself out 
in early 1865, the plight of Mississippi’s destitute families 
became even more severe. "Where the want is greatest your 
money is of least value, and those who have hoarded supplies 
will not sell," Clark informed the legislature which again 
assembled in special session in late February, 1865.39 Starva­
tion conditions prevailed in some parts of the state due to 
crop failures, and in others enemy incursions, coupled with 
consumption by the Confederate armies had "drained the country 
and raised prices to fabulous rates." To alleviate the re­
sulting situation, Clark urged the delegates to take strong 
measures to provide for that class who, he reminded the leg­
islators, "are your special care— the families of our soldiers."^0
Heeding Clark’s admonitions, the legislature indeed passed 
in the waning days of the Confederacy a massive and comprehen­
sive relief measure, aimed at overcoming the limitations of 
the previous piecemeal approach. Resorting to measures simi­
lar to those employed by Confederate authorities, the legis­
lature provided for the raising of a two per cent tax in kind 
on corn, wheat, and bacon to be collected on all but the 
smallest productions. In addition, a special tax equal to 
one hundred and fifty per cent of the regular state tax was 
assessed, the proceeds to constitute a "reserve fund" to be 
used for unspecified purposes. A two per cent gross profits
^^Mississippi House Journal (February, 1865), p. 6.
40ibid.
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tax was levied on iron foundries, machine shops, carpenter 
shops, and the like, which coupled with a similar amount as­
sessed "dealers and speculators in grain, provisions, tobacco, 
salt, horses, mules, hogs and cattle" was expected to raise 
considerable revenue. To provide for a deficit remaining in 
the 1864 indigent fund, county boards of police were required 
to meet as soon as possible for the purpose of levying a one 
half of one per cent tax in kind on all corn, wheat, and 
bacon grown and produced in 1864. In addition to these tax 
measures, another twenty-five per cent on the regular state 
assessment was to be raised and added to the "military relief 
fund." Finally, county commissioners responsible for the 
collection and distribution of aid to the indigent were re­
quired to draw up new rolls of the destitute, dividing them 
into three classes according to the extent of their needs. 
Having done this, the commissioners were instructed to impress 
in the communities the necessary articles from producers, and 
even require the latter to deliver the impressed goods to whom­
ever the commissioners designated. Failure of the producers 
to accept this responsibility would result in their being 
assessed twice the amount regularly required.
In passing such sweeping and extraordinary relief measures, 
the legislature appeared little concerned with consequences 
or complaints from those identified as "producers," on whom 
the great burden of the tax fell. This represented drastic 
measures, but then the times were also extraordinary and the
^Mississippi Laws (February, 1865), pp. 3-10.
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needs of the indigent urgent. Before much could be accomplish­
ed by way of instituting the harsh measures required by this 
act, the war ended, signaling a new era in the tax structure.
Meanwhile, with the cost of necessary goods outrageously 
high as early as 1862, it is little wonder that a large num­
ber of Mississippians, disloyal as well as loyal, began to 
actively seek opportunities to participate in illegal trade 
with the enemy, rather than depend upon state or Confederate 
officials to supply their basic needs. The loss of Memphis 
and New Orleans to the Federal armies in the spring of 1862 
added greatly to the temptation to trade cotton and other 
items for goods and food so desparately needed by many people 
in Mississippi.42 Dire necessity on the part of even loyal 
Confederates, coupled with eagerness by the disloyal, and 
opportunity, once the two main commercial cities of the Mis­
sissippi River lay within Federal lines, combined to foster 
a steady growth of illegal trade by Mississippians. G. R.
Fall reported to Pettus in July, 1862, that even "men of 
wealth and high position do not hesitate to declare that they 
will trade with the enemy."43
Initially, Mississippi and Confederate officials at­
tempted to put a stop to the illegal trade with the Fédérais. 
During the summer of 1862, Confederate Generals Earl Van Dorn
42schwab, A Financial and Industrial History, pp. 260- 
261; Officials Records, Ser. I, Vol. 52, pt. 2, pp. 387, 412, 
453, 460, 465.
43q  ^ ^ Fall to Pettus, July 11, Ser. E., Vol. 57, MDAH.
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and Daniel Ruggles issued strict orders against such illicit 
trade, and those guilty of countervening these orders were 
in some instances dealt with rather s e v e r e l y . 44 a detachment 
of Confederate soldiers, upon discovering a party of some 
twenty-five persons returning from the enemy’s lines with 
goods purchased from the Fédérais, summarily executed eight 
of the "criminals."45
Although General U. S. Grant, Federal commander in the 
Mississippi area, directed his officers to allow no goods 
through the lines when there was danger of their being car­
ried south, the order appears to have been generally ignor­
ed.46 Later in 1862, this policy underwent revision, and 
permits were even issued to persons engaged in illegal trad­
ing.4? In November, James L. Alcorn, a Mississippi militia 
general, wrote his wife that a number of planters in Cahoma 
County traded with the Fédérais quite openly, little fearful 
of Interference from either Federal or Confederate authorities.48 
Altogether, the trade benefitted both the Confederates, who 
seemed unable to furnish the necessaries of life to their 
people, and were unwilling to take the drastic steps neces-
44official Records, Ser. E., Vol. 15, pp. 805-806. 
45gettersworth, Confederate Mississippi, p. 174.
46corinth /Mississippi/ War Eagle, August 7, 1862.
4/official Records, Ser. 4, Vol. 3, p. 647; Bettersworth, 
Confederate Mississippi, pp. 174-175.
48percy L. Rainwater, (ed.), "Letters of James Lusk Al­
corn," Journal of Southern History, III (1937), p. 198.
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sary to effectively curtail spiraling inflation, and the Féd­
érais, who desparately needed cotton to supplement the dwindl­
ing supplies of Northern textile mills. As these causal 
factors increased in severity throughout the year, restrictions 
were gradually relaxed, although neither side overtly condoned 
the demoralizing traffic.
Then with the fall of Vicksburg And Jackson in the spring 
and summer of 1863, trading with the Fédérais increased great­
ly. With the loss of these cities, little remained worth 
keeping large concentrations of Confederate or state troops 
in the area. Consequently, after about the middle of 1863, 
Mississippi became to all intents and purposes neutralized.
Army details sent to arrest and return the thousands of de­
serters often joined them i n s t e a d . 49 Morale, already low, 
disintegrated in 1863 and for all practical pt .poses, after 
that date a great number of Mississippians simply rode out 
the war, trying only to survive and save whatever possible 
of their property.
Under these conditions, with Confederate money practic­
ally worthless and state currency also falling in value, legis­
lative enactments aimed at bolstering the financial structure 
had little effect. New issues might appear, and old ones be 
stamped "reissued," but unless merchants, speculators, planters
49pfficial Records, Ser. I, Vol. 32, pt. 2, pp. 622-623; 
Ibid., Vol. 49, pt. 1, pp. 944-945; William P. Chalmers, "My 
Journal," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, 
Centenary Series, V (1917), p. 314.
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and other "haves" accepted such money in exchange for neces­
sary goods, laws and new currency issues meant nothing. Since 
the fate of the Confederacy appeared sealed to many Missis­
sippians, and since money, regardless of whether printed by 
the state or Confederate authorities would therefore be worth­
less, such currency ceased to be more than a "convenient 
medium of exchange" by the time Clark took office. As a re­
sult, with the main objective of a majority of the state's 
citizens consisting of mere survival, a widespread return to 
the barter system became the only viable method of obtaining 
necessary goods such as food, salt, and medicines. Sometimes 
these articles might be procured— although at ruinous prices—  
from local suppliers, but increasingly in the final years of 
the war the only feasible source of such essential items be­
came the hated enemy. Consequently, by 1864, trade with the 
enemy— both official and private— represented the main concern 
of Mississippians generally.
The Mississippi legislature tacitly recognized the im­
possibility of obtaining some classes of necessary articles 
within the Confederacy when in December, 1863, it appropriated 
$100,000 for use of the governor in "securing a sufficient 
supply of cotton and wool cards for the families of soldiers 
and citizens" who so desperately needed these items. While 
the law authorized the governor to enter into contracts "with 
any responsible manufacturer of cotton or wool cards," no 
mention was made of where the cards should be obtained. One 
thing seemed certain; no sufficient supply existed in the
299
Confederacy. Also, the act authorized the governor to ap­
point an agent "for the purchase or exchange of cotton for 
cotton or wool cards" who would submit acceptable surlties, 
then be allowed to work out his own trades with whomever he 
could.50 Although the legislators certainly knew of the ex­
tensive trade being carried on between private citizens and 
Federal agents, no effort was made to attempt to prevent or 
even curtail such illegal trade.
Following this legislative directive, the already ex­
tensive trading with the enemy increased greatly throughout 
the remainder of the war period. Actually, the trade con­
sisted of two types: official intercourse between agents
appointed by the governor and Union contacts, and the surrepti­
tious exchanges between private individuals and persons with­
in Federal lines. Sometimes condemned and sometimes encour­
aged by Federal, Confederate, and state officials, the trade 
proved both beneficial and detrimental to all concerned. The 
North desperately needed cotton, while the South suffered 
severely from the want of certain necessary articles, parti­
cularly salt, medicines, and food. Nevertheless since the 
trade remained officially banned by both Federal and Confed­
erate law, to participate in it meant resorting to illegal 
acts, but even more important, the tremendous rewards possible 
induced a great number of people to abandon their principles 
in favor of gaining huge profits. Such extensive trade also
^^Mississippi House Journal (November, 1863), pp. 172, 
213, 265, 321, 325; Mississippi Laws (November, 1863), pp. 
144-145.
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made something of an ironic mockery of the fighting itself, 
and led to considerable demoralization on both sides.
Unlike Pettus who consistently decried the necessity of 
even the smallest commercial intercourse with the enemy, 
Governor Charles Clark recognized the need for such trade in 
order to provide essential items to Mississippians. Clark 
was no more a traitor or a Unionist than Pettus; yet he fully 
realized that by late 1863, when he assumed office, the people 
of his state were truly suffering from the want of some types 
of supplies. Since the Federally-held cities of Memphis and 
New Orleans offered the only source of such necessary articles, 
Clark determined that dire paucity dictated the opening of 
negotiations leading to direct trade with these cities, de­
spite his desire to continue prosecution of the war on other 
fronts. After all, if supplies could be obtained from the 
enemy with which to maintain the fight against that enemy, 
then Clark was perfectly willing to go to extreme lengths to 
secure those supplies.51
Among the necessary items needed by most Mississippians, 
reduced to a state of self-sufficiency by the war, were cot­
ton and wool cards, essential in processing those fibers into 
material for clothing. These particular articles became 
especially necessary once Federal invaders destroyed all of 
the important textile mills in the state in 1863. Immediately,
51charles Clark to W. E. Montgomery, February 12, 1864; 
Clark to J. W. C. Watson, December 21, 1864, Ser. E., Vol.
65, MDAH; Mississippi House Journal (February, 1865), pp. 43- 
45.
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speculators bought up the few pairs of cotton and wool cards 
available, and raised the price far beyond the reach of all 
the state’s poor. The latter class urgently appealed to 
Clark for help in obtaining cards, and when the legislature 
provided the money, the Governor set about attempting to 
devise a program whereby the cards might be s e c u r e d . 5%
Once the legislature cleared the way for Clark to com­
mence searching for an acceptable agent through which to ob­
tain the desired cotton and wool cards, the Governor’s of­
fice was deluged with offers from mercantile firms, railroad 
officials, army officers, Unionists, and other individuals. 
Before finally rewarding his main contract to two firms in 
May, 1864, Clark received some twenty-four written proposals 
from various individuals throughout the state. Some offered 
to furnish a specified amount of cards free to the state, 
providing Clark allowed them to ship a few hundred bales of 
cotton into the Federal lines. Others desired to furnish 
the cards for small amounts of money, again contingent upon 
obtaining trading privileges with the Fédérais. The large 
number of written proposals coming as they did from some of 
the largest planters in the state, railroad officials, and 
private citizens indicated that these representatives of all 
classes were quite willing to participate in trading with the 
enemy. Some alluded to their strong desire to serve their 
state and the Confederacy, but invariably each made his pro-
W. C. Watson to Clark, January 30, February 10,
1864; James Seddon to Clark, April 12, 1864, Ser. E ., Vol. 64, 
MDAH.
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posai only on the basis of being allowed to pass Confederate 
lines unmolested with large amounts of cotton.^3
Ultimately, Clark divided the main portion of the con­
tract to secure cotton and wool cards between two firms. The 
first contract went to Baskerville, Whitfield and Company on 
May 19. By the terms of this contract, the company agreed 
to furnish the state of Mississippi 30,000 pair of cotton 
and 5,000 pair of wool cards at a price not to exceed $1.50 
per pair. In addition, the company agreed to furnish "an 
invoice of medicines. Drugs, needles, and Shears, at cost 
prices in Federal funds where purchased" in whatever quanti­
ties state officials directed. No provision for these latter 
types of goods was included in the original appropriation, 
but Clark, acting on his own, decided to make an effort to 
obtain these much-needed articles if possible. In return for 
their furnishing to the state the cotton and wool cards and 
other items, Governor Clark promised to secure permission from 
the Confederate military authorities to allow the passage
33a wide range of proposals were forwarded to Clark when 
it became generally known he was considering letting contracts 
for the procurement of cards. Among the more articulate writ­
ten proposals were: Lt. Col. James B. McRae to Clark, Decem­
ber 9, 1863; B. B. Wilkinson to Clark, December 12, 1863; R.
Seal to Clark, December 14, 1863; John Condon to Clark, Decem­
ber 20, 1863; W. Goodman to Clark, January 6, 1864; Robert L. 
Fisk to Clark, January 12, 1864; A. M. Dowling to Clark, Janu­
ary 15, 1864; Charles T. Newman, Jr. to Clark, January 15,
1864; F . T. Pain to Clark, January 16, 1864; L. M.^Ash to Clark, 
January 21, 1864; F . T. Finley to Clark, February 1, 1864; J.
G. Bailie to Clark, February 22, 1864; J. M. Lyles to Clark, 
March 24, April 19, 1864; J. D. Burch and J. B. Milory to 
Clark, March 27, 1864; J. R. Christian to Clark, March 28,
1864; A. P. McMillan to Clark, April 26, 1864; John D. McLemore 
to Clark, June 8, 1864, Ser. E., Vol. 65, MDAH.
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through their lines of 1,500 bales of cotton.54
A week after signing the Baskerville, Whitfield contract, 
Clark concluded a similar agreement with Bowles, Edmondson 
and Company. The latter firm agreed to furnish 1,400 pair 
of cotton cards, and 2,000 pair of wool cards, in addition 
to "medicines. Drugs, needles, & Shears." Unlike the first 
contract which provided for the purchasing of $100,000 worth 
of cards and other supplies, the contract with Bowles, Ed­
mondson and Company called for the suppling of items totaling 
only $40,000.55
Each of the firms receiving huge contracts for furnish­
ing needed items from within Federal lines experienced con­
siderable difficulty in fulfilling the terms of their agree­
ments. Ordinary citizens, forbidden by Confederate law from 
trading with the enemy, rose in indignation upon observing 
the state carrying out its own plans for such trade. Seeing 
the large movements of cotton by the firms trading on behalf 
of the state government, "every man, woman, and child, whose 
inclinations prompted them, immediately set out with their 
wagons for Baton Rouge, Bayou Sara, and Fort Adams," with 
their own cotton, one Confederate army officer reported. In 
communicating this situation to Confederate General Stephen 
D. Lee, commander in Mississippi, Colonel J. S. Scott expressed 
the fear that the "loyal element of citizens, becoming exasper-
^4"The Baskerville-Whitfield Cotton Card Contract," May 
19, 1864, located in Ser. E., Vol. 65, MDAH.
55"The Bowles-Edmondson Cotton Card Contract," May 26, 
1864, in Ibid.
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ated at what they fancied to be a huge speculation of Govern­
ment agents held meetings and threatened to burn every bale 
of cotton in the d i s t r i c t . A p p a r e n t l y  the feeling existed 
that if the government could trade for items they wanted, 
then the citizens should be allowed to do likewise. Fearing 
the eruption of violence which threatened the communities 
where the state agents collected cotton for transport to Fed­
eral lines, Colonel Scott simply ordered all movement of 
cotton stopped "until the matter could be investigated."
In late June, Baskerville reported to Clark that he had 
three parties at work, each charged with fulfilling one half 
of the total contract. By thus dividing and multiplying his 
efforts, Baskerville informed the Governor, he fully expected 
success in at least one instance. He assured Clark that he 
was "receiving the hearty cooperation of the military, and 
that he expected to be in a position to furnish some cotton 
and wool cards soon.5?
For their part, Bowles, Edmondson and Company followed 
the same path as Baskerville in attempting to circumvent Con­
federate authorities who at first gave and then rescinded 
permission for the contemplated exchanges. By August, only 
a small portion of their contract had been fulfilled, al­
though Bowles informed the Governor he expected more success 
in the near future.
560fficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 39, pp. 656, 725-726.
57c. Baskerville to Clark, June 23, 1864, Ser. E., Vol. 
65, MDAH.
58gowles, Edmondson & Co. to Clark, June, 1864, Ibid.
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Clark meanwhile, disappointed in the performance of the 
two main contractors to meet the terras of their agreement, 
and aware of the urgency of obtaining some necessary articles, 
entered into another contract, this with S. W. Lyon. Lyon 
agreed to furnish the state seven hundred pair of cotton cards 
at cost price, with the understanding that he be permitted 
to ship thirty bales of cotton through Confederate lines. Lyon 
also agreed to obtain a portion of his contract in medicines 
if possible.
When the legislature met in August, 1864, Clark regret­
fully informed them that all the contractors had failed to 
secure a significant portion of the desired articles. Blaming 
causes "beyond the control of the contractors," the Governor 
expressed the hope that they would shortly be able to fulfill 
completely the terms of their c o n t r a c t s . D u e  largely to 
Confederate recalcitrance, this hope proved groundless, and 
in April, 1865, a committee of citizens met to determine an 
equitable settlement of the c o n t r a c t s . A negligible amount 
of cards and medicines had been obtained, thus Clark’s opti­
mistic desire to both take advantage of and make war on the 
enemy simultaneously ended in f a i l u r e . ^2
59"S. W. Lyon's Cotton Card Contract," June 16, 1864, 
in Ibid.
^^Mississippi House Journal (August, 1864), p. 11.
GlAbraham Murdock to Clark, April 10, 1865, Ser. E., Vol. 
68, MDAH.
G^Clark to Major L. Mims, December 20, 1864; Major L.
Mims to Clark, December 20, 1864, Ser. E., Vol. 66; R. W. 
Edmondson to Clark, April 21, 1865, Ser. E., Vol. 68, MDAH.
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Concurrent with his efforts to procure cotton and wool 
cards and other specific supplies authorized by legislative 
enactment, Clark determined to utilize the method of illegal 
trade with respect to other necessities so scarce in Missis­
sippi. On May 12, 1864, he notified General Leonidis Polk 
of his intention to send cotton from Mississippi into the 
enemy lines, there to be exchanged for clothing, medicines, 
and "other supplies" necessary for the soldiers and their 
destitute families. He requested that Polk allow the passage 
of such cotton through his lines without molestation and in 
turn, Clark assured the Commander, he would exert himself to 
prevent any such cotton from falling into the hands of any- 
one "owing allegiance to the United States."
Once Clark’s intention to enter into trading with the 
enemy in areas other than the cotton and wool cards became 
known, numerous persons, from planters and railroad officials 
to ordinary citizens quickly asked for permission to act as 
his agent, or to be given permission to operate on their own.^^ 
Clark discouraged these types of activities, feeling that they 
could get quickly out of control, and might open the way to 
massive commercial intercourse with the enemy, which he still 
hoped to prevent. In some instances, however, the Governor
63ciark to General L. Polk, May 12, 1864, Ser. E., Vol. 
65, MDAH.
64g. B. Hartley to Clark, July 13, 1864; T. L. Martin 
to Clark, July 15, 1864; M. D. Shelby to Clark, September 28, 
1864; J. M. Haynes and Company to Clark, September 29, 1864, 
Ser. E., Vol. 66, MDAH.
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not only gave his approval to trading operations, but himself 
paved the way for such activities by interceding with local 
Confederate commanders. Clark particularly approved trade 
with the Fédérais in order to obtain supplies for the blind 
and insane institutes in the state.@5
Ultimately, Clark's allowing certain perople to enter 
trading relations with Union forces on behalf of the state 
became interpreted by a large number of Mississippians as 
tacit permission for them to act likewise. This led to the 
development of a sort of public psychology which at once 
bothered and benefited the participants. Many people who 
themselves traded with the Fédérais, or desired Clark's per­
mission for such trading, did not see this activity as in any 
way inconsistent with their loyalty as Southerners. This in­
congruous attitude surfaced in correspondence with Clark in 
which those people who traded with the enemy were scorned and 
castigated, then later in the same letter permission was 
sought by the writer for the same purpose. A. Q. Withers 
wrote bitterly to Clark in October, 1864, recounting how a 
Federal officer, "vile devil, came to my Home and burnt up 
my House with every article in it," then ran off all his 
slaves. Having related other depredations committed by Union 
soldiers, Withers abruptly ended his denunciatory tirade and 
asked Clark to grant him authority to "control the cotton 
trade to Memphis," and even concluded his remarkable communi-
W. Robinson to Clark, June 18, 1864; and Clark to 
Dr. Robert Kells, June 20, 1864; Ibid.
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cation with the statement that the Federal "deamon devils 
may take from us earthly goods, but principles n e v e r . " 6 6  
Others appeared to feel at one and the same time very guilty 
about trafficking with the Fédérais, but quite anxious to 
continue. Sometimes, in a vein reminiscent of the hostile 
feeling often manifested toward slave traders prior to the 
war, those who benefited from the trade condemned those who 
carried on the actual exchange. Amanda Worthington, who 
left a diary replete with personal observations concerning 
illegal trade, commented in January, 1865, that a Mr. Lewis, 
who operated a trading boat upon the lake near her home, 
furnished her with a "large bill of goods" in exchange for 
cotton. Voicing no antipathy to accept his services, she 
nevertheless castigated Lewis as one who pretended to be "a 
strong Southern sympathizer," but was in fact "an outrageous 
yankee cheat & swindler."6? This in some way appeared to 
absolve her from any guilt over personal wrongdoing, for she 
had not actually traded with the hated enemy herself.
Official Confederate attitude toward trading with the 
enemy vacillated markedly throughout the final year of the 
war. Although a law forbidding such intercourse remained on 
the statute books, enforcement appeared more a matter for 
local Confederate commanders to decide. This lattitude re­
sulted in a situation of uncertainty, since those who wished
66a , Q. Withers to Clark, October 28, 1864, Ibid.
67Amanda Worthington, "Diary of Willoughby Plantation, 
Washington County, Mississippi, January 1, 1862-October 21, 
1865," Worthington Family Papers, MDAH, entry for January 19, 
1865.
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to participate in the trade, either on behalf of the state 
or on their own account, never could predict from one day to 
another the extent to which such trading would be counten­
anced. Governor Clark attempted repeatedly in 1864 to obtain 
some solid commitment from area Confederate officers in re­
lation to developing a consistent exchange p o l i c y . H e  
never achieved any degree of success. ' Having acted as a 
liason between the Governor and Confederate officials in 
Richmond for some time, General Richard Taylor in January,
1865, informed Clark that though he represented to the Secre­
tary of War the "necessities and Sufferings of the people of 
those Sections of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana," his 
efforts to "induce the department to authorize the exchange 
of limited quantities of private or state Cotton for neces­
sary family supplies" had "proven fruitless." Taylor, appar­
ently willing to evade the spirit if not the letter of the 
department’s refusal, told Clark that General Beauregard had 
informed him to "in the absence of any instructions to him 
from the Department forbidding it, grant the necessary authori­
zations for such exchanges upon the applications of the Gov­
ernors of the respective states."®®
Federal attitude toward the illicit trade appeared as 
divided as that of the Confederate officials. Some Federal 
officers did everything in their power to prevent men in
®®Clark to J. W. C. Watson, December 21, 1863, Ser. E., 
Vol. 65; James Seddon to Clark, April 12, 1864, Ibid., Vol. 
64, MDAH.
®®General R. Taylor to Clark, January 21, 1865, Ser. E .,
Vol. 68, MDAH.
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their armies from trading with the Southerners outside Union 
lines. General N. J. T. Dana, sent in by the Federal War 
Department to bring some order to the disintegrating Union 
commands in the Memphis area, expressed shock at the extent 
of illicit traffic in the region around Vicksburg. Prior to 
his arrival there, he asserted, "the district had been almost 
completely swayed by two external powers, to wit, money in 
the possession of cotton speculators and political adventure- 
ers, and beauty in possession of rebel females, once lovely 
and with delicate sensibilities, now cunning, traitorous, 
and dangerous." Many good officers had "been debauched by 
one or both of these," Dana reluctantly reported, and warned 
the War Department to expect "howling" against him by offi­
cers who resented his putting a stop to their illegal t r a d e .
Other high Union commanders in the Mississippi area, 
notably General William T. Sherman, took a very different 
view from Dana’s in the matter of trading with the Confeder­
ates. From his earliest entrance into the deep Southern 
theatre of war, Sherman urged a policy of using the benefits 
of trade to create disaffection and disloyalty among South­
erners. Writing from Vicksburg in early March, 1864, Sherman 
instructed General James B. McPherson to encourage "by all 
means the packet and through trade on the river," as such 
trade would "keep the people dependent on the luxuries and 
conveniences of life, and to that extent shake their love for
70Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 52, pt. 1, pp. 652-654.
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the impoverished rebel concern."71 In a later report to 
Salmon P. Chase, Sherman expressed his willingness "to use 
commerce as a means of war to corrupt and demoralize the 
enemy." He did insist, though, that none of his officers 
participate in any way in the "contaminating trade," and 
suggested instead that the treasury agents should manage the
i l l e g a l  c o m m e r c e . 7 2
While Confederate, Federal, and state officials bickered 
and equivocated over the matter of trade among themselves, 
a great number of Mississippians turned to exchange with the 
enemy as the only means of supplying items necessary for 
their survival and comfort. While such illegal trade had, 
prior to 1864, been confined largely, although of course not 
altogether, to outright Unionists or those with weak ties to 
the Confederacy, prolonged scarcity and inability of state 
and Confederate officials to supply these needs led to wide­
spread trading on the part of otherwise loyal Confederates 
in Mississippi. For some, like Mrs. C. A. McWillie, trading 
with the enemy for even so small an article as a hat for her 
son necessitated, as she expressed it, "a compromise with my 
tightly-laced c o n s c i e n c e ."73 For others, the mere existence 
of ample opportunity provided sufficient excuse to commence 
grandiose operations. J. A. Maury, for example, although de-
7 1 j b i d . , Vol. 32, pt. 3, pp. 35-36.
72i b i d p. 55.
73Mrs. C . A. McWillie to Son, September 11, 1864, 
McWillie-Compton Papers, MDAH.
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tained by Confederate authorities for his illegal activities, 
schemed to expand his operations as soon as he obtained his 
freedom. In July, 1864, he informed his partner that "key 
parties have all the permits for 20,000 bales / o f  cotto^Z & 
we need not have to give | to the Government." He urged 
C. D, Hamilton to "go to Jackson and make all the ai/agements 
secure" for within ten days he would "be ready to commence 
operations.
Involved in all the trading with the Fédérais was cot­
ton— at once the brightest hope and deepest despair of the 
Confederacy. This article represented the one item Missis­
sippians possessed, and the very staple most desired by 
Federal officers and men. General Polk described the baneful 
effect of the presence of cotton in his department, which in­
cluded Mississippi, in a dispatch to President Davis in late 
April. According to Polk, the "condition of affairs along 
the western front . . . originating in the intercourse of 
our people with the enemy, and developed by illicit trade, 
exhibiting itself in absenteeism, murder, and robbery" was 
directly induced by "cotton in the hands of citizens along 
the b o r d e r . "75 John C .  Kay, an informant of Polk’s in Mis­
sissippi, related to the General that "Everybody in this 
section sells cotton. I could not to-day name anyone inno­
cent of trading with the enemy's flag, yet a vast amount of
74j. A. Maury to C. D. Hamilton, July, 1864, C. D. Ham­
ilton Papers, Ibid.
75official Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 32, pt. 3, pp. 833-843,
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this trade is beneficial to the Confederacy.” Very few people 
who traded with the enemy, Kay suggested, wanted the green­
backs for their own sake, but rather because Confederate 
notes would not "buy a pound of salt or a pair of shoes.
In some areas, toward the middle of 1864, greenbacks repre­
sented the only currency acceptable, even for Confederate army 
stores. Eventually, by the last months of the war. Confeder­
ate notes passed in Mississippi only at a discount of ninety 
per cent, while greenbacks constantly increased in value.??
With the failure of formal monetary enactments to pro­
vide a stable, useable currency to Mississippians, and equally 
unproductive efforts of state and Confederate authorities to 
furnish basic necessities to the state’s people, the citizenry 
turned in vast numbers to the enemy as a source of supply. 
Confederate and state officers mounted weak demonstrations 
aimed at curbing the trade, but by 1864, starving Mississip­
pians, disillusioned by the inability of Southern governments 
to furnish needed supplies, and feeling that their attempt 
to gain political independence tottered on the verge of utter 
failure, determined to attend first to the needs of themselves 
and their families. Some continued to lend support to the
76 Ibid., Vol. 52, pt. 2, p. 600.
7?Henry C. Minor to Wm. J. Minor, March 1, 1864, William 
J. Minor Family Papers, Louisiana State University, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana; De Bow's Review, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
(March, 1866), pp. 312-313; Official Records, Ser. 1, Vol.
39, p. 684.
780fficial Records, Ser. 1, Vol. 32, pt. 3, pp. 625-627;
Ibid., Vol. 39, pp. 196-197, 625-627, 684, 827-828.
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Confederate cause, but many more decided their only hope for 
survival lay in taking measures to supply their own needs, 
regardless of the harmful effect this might have on Confeder­
ate chances of success. There occurred also a change in at­
titude toward Unionism in the state. By late in the war 
period, so many former staunch supporters of the Confederates 
had turned away from them and embraced Unionism, or at least 
demonstrated an inclination toward accepting whatever peace 
the North was willing to grant, that those who had maintained 
a Unionist position throughout the war were looked to for 
leadership. The former spirit of volunteering was completely 
dead, replaced with a pervasive feeling that the once proud 
and victorious Confederate army had become in effect little 
more than a police force, whose main objective in Mississippi 
appeared to consist of harassing, raiding, and generally dis­
rupting the ordinary activities of life. Even Confederate 
officers in the area acknowledged this to be the case. Gen­
eral Stephen D. Lee expressed this feeling when he stated in 
April, 1864 that in his opinion, the "principal and, in fact, 
nearly the only duties" of his men consisted of "breaking 
up the illegal trade between citizens and the enemy.
By the end of the war, a great number of Mississippians 
had abandoned the Confederates. For those Unionist beliefs 
had guided their action throughout the war, the imminent 
downfall of the Confederacy was welcomed as a return to
79lbid., Vol. 32, pt. 3, p. 750.
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normalcy, but for most Mississippians, desertion of the Con­
federate cause came only with reluctance. Then with the 
early scarcity of a wide range of necessary consumer supplies 
came the development of inflation and speculation. Money 
became scarce, then altogether too plentiful. Never did 
either Confederate or state financial officers plan or exe­
cute an effective, comprehensive monetary policy. Mississippi 
officials did issue money based on cotton, which circulated 
at a much higher rate than did any of the dozens of Confeder­
ate issues, but Mississippi's money, issued by a government 
founded under the protection of the Confederacy and inextric­
ably bound with it, could only reflect the fortunes of the 
Confederacy. If the latter failed, the former must of ne­
cessity become worthless as well. As the war advanced, and 
the probability of a Federal victory became more evident. 
Confederate money as well as Mississippi money fell drastic­
ally in value, while Federal greenbacks rose accordingly.
Since their only possession of value was cotton, Mississip­
pians traded this cotton to the Fédérais in exchange for 
necessary articles unobtainable in the Confederacy. This 
vicious circle continued to operate until 1865; Mississippi's 
financial system had gone from nonexistent to acceptible and 
back to nothing— leaving the citizens essentially where they 
found themselves in 1861. That position involved relying 
mostly on barter and outside currencies to obtain necessary 
articles. Like the life of the Confederacy itself. Missis­
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sippi financial endeavors during the Civil War rose on a 
tide of optimism, and died on a note of despair. Major A. L. 
Jonas, a Mississippi veteran of the Civil War, scribbled a 
poignant epitaph to wartime finance on the unprinted back of 
a Confederate note. His words reflect the hopes, dreams, 
and ultimate despair of Mississippians who lived and died in 
fighting for the Confederacy:
THE CONFEDERATE NOTE
Representing nothing on God’s earth how,
And naught in the waters below it,
As the pledge of a nation that passed away.
Keep it, dear friend, and show it.
Show it to those who will lend an ear 
To the tale this paper will tell,
Of liberty born of a patriot’s dream,
Of a storm-cradled nation that fell.
Too poor to possess the precious ores.
And too much of a stranger to borrow,
We issue to-day our promise to pay 
And hope to redeem on the morrow.
The days rolled on and the weeks became years.
But our coffers were empty still.
Coin was so scarce the Treasury quaked 
If a dollar should drop in the till.
But the faith that was in us was strong indeed. 
Though our poverty well we discerned.
And this little note represented the pay 
That our suffering veterans earned.
They knew it had hardly a value in gold.
Yet as gold our soldiers received it;
It gazed in our eyes with a promise to pay 
And every true soldier believed it.
But our boys thought little of price or pay.
Or of bills that were over-due.
We knew if it bought our bread to-day,
’Twas the best our poor country could do.
Keep it. It tells all our history over.
From the birth of the dream to its last;
Modest and born of the Angel Hope,




Providing a stable economic and financial structure for 
Mississippians proved both the most persistent and difficult 
task wartime state officials faced. All major military and 
diplomatic decisions emanated from Richmond, although policy 
in those areas greatly effected affairs in Mississippi. Con­
sequently, the one domain over which state authorities ex­
ercized greatest latitude consisted of economically-oriented 
problems. At times during the conflict, the governors and 
other state officials did concern themselves deeply in mat­
ters relating to defense and militia organization, but cer­
tainly after the fall of Vicksburg and Jackson in 1863, at­
tention mainly revolved around providing economic relief to 
the thousands of destitute who became virtual wards of the 
state. The methods and procedures utilized in this effort, 
as well as the general effectiveness of such programs, de­
termined the degree, to which Mississippi’s wartime financial 
schemes succeeded.
Due to the fiscal irresponsibility in the state’s early 
history, and particularly to the repudiation of most of its 
outstanding public debt in 1842, Mississippi entered the war 
period with no financial system, a negligible debt, and no
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credit. This severely limited possible avenues of financial 
assistance which the state could pursue. Whereas state se­
curities had traditionally been exceptionally lucrative ones 
for both foreign and domestic investors, Mississippi's re- 
pudiationist activity negated any possibility of marketing 
wartime state bonds overseas. This hurt not only Mississippi 
but Southern hopes for extensive foreign consumption of bond 
issues as well. Northern agents, particularly Robert J. 
Walker, a former United States Senator from Mississippi, 
worked diligently to convince European investors that Jeffer­
son Davis himself had led the repudiationist movement in Mis­
sissippi. Since a portion of the Planter’s and Union Bank 
bonds were purchased by English financiers, such propaganda 
as that espoused by Walker fell on receptive ears.
Since securing foreign assistance in absorbing financial 
wartime burdens proved impossible, Mississippi ultimately 
came to depend on two sources for money; Confederate and 
state-authorized issues. Insofar as money issued by the Con­
federate Government was concerned, it became more a liability 
than an asset. From the very beginning, Confederate treasury 
officials pursued a course which, based as it was on the most 
ill-conceived economic foundations, failed dismally in its 
aim of providing a stable financial structure for the South­
ern states.
Mississippi, usually considered one of the most rabid 
states in the Confederacy, actually remained a viable member 
of that union only by the most tenuous threads. Possessing
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an extremely negative fiscal history, beset by scarcity of 
necessities throughout the war, plagued by persistent infla­
tion and torn apart by internal strife, Mississippi faced 
incredible difficulty in maintaining the mere semblance of 
political and economic integrity. This resulted from a num­
ber of factors, some of which the state government could have 
handled, and others over which state officials exercized no 
jurisdiction.
Even while secessionist sentiment gained favor among 
most Mississippians in 1860, a significant portion of the 
state’s citizenry decided, for a number of reasons, to re­
main faithful to the ideals of the Federal Union. These 
people, representing all social classes in the state, created 
a double problem for Mississippi Confederates. On the one 
hand they withheld all support from the Confederacy, and on 
the other many lent active assistance to the Federal mili­
tary operating in the area. Adding strength to those who 
from the beginning supported Unionism were thousands more 
who joined their ranks as dissatisfaction with Confederate 
policies increased during the latter part of the war.
Thus the activities of Unionists, coupled with wide­
spread speculation, unchecked inflation, and the inability 
of state or Confederate authorities to furnish basic neces­
sities led to a general breakdown of morale within the state. 
This disintegration meant that state officials, after the 
initial rush of excitement following secession in 1861 sub­
sided, never could count on the loyalty of even nearly all .
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Mississippians. Leaving aside those Mississippians of pro- 
Northern Unionist sentiments, a great portion of the state's 
people simply lacked strong dedication to the Confederate 
cause. Consequently, uncounted thousands yielded little or 
no support to the Confederacy. In many cases, dedication 
to amassing wealth, either through illegal trade with the 
enemy, participation in merchandise speculation, or even 
through very proper Confederate contracts, superceded any 
pervasive dedication to any of the plethora of reasons which 
supposedly precipitated the conflict. Even in the bitter 
diatribes, so often utilized by the ftreating state leader­
ship, such issues as the maintenance of slavery and the pre­
servation of state rights rarely surfaced, and then only in 
a peripheral manner. Rather, continued resistance was fre­
quently urged simply to "repel the enemy," or to "punish the 
invaders of our beloved Southland." This became especially 
true once Clark and the more conservative leadership took 
over the direction of state affairs in 1863. This lack of 
any real dedication to a firm ideology at least in part, 
then, explains the readiness with which men deserted the 
army and refused service— or even loyalty— to the Confeder­
acy.
Another factor which continually caused problems for 
Mississippi officials during the war period involved decen­
tralization of powers and functions, both on the Confederate- 
state, and state-local levels. This caused extreme conster­
nation particularly in the areas of finance and general
321
economic policies. Rarely did Confederate treasury officials 
consult state authorities before implementing major financial 
programs. This lack of communication prevented any coordin­
ate efforts, and since the Confederacy did not consult state 
desires in the matter of finance, the resulting programs 
almost never coincided with state needs. This led to wide­
spread rejection of Confederate programs, which in turn as­
sured the failure of such programs. When such failure occur­
red, the money issued by Richmond authorities immediately 
sank in value, which then necessitated more issues or addi­
tional taxes— both of which policies further alienated Mis­
sissippians from the Confederate Government.
In the area of general economic policies, decentraliza­
tion and paucity of meaningful exchanges of ideas between 
the Confederate and Mississippi Governments resulted in the 
development of a dominant economic policy by the general 
government which proved anathema to most Mississippians. This 
involved the use and disposition of Southern cotton. Having 
once determined to use the South's cotton as the main economic 
weapon in carrying forward international diplomatic policies. 
Confederate officials stuck to what early proved an inaccur­
ate assessment of the effectiveness of such a policy. This 
at once cut off the necessary foreign markets and created a 
tremendous problem of storage, protection, and domestic 
utilization of Mississippi’s economic mainstay. Then, rather 
than using the South's huge cotton stores as the basis of a 
viable credit-financial system, as so many Mississippians
322
urged, Confederate officials resorted instead to the print­
ing-press as a cure-all for fiscal chaos. Then when Confed­
erate authorities decided to burn mass amounts of cotton, 
both to prevent it from being captured by Federal forces and 
as a shock treatment calculated to jog recalcitrant Europeans 
into intervention, Mississippi cotton producers again ob­
jected strenuously. As cotton represented the only Mississippi 
product of significant value, burning precluded its future 
use in reestablishing the state's economy in the post-war era.
Lack of strong or consistent central control by the 
Richmond Government led to abuses in other areas affecting 
Mississippi as well. A lax chain of command within the mili­
tary, for example, left the implementation of important poli­
cies relating to impressment, conscription, and even protec­
tion within the purview of local commanders. This sometimes 
led to abuses by these officers which proved a recurring 
problem for Mississippi officials.
Problems relating to decentralization not only plagued 
Confederate-Mississippi relations, but also created similar 
situations within the state itself. Close cooperation never 
existed between state and local authorities, which resulted 
in constant misunderstandings regarding taxes and finance.
This problem became compounded upon disruptions of existing 
transportation and communication by Federal raids. Supplies 
of cattle, grain, and other necessary items, relatively 
plentiful in some areas of the state, could not be made 
readily available in other regions due to these disruptions.
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Lack of adequate communication and transportation within 
the Confederacy forced a certain amount of decentralization 
of governmental powers and functions, but also significant in 
preventing the development of a viable, unified policy-making 
unit were pervasive attitudes of independence harbored by 
most Mississippians. After all, by 1860, remaining constantly 
on the alert for governmental inroads into what were deemed 
individual perogatives had become a way of life for most 
Southerners. This propensity to fiercely guard the right to 
independent action was especially strong among Mississippi’s 
scattered, traditionally self-sufficient population. Thus, 
instead of supporting Confederate policies which might be 
beneficial to many Southerners, although not necessarily to 
Mississippians, citizens of that state early developed an 
antagonistic attitude toward a number of Confederate programs. 
Then abuses concerning conscription and impressment occurred, 
as was inevitable considering the overall Southern situation, 
and many Mississippians disavowed any support for all Confed­
erate programs. This traditional independent attitude also 
became evident with regard to Unionism. With the growing 
antagonism toward central authority which characterized the 
period from 1820 to 1860, came the development of a habit of 
making serious political decisions with little regard for the 
rights and needs of others. Thus when secession became a 
reality, Mississippians, supposed by most Northerners to be 
homogeneous in their anti-Northern attitude, demonstrated 
their independent spirit by basing their decision of whether
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to support the Confederacy strictly on personal grounds.
Later when Confederate policy— for instance that relating 
to the disposition of cotton— proved unpopular among many 
planters, some refused further support for other Confederate 
programs.
The dichotomous needs and asperations of the various 
social classes in Mississippi did not meld into a singleness 
of purpose, as action surrounding the occurance of secession 
led the ftreating state leadership to hope. Rather, class 
lines sharpened as a result of the exigencies of war. When 
Confederate policy dictated that merchants obtain their goods 
from within the seceded South, this class of citizens both 
found necessary items high in price, and practically unavail­
able at any price. Private citizens who could, bought their 
goods from outside the Confederacy, thereby placing additional 
burdens on merchants. Then when both the merchant class and 
the consumers began to hoard specie as well as "necessities,” 
the price went even higher, leading to spiraling inflation. 
Each class blamed the other for precipitating this situation. 
Meanwhile, the poor castigated the wealthy planters for the 
latter's failure to sell his produce at cheap prices, and 
often retaliated by pillaging and stealing. The planters on 
the other hand, blamed the Confederate and state Governments 
for failure to either purchase their cotton or allow the 
planters themselves to dispose of it through the blockade.
Then with the passage of conscript laws which allowed some 
wealthy farmers to either pay a substitute to serve in their
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stead in the army, or remain on the plantation to guard the 
slaves, the non-slaveholding classes became more restive. 
Aggravated over what many came to view as the "rich man's 
war and the poor man's fight," these lower class representa­
tives deserted in droves. Failure of the state government 
to adequately provide for their families caught in the pinch 
of inflated prices and paucity of supplies drove many more 
of Mississippi’s poorer citizens to desert the Confederates 
and become criminals in their own land. The state's cotton 
money scheme, which appeared to benefit the wealthy also 
created dissatisfaction among the state's poor.
Viewed as a whole, Mississippi's financial endeavours 
during tae war period must be seen as a limited success. 
Given the state's lack of credit, paucity of sources of 
domestic wealth, and the early invasion of the enemy, Mis­
sissippi officials overcame severe obstacles to create and 
maintain a financial structure which consistently remained 
more acceptable than that of the Confederate Government. 
Without doubt a great deal more could have been done by 
state officials to contain and control inflation, yet scarc­
ity— which state officials could do little about— dictated 
that prices would remain excessively high. To circumvent 
these shortages, Mississippi leaders attempted to develop 
domestic sources for necessary supplies, but often, as in 
the case of salt, nature precluded the success of their ef­
forts. In numerous other instances. Federal military pre­
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sence, or unfavorable Confederate policies forced the aban­
donment of the state efforts to provide for its people. The 
subsequent breakdown of morale, even among those deeply com­
mitted to the Confederate effort to gain political independ­
ence, created a pervasive air of defeatism which infected 
all Mississippians. Ultimately, it came down to a question 
of mere survival and at that point even the governor advo­
cated a program designed to accomplish just that. Thus in 
some ways, the final agonizing years of the war proved more 
satisfying than the first. At least some Mississippians 
faced stark reality, and acted upon the assumption that the 
state’s first responsibility was to people— regardless of 
the demands of a traditional ideal.
APPENDIX
Reproduced here are some of the documents relating to 
the use made of cotton by Mississippi during the Civil War 
period. Also, one note representing each of the major state 
issues of money is reproduced. All these notes and docu­
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When the price of cotton rose in the fall of 1862, many 
Mississippi cotton producers, who had loaned part or all of 
their 1861 cotton crop to the state in exchange for "cotton 
money," desired to redeem their pledged cotton. Having obtain­
ed a receipt such as the one pictured above, the farmer was 
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the State of Mississippi, entitled, “ An Act authorizing the Issuance of Treasury Notes as
advances upon Cotton, approved December the l9th, 18G1, on__
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The above named (\>*.A^this day personally appeared before me. '
and made oath that the matters stated in the foregoing P etition, are true in substance and 
fact.
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^   Probate Judge. I
In order to obtain cotton notes, authorized by the act of Decem­
ber 19, 1861, this or a similar bond was executed by Mississippi 
cotton producers.
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the act of January 26, 1861
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